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Digital information and communication technologies promise to modernise 
health care and reduce costs. Nonetheless, it has proved difficult to embed 
these technologies in everyday use. There is now an impressive body of 
international research which shows that the everyday processes of health 
care work and organization are central here. Digital technologies seek to 
change working practices and workforce configuration and – at the same 
time - they require concerted action by the health care workforce to bring 
them into use. However, whilst research has concentrated on how health 
care work and organization shape the outcomes of particular technological 
interventions, it has rarely explored the implications of these findings for 
workforce management and planning. This is in part because of a focus on 
understanding why an intervention does (or, often, does not) become 
embedded in practice; and in part because the case-study focus of previous 
research has not endeavoured to make wider, more systematic claims to 
inform workforce planning and policy.  
Aims 
This project aims to inform workforce planning and policy by undertaking a 
detailed comparative analysis of the workforce implications of a particular 
technology, a computer decision support system (CDSS). 
Our objectives were to: 
1) understand the impact of the technology on everyday work and service 
delivery; 
2) identify education and training needs for staff engaging with the 
technology; 
3) examine the implications of the CDSS for workforce reconfiguration and 
management planning. 
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Methods 
To enable systematic cross-case analysis we used Normalization Process 
Theory (NPT) which offers a robust framework to analyse how technological 
interventions are used in different settings.  
Our study combined ethnographic and survey methods to conduct three 
case studies of a CDSS in use.  
The ethnography used non-participant observation, interviews and 
documentary research. These data comprise nearly 500 hours of 
observation conducted between 2008-2010; and 61 interviews with call-
handlers, clinicians, organizational managers and stakeholders including 
policy-makers, commissioners and system developers. We collected 
documents describing the CDSS design, development and evaluation, 
minutes, training materials and publicly available policy documents, reports 
and media releases.   
A survey of call handlers was conducted to record demographic information 
and to capture skills, experience and training and assess trust in the CDSS 
and the wider organization. A total of 166 questionnaires were distributed, 
with an email reminder after 3 weeks, and 103 (62%) questionnaires were 
returned completed. 
Ethnographic data were coded independently, analysed jointly in data clinics 
and imported into Atlas.Ti. We examined data within each setting and then 
across settings structured around our research questions and Normalization 
Process Theory. We used a mixture of analytical approaches including 
thematic analysis and matrix/charting techniques to facilitate comparison.  
Survey data were double entered in MS Excel, checked and corrected. The 
data were exported to PASW Statistics and descriptive statistics calculated. 
Our methods were integrated developmentally: the ethnography informed 
the survey design which, in turn, supplemented the observation and 
interviews. We also combined data across methods to explore convergence 
and contradiction.  
Results 
We studied a CDSS designed to enable prioritization and management of 
telephone calls to emergency or urgent care services. It is almost 
exclusively used by clerical staff in our settings (although it can also be 
used by clinical staff).  
Our settings were:  
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 An established emergency call-handling service provided by an 
Ambulance Trust (referred to as 999).  
 A new single point of access call-handling service for urgent and 
unscheduled care provided by the same Ambulance Trust (referred to 
as SPA)  
 An established out-of-hours call-handling service and face-to-face 
patient prioritization at an Urgent Care Centre, run by a GP out-of-
hours service (referred to as OOH) 
This same technology is used distinctively in each setting reflecting 
important differences between urgent and emergency care and the context 
of the work. There are differences in workforce characteristics (e.g. age, 
qualifications), roles and organizational hierarchies in the three settings. 
While there is a common training programme, training practice varies 
across the three settings.  
We analysed our data using the four domains of NPT (coherence, cognitive 
participation, collective action and reflexive monitoring) and this also 
structures our longer report. The domain of coherence encompasses the 
ways in which an intervention is understood as meaningful, achievable and 
desirable and cognitive participation considers if and how the actors 
necessary to deliver the intervention are enrolled into action. These 
processes of sense-making and engaging a range of actors are essential to 
the third domain, collective action which focuses on the work that people 
do to bring an intervention or technology into use. The final domain of 
reflexive monitoring looks at the processes of appraisal and adjustment 
that are necessary to keep an intervention in place.  
Coherence: was achieved around the CDSS even though local contexts 
varied considerably. Across all three sites, there was agreement that the 
CDSS was suitable for the (varied) tasks and that appropriate resources 
were in place to enable effective implementation, although these varied 
between settings. There were differences between settings where the CDSS 
replaced an established system with existing staff and where the service 
and/or the staff were new. Knowledge, experience and work identities built 
through doing call-handling work influenced the coherence of the CDSS for 
staff in different settings. Coherence was underpinned by wider 
understandings and discourses, notably about i) rationing ii) modifying 
caller/patient behaviour and iii) the legitimacy of evidence based medicine. 
Cognitive participation: in all three settings key players were successful in 
enrolling a network of diverse actors – people and technologies - necessary 
to bring the CDSS into use. Managers in 999 and OOH had to work harder 
to enrol call-handlers and the CDSS developers had higher engagement 
with the 999 setting which helped build trust and foster enrolment and 
legitimation of the CDSS. Effort was expended in enrolling a range of staff 
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although not all staff were in the same position regarding the CDSS – for 
example call-handlers‟ enrolment was mandatory and they had very little 
power to resist its introduction. 
Collective action: the work of organising and enacting CDSS call 
management and triage requires collective purposive action. In 999 call-
handlers used the CDSS in the management, categorization and 
prioritization of emergency calls and it was viewed positively despite the 
apparent intensification of their work. In SPA the CDSS facilitates the 
management of urgent care calls, sorting by urgency and enabling referral 
to services and/or the giving of health advice. This work is extended beyond 
999 work despite being similar. In OOH the CDSS managed calls to out-of-
hours care and face-to-face attendees at an Urgent Care Centre. At OOH 
work was both extended and became more scripted. The operationalization 
of the CDSS has changed the work in each setting. Call-handling uses 
expertise based on discretion, negotiation and translation skills and it 
requires emotional labour. The skills created and sustained by introducing 
the CDSS include experiential, embodied and clinical expertise. Using the 
CDSS offered the call-handlers an identity as health workers and not as 
generic call centre operatives. Some existing divisions of labour and 
hierarchies were disrupted; for example, at 999 and SPA a new role – 
clinical supervisor – was introduced.  
Reflexive monitoring: although similar monitoring, appraisal and adaptation 
mechanisms keep the CDSS in place, there were differences in how these 
mechanisms were operationalised across the three settings. Successful 
deployment of the CDSS entailed significant and long-term involvement 
from the developers including the need to adapt the system for each 
setting. All three sites devoted additional staff resources to support call-
handlers, including clinical supervision (999 and SPA only) and audit and 
training staff. Audit processes were operationalised differently in OOH 
compared with 999 and SPA. Call-handlers understood the need for audit, 
and valued it. They trusted the CDSS, whilst recognising that it „failed‟ in 
some circumstances.  
Conclusions 
The work of bringing the CDSS into use and maintaining its everyday use 
(collective action) was enabled by a range of actors who established 
coherence and secured buy-in (cognitive participation) and engaged in on-
going appraisal and adjustment (reflexive monitoring). This effort has been 
expended to bring the CDSS into use and continues to be required to keep 
it in everyday use. The four constructs of collective action, coherence, 
cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring play out differently in each 
setting.  
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The CDSS must be understood both as a computer technology and as a set 
of practices related to that technology, kept in place by a network of actors 
in particular contexts. The CDSS changes call-handling work and creates a 
new worker identity (of health care call-handler) that needs to be 
recognised and supported. The three settings are characterised by different 
„work‟ and different workforce characteristics. While there is a common core 
of training the content and format of this varies across the three settings. 
The skills and divisions of labour created and sustained by introducing the 
CDSS are not just those required to operate the computer system „by rote‟ 
but are also about individual experiential, embodied expertise and team 
sharing of knowledge. While there may have been a vision of a clinician-free 
environment, two settings have found it necessary to introduce additional 
clinical supervision, and all three settings have expanded their workforce.   
This report details three case studies where a CDSS has been brought into 
use and appears to have a strong chance of normalising (becoming 
routine). However, it is essential to recognise that this has been achieved, 
and will only continue to be maintained, by the efforts of those involved in 
the specific settings and if the wider context continues to support the 
coherence, cognitive participation, and reflective monitoring processes that 
surround this collective action. 
Policy-makers and practitioners should recognise that although single 
technologies can be made to work in different settings, this takes more 
effort than simply slotting a technology into place. Not least, technological 
interventions may require new resources to support their effective use, for 
example, requiring new roles, new organizational functions and considerable 
management time, all – perhaps – on an on-going basis.
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The Report 
1 Digital technologies in health care: 




Digital information and communication technologies (ICTs) have been 
widely heralded as a way to modernise health care, promising to square the 
circle of fiscal control and rising costs and deliver high quality, cost 
effective, equitable health care1-4. However, the experience of embedding 
digital technologies into practice has been fraught with difficulty; despite 
impressive innovation getting technologies into everyday use is no simple 
matter.  
There is considerable international research that seeks to account for the 
delays, compromises and failure that have characterised the introduction of 
digital technologies in health care5-11. Much of this points to the significance 
of embedded working and organizational practices in shaping outcomes12-21. 
Technological interventions do not slip seamlessly into established practice; 
they alter how health care work is undertaken and organized. Indeed, this is 
a significant part of the appeal for policy-makers and managers. To achieve 
change – to bring technologies into use - requires considerable investment 
and commitment, at the point of service delivery and beyond, by those who 
support, manage and fund this. Given that interventions commonly propose 
changes to working and organizational practices it is unsurprising that 
actors might not want to adopt new technologies or use them as originally 
intended.  
Whilst it is clear that digital technologies propose change for the health care 
workforce and – at the same time - that the workforce is central to shaping 
the outcomes of technological interventions in health care, it remains 
unclear what the implications of these findings are for workforce planning 
and organization.  
 
The aim of this project was to inform workforce planning and policy by 
undertaking a detailed comparative case analysis of a particular technology 
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focusing specifically on workforce questions. We used a robust theoretical 
framework which allowed us to generalise from our cases.   
The remainder of Chapter 1 explores background literature and outlines our 
objectives and approach.  
 
1.2 Digital technologies in health care: the promise 
A great deal of hope, time and money has been invested in technological 
interventions for organizing and managing health care, especially ICTs: for 
example, gross spending on the national programme for IT in the NHS was 
£12.4 billion over ten years22-23. The Labour government understood that 
new digital technologies would  
… provide NHS staff with the most modern tools to improve the 
treatment and care of patients and be able to narrow inequalities in 
health … Our information strategy will help staff do the jobs they came 
into the NHS to do and to do them better.1  
Similar claims were echoed elsewhere: one EU conference contributor 
described e-health as  
the most important revolution in health care since the advent of 
modern medicine, vaccines or even public health measures like 
sanitation and clear water3.  
The election of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat government in 2010 
combined with serious economic recession seems likely to reduce NHS 
spending on ICT. The Conservative Manifesto24 promised a public sector 
„freeze on new IT spending‟ and „changes to ICT procurement to deliver 
better value for money‟ and while this is not re-iterated in the coalition 
agreement25 even if IT investment slows, the Coalition appear keen to  
promote the use of digital technologies. There is continued commitment to 
the National Spine electronic health care record, which – it is argued – 
offers individual patients more control over their health records, and to 
publishing hospital performance data on the web to offer greater 
transparency. More recently the government has announced a new „single 
3-digit number for access to every kind of urgent care‟ using a Computer 
Decision Support System and integrated database of services. Despite 
political and economic change there remains considerable optimism that ICT 
can deliver significant improvements to health care organization and 
delivery.  
At the heart of this optimism lies the claim that digital technologies can help 
the NHS make more effective use of resources, particularly staff (currently 
some 70% of the NHS budget)26. There are three principal ways in which 
this might be achieved. First, digital technologies might be harnessed to 
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improve information and communication flows, raising productivity and 
enhancing quality (e.g. using centralised databases to integrate information 
and allow location-free access by multiple users to a single record). This has 
the advantage of allowing multiple clinicians to access and edit the same 
record and to access it instantly, rather than waiting for the (only) paper 
copy. Likewise internet search engines – such as NHS Evidence 
(http://www.evidence.nhs.uk) – can be used to access up to date research 
quickly to support clinical decision making and spread good practice.  
Second – and linked to the previous point - digital technologies might 
enable changes to work practices and workforce configuration. There has 
been considerable enthusiasm for „telemedicine‟ - harnessing digital 
technologies to offer remote consultations: doctors with particular expertise 
can „see‟ patients from across the country6 making service delivery to 
remote and rural areas more cost-effective27,28. Indeed, some have 
suggested that digitally enabled networks will „rewrite‟ or improve existing 
organizational networks29.  
Better information and communication flows may also facilitate labour 
substitution: for example, nurses can lead routine clinics with remote 
medical supervision/support. Digitised clinical information can be 
transmitted to specialists so that expertise does not have to be co-located 
with clinics. Similarly, home-based sensors and monitoring allow patients 
with chronic conditions to undertake routine testing and/or data 
transmission, enabling remote monitoring by clinicians or clerical 
workers30,31. As more and more expertise is vested in technologies, it 
becomes theoretically possible to replace expensive clinical skills with 
cheaper staff.  
Third, digital data offers new resources for organizing and planning health 
services. As activities become increasingly digitised, work leaves digital 
„trails‟ offering managers extended information about everyday practice. 
This renders both individuals and work processes calculable, knowable and 
– perhaps – more governable. At the same time increasingly visible forms of 
surveillance may result in improved self-reflection and discipline by 
workers7 thereby enhancing productivity. 
The promise of digital technologies in health care is one of change: they 
enable work to be done differently, better and/or more cost-effectively. At 
the heart of these claims lie significant changes to established work 
practices and workforce configuration. Digital technologies can alter 
traditional divisions of labour, potentially reducing specialist staff inputs and 
reconfiguring roles and tasks to require fewer or different competencies. 
This, in turn, alters workforce training and education needs and impacts on 
how staff are recruited and retained. Technologies can also change how 
work is managed: digital surveillance and auditing provide precise 
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measurement and feedback about what workers do and open up 
opportunities to supervise and govern work differently.  
 
1.3 Digital technologies in health care: the practice 
Despite the promise of digital technologies in health care, a decade of 
research reveals a different picture. Research on telemedicine, telecare and 
health care information systems reveals unexpected and limited outcomes, 
failed and abandoned projects5-7;9-11;32-35. A range of explanations for these 
difficulties have been explored, for example cost effectiveness36, 
professional engagement37, patient satisfaction38 and ethical difficulties39 but 
it is clear that particular outcomes depend on the interplay between 
technologies and the workforce, and are made in the everyday conduct of 
health care work and organization12-19;21.  
This is, in part, because it takes so much work for technological 
interventions to come into use. They do not simply „happen‟ but require 
commitment and action by those expected to bring them into everyday 
practice, including the provision of appropriate training, the integration of 
new interventions into wider technological and managerial systems or 
negotiation of contracts with suppliers20.  
More than this, research demonstrates that embedding technologies in 
practice is difficult because - intentionally or otherwise - technological 
interventions change work and organizational practice21,40. New technologies 
require new socially organized practice to enable their integration41 and 
these often clash with established professional practices, roles and 
identities13;34;42. Often interventions that „work‟ in one clinical speciality do 
not fit neatly with established practices elsewhere43: in psychiatry, for 
instance, co-presence has been represented as a therapeutic principle of the 
clinical encounter44 but this may not be true for dermatology. Furthermore, 
technological interventions may disrupt inter-professional power relations. 
Research on the introduction of remote emergency medicine consultation 
shows how this disrupts established medical-nursing hierarchies, with 
nurses becoming more assertive when advising patients and increasing „turn 
taking‟ between doctors and nurses45,46. Digital technologies also bring new 
forms of knowledge into play, and new „players‟ - technical experts, risk 
managers and assessors47. The centrality of these new and/or increasingly 
powerful forms of expertise introduces new power relations, knowledge and 
identities into health care work and organization, fragmenting familiar 
boundaries. Indeed, in May and Ellis‟s study of a telemedicine intervention, 
even in the development phase there were contests between clinicians, 
technical experts and external evaluators „over what kinds of knowledge 
and practice count‟6.  
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Beyond front-line service delivery, technological interventions can also 
change established organizational forms. Indeed, a central rationale for ICT 
initiatives is that they enhance organizational efficiency by improving 
management information. Such increased bureaucratization has been a 
source of tension between managers and professionals across the public 
sector since the early 1980s48 and may conflict with professional imperatives 
49,50. As Doolin7 explains, within information system architecture  
[s]ome activities are given existence and attention while others remain 
unrecognised, enabling managerial knowledge to make stronger truth 
claims (Boland and Schultze 1996) and engendering compliance in 
those subject to such scrutiny‟ (p 345). 
Professional resistance to such systems may modify outcomes and disrupt 
power relations7;51,52. 
1.4 Implications for workforce management and 
planning? 
It is clear that digital information and communication technologies hold 
considerable promise for the organization and delivery of health care and, 
at the same time, that bringing this to fruition is not easy. At the heart of 
both the promise and the practice lies the interplay between technology and 
the health care workforce. Yet the workforce management and planning 
implications of new technologies are seldom addressed by research. 
This appears to be for two main reasons. First, the driver of much research 
into health technologies has sought to understand implementation 
processes. It focuses on why interventions do/do not get embedded in 
practice and does not extend this to think about strategic, political53 or 
workforce issues. It is also characterised by an assumption that there is an 
„it‟ (i.e. the technology) that is implemented – rather than seeing the 
ensemble of work practices and social relations that shape each other to 
bring a technology into use. 
Second, research has tended to use case studies, focussing on specific 
occupational groups (e.g. doctors or nurses) and their response to particular 
technological interventions. This has been excellent at revealing the 
complex and particular processes that shape particular outcomes, but 
cannot offer systematic analyses for workforce policy and/or management. 
In addition, there are important differences between the ways that social 
and management scientists understand these processes - for example, 
between proponents of micro-level studies that draw on Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) and Actor Network Theory (ANT), versus those 
drawing on broader sociological concepts such as „profession‟, 
„organization‟, „power‟, „identity‟ and „knowledge‟.  Whilst STS, and 
especially ANT, insist on the contingency and particularity of outcomes and 
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that broader claims cannot be made from any given outcome, endeavours 
to make cross-case links building on core sociological concepts (such as 
those listed above) only demonstrate that these capture common dynamics 
which nonetheless work out in contextually specific ways21. What is lacking 
is any abstraction or grasp of the generative mechanisms and processes 
through which outcomes are achieved - we cannot generalise, beyond 
saying that the same concepts are likely to be important in other cases. 
If we are to fully understand the implications of new technologies – such as 
ICTs - on health care work and workers we must try to provide systematic 
cross-case analyses that can inform workforce management and planning. 
 
1.5 Objectives of this research 
Our research redresses the gaps described by focussing on the workforce 
implications of a particular technology used by a range of staff in different 
settings, adopting a systematic approach with the aim of informing policy 
and management.  
Our objectives are to: 
1) understand the impact of new technology on everyday work and service 
delivery; 
2) identify education and training needs for staff engaging with new 
technologies; 
3) examine the implications of new technology for workforce reconfiguration 
and management planning. 
The focus of our research is a single technology – a computer decision 
support system (CDSS). The section below briefly explains what CDSS are, 
and is followed by a description of our theoretical approach.  
1.5.1 Computer decision support systems (CDSS) 
CDSS are computer programmes designed to assist with decision-making. 
They have diffused rapidly across the NHS, to support GP prescribing 
(PRODIGY), triage in urgent and emergency care (AMPDS, NHS Pathways) 
and for diagnosis and treatment, notably by NHS Direct and Walk-in 
Centres (NHS CAS and TAS).  
CDSS may allow staff to work more efficiently or safely, or faster, or enable 
substitution or reallocation of tasks. CDSS have already impacted upon 
workforce skill-mix and configuration (e.g. allowing non-clinically qualified 
call-handlers to deal with Ambulance Service first contacts). Their use is 
likely to increase rapidly – for example underpinning the national telephone 
number for non-emergency health services23. 
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Previous research has looked at CDSS design or compared CDSS with other 
technologies. What is missing is a systematic analysis of the relationship 
between CDSS, workforce reconfiguration and organizational management 
and strategy. Our research examines how a CDSS is used in different 
contexts. By theoretically grounding our analysis we seek to make 
generalizations that can inform NHS workforce planners and educators, 
managers, service commissioners and professionals in other contexts and 
working with other technologies, whilst also contributing directly to the 
understanding of how CDSS are used and managed in the NHS.  
1.5.2 Theoretical approach  
To enable systematic cross-case analysis our study draws on the conceptual 
framework offered by Normalization Process Theory (NPT)54. NPT is an 
extension of the Normalization Process Model (NPM)16;55,56 which framed our 
original proposal. Both the model and the theory were developed in 
response to failure of new technologies to embed in health care, and aimed 
to develop generalizable explanations57.  
NPT offers a robust framework to analyse how a CDSS is used in different 
settings. We have used the core domains of the theory to structure the 
presentation of our analysis in this report. Given the disciplinary 
backgrounds of the team members, our work is also informed by other 
theoretical resources, in particular the conceptual insights offered by 
organizational sociology (e.g. theories of  power, identity), from STS and 
ANT (e.g. theories of networks, actors and artefacts), and social psychology 
(theories of trust, knowledge sharing and teams). 
Below we offer a brief outline of NPM and NPT and how we have used these 
in this study.  
NPM focuses on the collective action required for an intervention to come 
into use. It developed from a series of important empirical studies – of 
telemedicine systems58;59, of professional-patient interaction and the 
organization of health care work in chronic illness60 and of the social 
production and operationalization of evidence in the clinical encounter61. It 
proposes that collective action is governed by four factors, each of which 
explains the degree to which an intervention will become embedded in 
everyday practice:  
(i) Interactional Workability: focuses on the work necessary to bring a 
complex intervention into place. NPM proposes that a complex intervention 
is disposed to normalization if it confers an interactional advantage by 
enhancing shared understandings of work and facilitating agreed outcomes 
(whether explicitly/implicitly, formally/informally). 
(ii) Relational integration: describes how knowledge and work is mediated 
and understood in practice. A complex intervention will affect not only the 
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knowledge required by users, but also the ways that they understand the 
actions of people around them. NPM proposes that: a complex intervention 
is disposed to normalization if it equals or improves accountability and 
confidence within networks. 
(iii) Skills set workability: refers to how the work is distributed, formally and 
informally, between workers in the broader organizational division of labour. 
Complex interventions may disrupt established divisions of labour and 
managing these changes is not simply a technical question. The model 
therefore proposes that a complex intervention is disposed to normalization 
if is calibrated to an agreed skill-set at a recognizable location in the 
division of labour. 
(iv) Contextual integration: refers to the organizational incorporation of 
work, e.g. expectations, resources and authority associated with the 
intervention and the interplay between established organizational activities 
and new interventions. The final proposition is therefore that a complex 
intervention is disposed to normalization if it confers organizational 
advantage in flexibly executing and realising work. 
NPM offered a significant advantage over previous analytical models 
because it attempts to specify processes and conditions that shape 
outcomes – regardless of technology or setting. However, as they tested 
the model empirically its originators identified some weaknesses in the 
model59. Specifically, NPM did not explain how practices were formed in 
ways that held them together, how actors were enrolled into networks or 
how they were appraised. In response to these weaknesses, the model was 
extended to become a middle range theory53;62 designed to 
explain the processes of implementation, embedding, and integration 
of material practices in formally defined contexts, relates these 
processes to causal social mechanisms, identifies components of those 
mechanisms, and defines the investments that are required to 
energize them57.  
 
NPT defines four core „domains‟ of activity that will shape the success – or 
otherwise – of a given intervention. Collective action constitutes one 
domain - encompassing the work that brings the intervention into use (or 
the extent to which this can be achieved). In response to concerns about  
how practices are „held together‟ in a way that makes sense, the domain of 
coherence encompasses the ways in which an intervention is understood 
as meaningful, achievable and desirable. The domain of cognitive 
participation considers if and how the actors necessary to deliver the 
intervention are enrolled into action, recognising that embedding an 
intervention is dependent on chains of interaction between diverse actors 
including but not limited to those who directly use the technology. Finally, 
the domain of reflexive monitoring encompasses the on-going processes 
of appraisal and adjustment that keep an intervention in place.  
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NPT provides a conceptual and analytical framework for understanding how 
the CDSS has been brought into use, and to make transferable propositions 
about its use elsewhere.  
 
1.6 Summary  
This chapter has outlined research evidence that new technologies have a 
direct impact on workforce planning and reconfiguration. They can change 
the nature of work and the workforce - requiring new or different skills/ 
competencies, new training, and different approaches to recruitment and 
retention. 
1.6.1 Benefits of this research  
This study examines the workforce implications of new technologies by 
examining how a single technology impacts on day-to-day work in different 
settings, and the implications for workforce planning, management and 
training. It also informs our understanding of change management as new 
technology changes work and introduces new ways of organizing and 
delivering care, and, contributes to the broader study of health care 
organizations. 
Our research complements other NIHR SDO funded studies of new 
technologies and e-Health (notably Potts SDO/131; Mair SDO/135; Laing 
SDO/130). It also operationalizes and develops the conceptual model and 
theory used in two cognate studies (May et al DH PRP „Integrating telecare'; 
Mair SDO/135), adding value to this work. The focus on a CDSS augments 
research on nurses' use of such technologies (Dowding et al DH PRP „Nurses 
use of decision-support') providing additional case study evidence. 
This project provides the first comparative analysis of a single CDSS in 
different health care settings. It enhances knowledge of the impact of CDSS 
on work and the workforce to enable better management and planning. Our 
findings about skills and knowledge and the division of labour can inform 
decisions about training and education, and the recruitment and retention of 
staff. Our understanding provides specific information relevant to 
developing new services underpinned by this technology (notably the new 
111 service) and by systematically looking across different organizational 
contexts allows us to inform wider debates about new technologies in health 
care.  
1.6.2  Outline of this report  
The remainder of this report is structured using NPT; the theory provides a 
systematic framework to integrate our data and present our analysis. 
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Chapters 2 and 3 detail our methodological approach and the context of our 
research. Chapters 4-7 present our findings using the four domains of NPT 
(Coherence, Cognitive participation, Collective Action and Reflexive 
Monitoring). Chapter 7 revisits the research questions in the original 
research proposal to demonstrate how these have been answered, and 
Chapter 8 provides conclusions about the implications of the research for 
workforce configuration, management and training.
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2.1 Introduction 
This section describes our methodological approach and research methods. 
Our approach is informed by three key considerations: 
1. The need to have a detailed understanding of how technologies are 
used in practice – how the work gets done using the CDSS and the 
impact and implications that the CDSS has for everyday work; 
2. The need to link our understandings of work with wider 
considerations of organizational management (including recruitment 
practices and training) and with the interests and practices of other 
stakeholders (including the CDSS developers and policy-makers); 
3. The need to extend this detailed understanding of individual cases to 
develop a systematic understanding of CDSS in everyday use to 
contribute to future policy and organizational management.  
Our study comprises three case studies of a CDSS in use. This small number 
of comparative cases offers the optimum combination of close familiarity 
with individual settings and work, with the opportunity for analytical and 
theoretical generalization.  
Our methods are mainly drawn from ethnography, but are augmented with 
survey work to explore training and trust in technology. 
2.2 Cases 
2.2.1  Selecting the „same technology‟ 
The study examines the same CDSS in three different settings to see how 
different staff use the same technology. The CDSS was chosen for three 
reasons. First, it is the only CDSS developed by the NHS and „owned‟ by the 
Department of Health, and we wanted to inform how the NHS develops 
appropriate decision support technologies. Second, it is one of a limited 
number of decision support systems used by non-clinical staff (although it 
can be used by nurses, doctors and paramedics) including those with 
limited experience of working in health care. It is therefore ideal for 
understanding the workforce implications of CDSS use by different staff in 
different settings. Third, the CDSS had not been part of a large-scale 
systematic evaluation.  
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2.2.2  Selecting the „different settings‟  
Our chosen CDSS was deployed from 2006, initially as a pilot, to manage 
emergency calls for an ambulance service, and subsequently in two out-of-
hours services, one run by a Primary Care Trust (PCT) and the other by an 
Ambulance Trust. Before the study began several other Trusts were either 
waiting to adopt, or were interested in using this CDSS and a DH decision to 
license the system for use in NHS Ambulance Trusts was imminent. 
However, the two out-of-hours pilots ceased using the software (both for 
what appear to have been strategic organizational reasons) and, during the 
course of our study, the CDSS was adopted two further urgent care services 
- a new single point of access (SPA) service (run by the Ambulance Trust 
pilot), and by a well-established GP-led out-of-hours service. The CDSS was 
licensed for use in Ambulance Trusts in mid-2009 and more Ambulance 
Trusts plan to adopt it. The constraints of our fieldwork led us to focus on 
the three settings where the CDSS was in use – „999‟ (the emergency call-
handling service run by the Ambulance Trust), „SPA‟ (urgent care single 
point of access telephone service run by the same Ambulance Trust) and 
„OOH‟ (the GP out-of-hours service). 
These sites provide different service settings in which to examine how the 
CDSS is used. Although we had not anticipated studying two services 
offered by the same Trust this, with hindsight, has proved beneficial, 
allowing us to explore the implications, benefits and challenges of this 
service configuration. 
The case studies were at different stages in their adoption of the CDSS. For 
999 the system was well established in the organization and staff were 
experienced in using it. SPA and OOH began using the CDSS in the Autumn 
2009 which allowed us to observe implementation, training of new and 
existing staff, the launch of an additional service using the system (at OOH) 
and the early embedding of the technology in everyday practice.  
2.3 The Ethnography   
The ethnographic component of the study employed observational, 
interview and documentary methods to provide a detailed, nuanced 
description of the design, development, management and use of the CDSS 
in each setting.  
2.3.1 Non-participant observation 
An orientation visit by research team members was undertaken to each site 
to outline the project and negotiate access with key staff. Much of our 
observational work focused on the call-handlers using the CDSS but we also 
observed other staff, including clinical supervisors (999 and SPA site), 
ambulance dispatchers (999), GPs (OOH) and their interactions with each 
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other and the CDSS. The observation was purposively structured to capture 
activity at different times of day/days of the week and covered all or part of 
a shift depending on the setting (between 4 and 8 hours). 
There were opportunities to talk informally with staff between calls 
(particularly at quieter periods e.g. weekday evenings) and to talk to 
managers and other key personnel. 
The observation involved a single researcher sitting beside 1-2 call-
handlers, and occasionally sitting at back of room to observe the whole 
environment. To avoid placing undue pressure on staff the researcher 
usually approached one of the managers (e.g. shift manager) to negotiate 
where to sit, but as the research became more familiar to staff, researchers 
were often able to negotiate this directly with call-handlers.  
Staff being observed were given a verbal outline of the study and reminded 
that the researchers were not clinically qualified, and could not „assess‟ 
practice. Staff were free to ask the researcher to move away at any time 
and could refuse have the researcher sit with them (in the event no call-
handlers refused to be observed). Participant information leaflets were 
made available (Appendix 1). 
Detailed notes were overtly taken and transcribed soon afterwards. These 
included verbatim or near verbatim statements. Details about the nature of 
calls and the triage process were anonymised.  
The ethnographic data consist of nearly 500 hours of observation conducted 
over approximately 35-45 days at each site over several months (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Observational data: hours, days and period in each setting  





999 170 41 Nov 2008 – Jul 2010 
SPA 172 33 Oct 2009 – July 2010 
OOH 149 27 Sept 2009 – Aug 2010 
Total 491 101 Nov 2008 – Aug 2010 
2.3.2 Interviews 
Having conducted initial observation at each site a purposive sample of 
interviewees was identified. Call-handlers and control room staff were 
approached opportunistically and interviews were conducted during working 
hours at points in the day/evening when the service was less busy (with the 
agreement of shift managers). Potential interviewees were given the 
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participant information leaflet and time to consider if they would like to 
participate. Stakeholders and managers (including policy-makers, 
commissioners, system developers, corporate and operational managers) 
were approached and provided with a participant information sheet 
(Appendix 2) and a time for the interview was arranged if they agreed. Call-
handler interviews typically took 30-45 minutes because of the constraints 
of their work patterns, other interviews were between 60-90 minutes. 
Where possible, interviews took place in a private office or meeting room 
but in OOH some interviews took place in the call control room. 
Before the interview commenced, the researcher explained the study and 
consent form, seeking written consent to conduct the interview (Appendix 3 
and 4), digitally record and subsequently transcribe the interview. 
Assurances were given about confidentiality of the recording and anonymity 
of the transcript. All the interviews were recorded. Participants were 
encouraged to ask questions about the study or their involvement and to 
stop the interview at any time.  
The interview topic guide was adjusted to reflect the experience and 
seniority of each participant: staff interviews focussed on their experiences 
and their views about using the CDSS, changes to work patterns and 
practices and the nature of the work (Appendix 5 and 6). Stakeholders were 
asked to explore the antecedents of the introduction of the CDSS, to 
consider how roles and skills had changed and to tell us about the wider 
context of the service and CDSS use. A total of 61 interviews were 
conducted, with a total of 64 respondents (Table 2). 
 











999    7* 3 2** 6** 
SPA 15 4 1** - 
OOH 12 4        1 - 
Other - - - 9# 
* Includes one ambulance dispatcher 
** Includes staff who cover both 999 and SPA.  
# 4 in a group interview 
~ Includes 3 Department of Health, 4 Trust Board members, 4 senior clinical/operational 
managers,  2 developers, 1 IT manager, 1 ex call-handler/supervisor.   
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2.3.3  Documents 
We collected a range of documents. These described the CDSS design and 
development, and documented external evaluation and presentations by the 
developer team and service managers. We also had access to organizational 
minutes, training materials and publicly available policy documents, reports, 
and media releases. Many of these were available on organizational 
websites, and others were provided by each site (e.g. audit guidelines, 
training manuals). This material was used to inform the description of 
settings (chapter 3) and the analysis presented in chapters 4-7. 
 
2.4  Analysis of the ethnographic data 
Interviews and observational data (along with relevant documents) were 
analysed together. A sample of fieldnotes and interview transcripts were 
read and open coded independently by CP, SH, JT, JP, and MC. The codes 
were discussed in data clinics and refined and the interview transcripts and 
fieldnotes were imported to Atlas.Ti 6.1 and coded to facilitate data 
management and retrieval. We held 22 data clinics (approximately 100 
hours) to discuss emerging codes, explore themes of interest and develop 
our interpretations. As the study progressed, the analysis was structured to 
examine all the data within each setting, and then across these using the 
research questions and the NPM/NPT.  We had robust discussions about the 
affordances of the NPM and spent time exploring the data to operationalize 
the model. We examined the NPT and agreed that this was a preferable 
framework for the study. Data clinics were organized around sets of 
observational or interview data read in advance. As we progressed, 
individual team members identified emerging themes and we used 
discussion and consensus to determine how the data „fitted‟ the core 
domains of the theory and to reach saturation. Where we disagreed we 
sought clarification and advise from CM. We also wrote narrative and data 
summaries to support the analysis and used a mixture of analytical 
approaches (e.g. identifying and refining themes) and matrix/charting 
techniques to facilitate comparison and had ongoing discussions with the 
wider team and the advisors to check our interpretations. 
 
2.5 The Survey  
The survey (see Appendix 7 and 8) was designed to capture the skills, 
experience and training of call-handlers and their trust in the CDSS and the 
work system in which it is embedded.  
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2.5.1 Skills, experience and training 
The first part of the questionnaire collected demographic data about age, 
gender, academic qualifications, length of service and nature of 
employment (full or part-time). This was followed by six items assessing 
call-handlers‟ work experience and training relevant to their current work. 
Questions were asked about the specific skills required for the call-handler 
role and these were developed primarily from documentary analysis of the 
Continuous Quality Improvement tool (CQI) used for call audit. The CQI 
focuses on core skills regarded as essential for using the CDSS (effective 
call control; skilled questioning; active listening; skilled provision of 
information and advice; effective communication; practice according to 
designated role requirements; and skilled use of CDSS functionality). Our 
ethnographic analysis confirmed these categories were central to the daily 
enactment of call-handlers‟ work. Individual items derived from the CQI 
descriptions were supplemented with items tapping skills and practices not 
considered desirable by the system developers, but which the observation 
has revealed e.g. working ahead of the system and using leading questions. 
Further questions derived from the ethnography were added to assess 
team-working and knowledge sharing. This resulted in 26 items, rated on a 
10 point scale, (where 1 = very poor skill and 10 = very high skill or 1 = 
not very important and 10 = very important). 
2.5.2 Trust in the CDSS and work system 
The second part of the questionnaire assessed call-handlers trust in the 
CDSS and in key actors associated with the system. Questions were 
developed from the research literatures on interpersonal and organizational 
trust, and models of trust in technology. The study was theoretically 
grounded in two of the most established and widely used models of trust. 
Firstly, Muir and Moray‟s63 model of trust in technology based on factors of 
competence, predictability, dependability, responsibility and faith. Secondly 
on Mayer, Davis and Schoorman‟s64 model of organizational trust, focusing 
particularly on their three factors of perceived trustworthiness in others; 
ability, benevolence and integrity.  
To measure trust in technology, 15 items were developed from Muir and 
Moray‟s63 trust in technology questionnaire and adapted for use in the study 
settings. Five questions were added to assess call-handlers trusting beliefs 
about the benevolence and integrity of the system‟s use and motives for 
use. A final question asked for an overall rating of trust in the technology. 
Respondents were asked to rate each of the factors on a five point scale (1 
= strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
The final section of the questionnaire addressed call-handler‟s trust in the 
major actors relevant to their use of the CDSS - the organization, the audit 
team, the clinical supervisor (at 999 and SPA only) and the CDSS team. 
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Three items were framed around call-handlers‟ perceptions of 
trustworthiness in terms of ability, benevolence and integrity and an 
additional overall trust item. Four final items rated trust in relation to other 
call-handlers, callers and their own ability to use the CDSS. All these items 
were again measured on a five point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree). 
2.5.3 Format, piloting and administration   
We planned to administer the survey as two on-line questionnaires. In 
consultation with managers and in view of the limited internet/additional 
software access (for data protection reasons) we reverted to a single paper 
based questionnaire.  
The questionnaire was developed primarily by JP and JT with input from CP, 
SH and MC before being discussed more widely with the advisory board 
(Appendix 9). It was the piloted with six individuals at the 999 site, and 
managers and auditing/training staff were asked to comment on the length, 
readability and content. Following piloting some changes were made, 
notably the inclusion of additional questions, rewording some of the items. 
A total of 166 questionnaire packs were prepared for staff at each setting, 
999 (n=53), SPA (n=59) and OOH (n=54). Packs included a questionnaire, 
participant information leaflet (Appendix 10 and 11) and a freepost return 
envelope. The information leaflet emphasised that individual responses 
would not be fed back to the organization. Sites provided a list of names 
matched to a unique number to enable anonymization. Questionnaires were 
initially distributed by managers or supervisors but an initial low response 
led us to distribute the questionnaire packs ourselves.  Completed 
questionnaires were returned either directly to the researcher, placed in 
designated locked box at the site or posted. Managers at each site sent a 
follow up reminder email to staff after 3 weeks.  
2.5.4  Response rate 
103 questionnaires were completed and returned (response rate of 62%). 
There was a small difference in response rates between sites, with SPA 
returning the highest proportion of questionnaires (Table 3). The limits of 
research ethics approval were such that we were not able to collect 
information about non-responders, but looking at the ethnographic data 
against the survey responders does not suggest that that they were 
demographically different groups.  
 
Table 3. Survey response rate by study site 
 999 SPA OOH 
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31 39 33 
Number of non-
responders 
22 20 21 
Population Total 53 (58%) 59 (66%) 54 (61%) 
 
2.6  Analysis of the survey 
Survey data were double entered in MS Excel, checked and corrected. The 
data were exported to PASW and descriptive statistics calculated. In the 
skills section of the questionnaire items within each competency category 
were averaged to provide a mean for that category for each participant. 
Analysis of Variance was used to test for differences across the three study 
sites.  
For the purposes of the analysis Questions 1- 13 and 16 were analysed 
individually and compared across sites. Findings are presented in Chapter 3. 
For Questions 14 and 15, items were averaged for each of the six call 
handler competency categories for those items formally assessed through 
the CDSS quality assessment and audit processes (effective call control; 
skilled questioning; active listening; skilled provision of information and 
advice; effective communication; and skilled use of CDSS functionality). 
Reliability analysis using Cronbach‟s Alpha was performed on the seventeen 
CQI items and revealed a high level of internal consistency (=0.94). 
Further reliability analysis was performed for each of the CQI categories, 
again showing high levels of internal consistency (effective call control, = 
0.89; skilled questioning = 0.83; active listening = 0.80; effective 
communication = 0.87; and skilled use of CDSS functionality = 0.79). 
Reliability analysis was not performed on category skilled provision of 
information and advice which only contained one item. Details of mapping 
between individual items and competency categories can be found in 
Appendix 12. The remaining items in Questions 14 and 15 were analysed 
separately and are presented in Chapter 6. For Questions 17 and 18, items 
were average for the different trust dimensions in both the CDSS and in the 
various actors. Reliability analysis using Cronbach‟s Alpha was performed on 
the 21 trust in technology items and revealed a high level of internal 
consistency (=0.94). Further reliability analysis was performed for each of 
the dimensions of trust in technology. Internal reliability was found to be 
high for competence and dependability (= 0.77; = 0.076, respectively). 
Internal reliability was found to be more moderate for predictability, faith, 
benevolence and integrity (= 0.62; = 0.57; = 0.59 and = 0.54 
respectively. Dimensions with only two items (faith, integrity) had lower 
levels of reliability, reflecting Schoorman, Mayer and Davis (2007)75 view 
that internal consistency tends to be lower in cases where there are fewer 
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items. Additionally, the internal consistency for benevolence and integrity 
drawn from from Mayer et al. (1995)64 model of trust were relatively low 
compared to the dimension for competence. However, this finding is 
consistent with their own and subsequent research which has suggested 
that only when trusting relationships are fully established do these two 
dimensions become distinguishable. The lower levels of internal consistency 
found in this study may be reflective of an earlier stage in the development 
of trust between CH and the CDSS. Indeed when these two dimensions are 
combined the internal consistency was high (= 0.72).  Internal reliability 
anlysis performed on items measuring CH trust in clinical supervisors, the 
audit team, their organization and the CDSS development team was all high 
(= 0.91; = 0.91; = 0.89 and = 0.91 respectively). Details of mapping 
between individual items and competency categories can be found in 
Appendix 13 and 14 respectively. Call handlers ratings of ability and 
importance of each competency category, and of trust measures were 
compared across sites using univariate Analysis of Variance. Significant 
effects, where they occurred, are detailed throughout the report. 
2.7 Integration of the ethnography and survey  
Our methods were integrated in two ways. First developmentally - the 
ethnography informed the design and focus of the survey. The survey 
deliberately focussed on questions that were not fully captured by the 
observation or interviews (e.g. views about skills/workplace, „trust in 
technology‟). Secondly, we explored convergence and contradiction - a 
process termed „crystallization' which seeks to provide a more 
comprehensive account than that offered by a single method65. We have 
also sought to integrate our findings by using NPT as an overarching 
framework to present qualitative and quantitative findings together in 
chapters 4-7.  
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3 Context: Same technology, different 
settings 
3.1 Introduction 
This section describes the key characteristics of the CDSS („same 
technology‟) and the three cases („different settings‟) and the training 
associated with the CDSS.  
3.2 Same technology: the CDSS  
The CDSS studied here is designed to enable prioritization and management 
of telephone calls to emergency (999) or urgent (OOH, SPA) care services. 
It can be used by non-clinical (clerical) and clinical (nursing, paramedic or 
medical) staff. It is an expert system built on an extensive clinical evidence 
base subject to a continuous process of evidence review and update. A 
series of logical algorithms (pathways) underpin questions which the 
user/call-handler uses to ask the caller/patient to determine the clinical 
skills required, and the timeframe in which they must be accessed. The 
CDSS includes questions that the call-handler is required to answer, as well 
prompts to „probe‟ or to gain more accurate and/or precise information, for 
example, getting callers to describe the nature of chest pain (as „crushing‟, 
„shooting‟, „aching‟ and so on). The system is used to arrive at a disposition, 
ranging from an 8 minute emergency ambulance, an appointment with a 
GP, or information on the self-monitoring or treatment of symptoms.  
For dispositions to primary care or other community services the CDSS is 
able to identify the skill required to treat the patient, and map this to a 
record of clinical skills in local services, using an integrated directory of 
services. This directory, part of the capacity management system (CMS) 
provides information on the location of services, opening times, response 
times and clinical provision. 
The CDSS comprises three modules, summarised in Table 4. Module 0 is 
designed to support immediate identification of life threatening problems 
and the pathways here are typically short. It covers the vast majority of 
999 calls, and provides needs assessment for the despatch of „8 and 19 
minute‟ ambulances. Once immediately life-threatening situations have 
been ruled out, the call-handler moves into module 1, which includes a 
larger number of pathways designed to assess a wide range of symptoms. 
At the start of module 1, the call-handler is presented with a „body map‟ 
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(which is age and gender specific). The call-handler clicks the computer 
mouse to select the body area affected and is presented with a menu of 
pathways. The call-handler selects an appropriate pathway (based on the 
information provided by the caller, and the information presented on 
screen). The CDSS includes documentation of all clinical conditions. 
A further module (module 2) is designed for use by a clinician, (usually a 
nurse or paramedic) and involves a longer set of algorithms to establish the 
priority of the call and the most appropriate disposition. Module 2 is used in 
999 and SPA by clinical supervisors and not in OOH. 
 
Table 4. CDSS Modules  
Module Description 
Module 0 Questions relate to immediate and imminent threat to life, e.g. 
chest pain, severe loss of blood/ consciousness or not 
breathing. Some information filtering e.g. whether the problem 
is due to trauma (injury), if the call is from the patient 
themselves or a third party, as well as age and gender of the 
patient. 
Module 1 Module 1 begins after life-threatening situations have been 
ruled out and includes a larger number of pathways designed 
to assess a wide range of symptoms. The call-handler is 
presented with a „body map‟  to select the appropriate body 
system /area affected, this leads to a list of pathways relating 
to this area. 
Module 2 Nurse/paramedic assessment module where there is no 
obvious emergency. The call is transferred to a nurse for 
further assessment or provision of care advice. Typically used 
for more complex calls, or where the call-handler has arrived at 
a home care disposition.  
 
The CDSS also includes a database of care advice for the call-handler to 
provide over the telephone depending on the pathway. This includes: 
 advice provided during the call (e.g. cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
(CPR) instructions,  
 „Worsening advice‟ where the caller is advised to look out for signs of 
symptoms getting worse in the period before primary care is 
accessed,  
 Interim advice for non-emergency dispositions and for managing 
symptoms in the period before ambulance or primary care response 
(e.g. pain relief advice), 
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 Home care advice for self-care dispositions where detailed care 
advice is provided to support the patient in looking after themselves. 
3.3 Different settings 1: 999  
The NHS Ambulance Trust was formed in 2006 as part of a national 
rationalization of the ambulance service. It employs about 2000 people and 
provides 999 services to a population of over 2.5 million, covering an area 
which includes large cities and towns, and some more remote rural areas. 
Since January 2008 the Trust headquarters have been located about five 
miles from the city centre. This houses the main ambulance control room 
and administrative offices. In December 2009, the Trust opened a second 
centre about 11 miles from the headquarters, designed to mirror the first 
centre (and as a consequence, a satellite centre in the south of the region 
was closed) as a second, independent „back-up‟ facility.  
The ambulance control room takes calls from the public („999‟ calls), 
doctors, hospitals, police, and fire service. There are two main types of 
calls. Firstly, those relating to medical emergencies. The call-handlers have 
to work within the constraints of the „8 minute target‟ for urgent 
ambulances, a policy which dictates that a Category A ambulance must 
arrive within that time for immediately life threatening cases. Other possible 
dispositions, depending on urgency are: an ambulance within 19 minutes 
(Category B), within 60 minutes (Category C) or redirection to a clinician or 
other service. Secondly the service deals with calls about transporting 
patients to hospital from home or general practice surgeries at the request 
of a GP ('urgent calls' or „bed bureau calls‟). 
3.3.1 The 999 workforce 
The 999 control room staff are organised into five teams. When a full 
complement of staff is on duty during a single 12-hour shift, a team is 
typically made up of the following: 
 Eight to 15 non-clinical call-handlers who answer 999 calls and triage 
using the CDSS.  
 four communications officers who liaise between ambulance crews and 
hospitals, four dispatch officers who assign crews to each  incident 
 a duty manager who has responsibility for managing the operational 
aspects of the shift, including the call-handlers and dispatch desks 
 a clinical supervisor (either a nurse or paramedic) who works across 
both 999 and SPA services to deal with non-emergency medical calls, 
as well providing clinical advice and support to the call-handlers.  
Most control room staff work a 12 hour shift. Staff work a 37.5 hour week 
on 24/7 rota and a very small number of staff work part-time. There are 
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three rotas (A, B and C). The A and B 12 hour rotas are organised in a 5 
week pattern, which includes a 3 day week, 3 night week, 4 day week, 4 
night week and a relief week (where staff cover shifts as needed for annual 
leave or sickness). „A rota‟ staff work from 08:00 to 20:00 (or 20:00 to 
00.00:800 for night shifts). „B rota‟ staff have varying start and finish times 
(e.g. 7:30 to 19:30, 14:00 to 02:00 (or vice versa for night shifts). The C 
rota – on which all new call-handlers start – has a 10 hour shift pattern, 
with more variation in patterns of days of week and time of work. 
 
Call-handlers 
There were 53 staff employed as 999 call-handlers and most of were female 
and under 34 years. Of the 31 call-handler respondents to the survey, 22 
(71%) were female. The most common age group for call-handlers was 25-
34 years (15, 48%). Overall, 999 call-handlers had at least 1 years‟ 
experience of using the CDSS (with 12 (39%) having 1-2 years‟ experience 
and 12 (39%) three years‟ experience. Of 31 call-handlers surveyed, 23 
(75%) were employed on a full time basis. 
Call-handlers within this organization are formally titled Emergency Medical 
Systems Operators (EMSOs) but locally referred to as „call-takers‟.  
 
Dispatch officers 
Dispatch officers are responsible for allocating ambulance vehicles/crews to 
incidents/locations and sending details to the ambulances.  Four sets of 
dispatch desks each have responsibility for a single geographical area 
(known as the „centre desks‟ due to their position in the room) and a 
communications officer and a dispatch officer oversee each area. There is 
significant overlap between these two roles, but the dispatch officer has 
overall responsibility for allocating ambulances. Dispatch officers do not 
have the CDSS on their computers. For the most part, they are a self-
contained group, although there are discussions between the dispatch 
officers and call-handlers.  
Duty managers and control room managers 
The duty manager oversees and manages 999 operations and ensures that 
procedures are followed. Typically, the duty managers have previously 
worked as call-handlers and dispatch officers. They report to control room 
operational managers, who monitor performance and have overall 
responsibility for the staff, including Human Resources functions.  
Clinical supervisors 
Following the introduction of the CDSS, the Trust introduced the new role of 
„Clinical Supervisor‟ in the control room. During our 999 fieldwork there 
were six clinical supervisors (four paramedics, two nurses). When the SPA 
service was launched, additional clinical supervisors were employed.  
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Clinical supervisors are managed by non-control room Trust directorate 
managers. They provide clinical support for the 999 and SPA services - 
dealing with non-emergency calls (e.g. „refer to nurse‟ or home care 
dispositions) using the CDSS Module 2 and providing clinical information for 
the call-handlers. They also review calls as part of the audit processes and 
are involved in informally debriefing staff and formal retraining.  
Typically, for each shift there is one clinical supervisor in each control room, 
but when this is not possible (e.g. staff absence) the clinical supervisor at 
headquarters can be contacted by telephone.  
3.4 Different settings 2: SPA  
The SPA service began in October 2009 and provides an urgent care single 
point of access service for two PCTs serving a population of around 
600,000. The Ambulance Trust provides call-handling and the PCTs provide 
urgent care services. SPA replaced OOH call-handling previously provided 
by NHS and commercial organizations.  
SPA call-handlers are located at headquarters and the second centre.  
There are five urgent care centres (UCCs) across the geographical area 
which provide 24 hour services. Although UCCs will see patients who walk in 
without an appointment, patients are advised to call the SPA first. Although 
SPA runs over the 24 hour period, the majority of calls to the service occur 
during the out-of-hours period. As part of the SPA service, the Ambulance 
Trust also provides patient transport to UCCs for patients who have 
difficulties (e.g. patients who have a condition which means they cannot use 
other forms of transport). 
Following assessment and triaging of the call using the CDSS, the patient is 
passed to the service they need. Where necessary, the call-handler is able 
to book an appointment to see or speak to a health care professional 
(commonly a GP), and/or to book patient transport. 
3.4.1 The SPA workforce 
  Each SPA team includes: 
 Five full time call-handlers, and between 1 and 6 part-time call-
handlers that work either an 8 or 10 hour shift to match periods of 
high demand. Full time SPA staff are based at headquarters, part-
time call-handlers are split between the two sites.   
 An SPA call supervisor with a similar role to the 999 duty manager. 
 A clinical supervisor responsible for both 999 and SPA call-handlers.  
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Full time SPA call-handlers follow the same 12 hour shift rota as 999 staff, 
but there are more part-time staff (either 11 hours, 16 hours or 25 hours 
per week) and some work weekends only. 
 
Call-handlers 
There were 59 SPA call-handlers with similar age profile to 999 staff. Of 39 
respondents, 30 (77%) were under 35 years and 14 (36%) under 25 years. 
There were a higher proportion of male SPA call-handlers compared to 999 
(15/39; 38%). All SPA call-handlers had less than 2 years‟ experience as 
the service had been running for 18 months when the survey was 
conducted. 16 (41%) of SPA call-handlers were employed on a part-time 
basis.  
Most SPA calls occur during the out-of-hours period of evenings, nights and 
weekends, or occasional closures (e.g. when a UCC closes for training). 
Unlike most 999 call-handlers who are trained only to deal with 999 calls, 
many of the full-time SPA call-handlers are „dual trained‟ to take SPA and 
999 calls. In periods of high 999 activity, SPA call-handlers are sometimes 
diverted to take 999 calls. There are only one or two „dedicated‟ SPA call-
handlers on shift during normal work hours.   
Call supervisors   
Call supervisors are a new operational role within the organization, 
responsible for ensuring that the OOH standards are met, that calls are 
properly completed and closed, checking that dispositions/information has 
been passed through to the UCCs, and arranging home visits and if 
necessary, transport. They can support call-handlers if necessary, although 
the clinical supervisor tends to provide support using the CDSS. Call 
supervisors have received CDSS training and extra training in the booking 
system, but are not necessarily „super users‟ of the CDSS. They come from 
different backgrounds: some were previously call-handlers, but others were 
recruited from other parts of the organization or externally. Unlike 999, 
they are not necessarily staff who have worked their way up from call-
handlers, through dispatch to supervisory level. 
3.5 Different settings 3: OOH 
The GP led co-operative was established in the early 1990s and provides 
cover for over 150 GPs serving a population of approximately 140,000, in a 
large town and the surrounding suburban area. In addition to GP out-of-
hours (OOH) services, the organization has expanded to provide in-hours 
telephone answering, telephone consultations, OOH surgeries for a 
Dermatology Unit, a local Emergency Dental Service and OOH Local 
Pharmaceutical Services Dispensary. The service employs Pharmacists and 
Nurse Practitioners who can see, advise and treat patients.  
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OOH was located in a primary care centre (PCC), close to the town centre in 
a two-storey building containing reception and waiting area, an „operations‟ 
room (where call-handling took place), six consulting rooms, and a 
pharmacy dispensing room. There were a number of administrative offices 
and a staff room. The organization also provided a nurse-led satellite 
surgery in another area at weekends.  
During the course of the study, the organization began providing call 
answering for services in two other towns. These calls were taken and 
triaged but consultation/care was provided by other PCCs. Towards the end 
of our fieldwork, the OOH joined a new integrated service and relocated to a 
new UCC at an Acute hospital. The new UCC combined Emergency 
Department, OOH, Mental Health services and Primary Care. The OOH 
service aimed to provide a single point of access for patients - patients were 
encouraged to telephone as the first point of contact and these calls were 
managed using the CDSS. Patients attending the UCC and requiring urgent 
care were managed at a reception desk, booked in electronically onto an 
integrated primary and secondary care system (Adastra), and assessed 
using the CDSS to direct them to the appropriate service (Emergency 
Department or OOH care). 
3.5.1 The OOH workforce 
Call-handlers 
The introduction of the CDSS and creation of the UCC resulted in a large 
increase in the number of call-handlers (from about 30 to 54 during our 
study). Unlike both 999 and SPA settings, OOH call-handlers tended to be 
older. They were predominantly female: of 33 respondents to the survey 
(figures include call-handlers and the shift coordinators / managers who 
also take calls), 28 (85%) were female. Overall 21 (64%) were over the 
age of 45 years, with over a third of staff over the age of 55 years (12 
(36%). Many call-handlers were employed on a part-time basis, with two-
thirds of responders employed part-time (67%). Several call-handlers have 
a „second job‟ and some staff are employed on a „zero hours‟ contract (no 
specific hours or times of work are specified; the call-handler agrees to be 
available for work when required). OOH staff are experienced, typically 
having worked for the organization for a number of years. 
Shifts vary and are either 3, 4, 6 or 8 hours. Typically, the call-handling 
shift starts at 18:30 on weekdays, with 1 or 2 call-handlers who start at 
17:00 or 18:00 to deal with surgeries that close earlier. On weekday 
evenings, there are typically five call-handlers on shift between 18:30 and 
21:30. Between 21:30 and 22:30 staffing is reduced to three call-handlers, 
and to two call-handlers between 22:30 and 23:00. After 23:00, one call-
handler arrives to start their night shift (finishes at 08:00). At weekends 
during busy periods there may be up to seven call-handlers on shift.  
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Shift coordinators/managers 
There are several shift coordinators/managers, who typically work full-time. 
Their duties include organising staff rotas, responsibility for surgery and car 
equipment, supervising the call-handlers and operational issues - generally 
enduring that the service is run smoothly and solving problems related to 
calls or services. Whilst their role is primarily operational, shift coordinators 
also handle calls during busy periods.  
Senior managers and training/audit staff 
One senior manager oversees OOH, including the unscheduled care services 
directly connected OOH. Due to the small size of the organization the senior 
manager also gets involved in “operations at grassroots level” as well as 
having a more strategic role liaising with local commissioners etc.  
Following the introduction of the CDSS, a staff training and auditing role 
was created. Initially, one member of staff was responsible for training and 
auditing but over the course the study two additional staff have been 
trained to assist with the CDSS training and audit function. 
Clinical staff 
Clinical care is provided by GPs, and a small number of pharmacists and 
nurses who work shift patterns to cover the OOH period. These staff are not 
co-located in the call control room – with the exception of one GP who takes 
calls transferred from the call-handlers. The relocation of the service to the 
UCC has co-located OOH with clinical staff such as ambulance crews, nurses 
and hospital doctors who provide emergency services and these staff are 
not employed by the OOH organization.   
3.6 Recruitment and training across the three settings 
Training for call-handlers is structured around a core training package, 
produced by the CDSS developers, so the following section breaks with the 
pattern of discussing the settings separately and instead describes the 
recruitment and training for call-handling across all three settings.  
3.6.1 Recruitment 
We examined job descriptions available on the organizational and job 
vacancy websites for 999 and SPA call-handler roles and paper recruitment 
materials used by OOH.  
The Ambulance Trust in which the 999 and SPA services were based was a 
significant and well known employer in the region. The geographical area 
had historically suffered the impact of the decline in manufacturing and high 
levels of unemployment in each of the economic recessions of the past few 
decades. Recruitment for the Trust tended to be buoyant and there were 
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typically many more applicants for posts than the number of vacancies. For 
999 and SPA the „person specification‟ was identical. Job adverts and 
descriptions state that the organization requires call-handlers with previous 
experience of call-handling, customer service, initial complaint handling, 
working towards demanding targets and who would prefer experience of 
shift work. The range of skills and abilities listed included computer skills, 
decision making, negotiation, communication and multi-tasking. The job 
specification also included personal attributes such as assertiveness, 
confidence, being a team player, integrity, approachability, being polite and 
courteous, able to work under pressure and flexibility. The formal 
qualifications required were a minimum of 5 GCSEs (A-C) or equivalent, 
although the survey indicated that educational attainment tends to exceed 
this.  
In OOH the role specification describes the core skill as being able to 
provide a fast, accurate and effective telephone call taking (operator) 
service to patients in an emergency setting to identify the best route of 
care. This includes taking, recording and processing information received 
accurately and concisely using nationally recognised software to identify 
whether the patient requires GP or A&E care. The current role specification 
explains the dual role of call-handler and receptionist as follows:  
“In a part of the service, you will be using a phone with a headset to 
allow you to type relevant information on to a computer;” 
and staff area also required   
“to be able to work face to face with patients at A&E Reception and 
triage patients through a nationally recognised software system;” 
The materials sent to prospective applicants include a description of the 
initial training programme – as an 
“intensive internally based training programme (approx 60 hours) to 
be able to use the software in a safe, effective and efficient manner” 
and note that it may be necessary for staff to undertake other recognised 
training. 
The specification goes on to list other components of the role as follows:  
“To provide a professional and high quality telephone call taking 
service for local health care services i.e. District Nurses/GP practices; 
To be able to gather essential information in the least possible time 
while remaining polite and courteous; To provide customer focussed 
and professional reception duties to patients; To be able to follow strict 
procedures and protocols at all times; Ensuring full patient 
confidentiality at all times.; To work effectively under pressure in a 
calm and confident manner whilst remaining sensitive to the callers 
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and presenting patients‟ needs.; To undertake any clerical work, 
administrative, data inputting and any other duties.” 
Shortlisted candidates undergo selection processes which vary slightly 
between 999/SPA and OOH.  All the selection processes use group work and 
pre-employment tests. At 999 and SPA call-handlers participate in a three 
stage recruitment process – described by one manager as “stringent”. 
Firstly, applicants are invited to a „test centre‟, for a few hours of classroom 
based skill and psychometric tests, including numeracy and literacy, 
„judgement, perception and memory tests. They also take a test to assess 
typing speed. Secondly, following passing these tests, applicants then are 
invited to a „team day‟ which involves tasks and activities to look at 
communication and team-working skills (for example, building the highest 
structure with straws, working out a mathematical problem). The focus of 
this activity is on communication skills, role and behaviour in the team, 
rather than correctly „solving the problem‟. A panel of clinical supervisors, 
trainers and auditing staff from 999 and SPA services are involved in this 
selection process. Thirdly, if the applicant passes the second stage, they are 
invited for interview. 
Selection for OOH included similar activities but was condensed into a 
shorter period. The recruitment process included an afternoon of similar 
tests followed by an interview. Applicants undertook a typing test and 
computer skills test which involved using various Microsoft Windows 
packages (e.g. PowerPoint, Excel). They were then assigned to groups to 
undertake a task which they subsequently presented to the other groups. 
As an example, one of the tasks involved planning a fund raising event. This 
allowed 2-3 managers/shift coordinators to observe and assess how 
applicants worked in a group and their communication skills. Finally, as at 
999 and SPA, applicants were individually interviewed by the managers, for 
about half an hour. During this interview applicants were asked to provide 
answers to two questions that had been provided in advance. These 
questions related to the wider context of health care (e.g. “If you had 
£100,000, how would you spend it on improving the NHS in the [local 
area]?”) and the specifics of call-handling work (e.g. “If you took a phone 
call and the person was desperately out of breath and couldn't get many 
words out, what would be the first piece of information you'd get from 
them?”). Unlike 999 and SPA where applicants had to pass each successive 
stage of the selection programme, at OOH appointments were made after 
an aggregate assessment of the applicant‟s ability across the skills testing, 
group work and interview. 
3.6.2  Previous experience and qualifications of call-handlers 
We used the survey to collect data about previous experience and 
qualifications of the call-handling workforce. This showed that most call-
handlers held a minimum of 5 GCSEs (or equivalent). Interestingly the call-
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handlers in SPA were more likely to have A-levels and/or undergraduate 
degrees, and this may reflect the timing of the launch of this new service in 
relation to an economic recession and difficulties experienced by local 
people finding work. By contrast OOH call-handlers had lower levels of 
educational qualifications (Table 5) but this may reflect older average age of 
this workforce and the more established service and length of employment. 
It is worth noting that the patterning of qualifications – notably the 
apparent „over‟ qualification of staff in SPA may impact on career 
aspirations and expectations (Table 6).  
 
Table 5. Academic qualifications of call-handlers by study site 






No formal qualifications 0 0 4 
1+ O levels /CSEs /GCSEs (any 
grades) 
3 0 4 
5+ O levels/CSEs (grade 1), 5+ 
GCSEs (grades A-C) School 
Certificate 
4 4 7 
NVQ Level 1, Foundation GVNQ 0 0 1 
NVQ Level 2, Intermediate GVNQ 2 2 0 
NVQ Level 3, Advanced GVNQ 6 1 3 
NVQ Levels 4-5, HNC, HND 2 1 0 
Other (e.g. City & Guilds, RSA/OCR, 
BTEC / Edexcel) 
4 5 5 
1+ A levels / AS levels  1 1 1 
2+ A levels, 4+ AS levels, Higher 
School Certificate 
5 14 2 
First Degree (e.g. BA, BSc) 4 10 3 
Higher Degree (e.g. MA, PhD, PCGE, 
PG certificate, diplomas) 
0 1 2 
 
Table 6 shows that in all three settings, the majority of call-handlers viewed 
their role as a long term job or career, but this was particularly high in OOH 
(28/31 (85%) compared to 20 (64%) in 999 and 23 (59%) in SPA. Staff 
views in the OOH setting are slightly surprising given that many are 
employed on a part-time basis and undertake this job as a second job or fit 
this paid work around caring commitments. Call-handlers in SPA and 999 
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were more likely to report doing call-handling to gain experience for another 
job. SPA had a small number of staff who were also undertaking 
further/higher education alongside their call-handling work. 
 
Table 6. Staff views about their call-handling role 






As a long term job or career 20 23 28 
It fits around study commitments 0 6 1 
Gaining experience for another job 9 11 2 
As a short-term job 2 9 1 
Fits around childcare 
commitments 
2 2 5 
Other 1 5 3 
 
Previous experience of working in health care was not a requirement for 
call-handler positions but Table 7 shows that the majority had previous 
experience of customer service roles (over 80% of call-handlers in each 
setting). OOH staff having the lowest levels of previous experience, of 33 
survey respondents, 13 (41%) had call centre experience compared to 
21/31 (68%) and 28/39 (72%) of 999 and SPA call-handlers respectively.  
 









Call centre work    21 (68%)a*     28 (72%)b**     13 (41%)a* b** 
Customer service 27 (87%) 32 (82%) 26 (81%) 
Health and social care     5 (16%)a* 10 (26%)   14 (45%)a* 
N.B.   Common superscript in same row shows significant difference between those sites -  * 
p < 0.05;   ** p<0.01 
 
3.6.3  Initial call-handler training 
Training following appointment for all call-handlers across the three settings 
was similar. Training materials were developed by the CDSS developer team 
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and augmented by existing site specific materials (e.g. health and safety, 
organizational procedures etc).   
In 999 and SPA new staff had a 7 week full-time training program based on 
a demonstration/training version of the CDSS. Call-handlers were trained in 
small groups in a dedicated classroom with computers/monitors which 
mimic those in the control room. Training materials include a „distance 
learning pack‟ given to all trainees to read before they commence training. 
This details a wide range of clinical signs and symptoms and at the end of 
the pack there is a series of questions to test comprehension. 
The first two days for 999 and SPA induction includes an introduction to the 
organization and a series of talks from and about human resources, 
occupational health, and the trades unions. New call-handlers are given 
their uniforms and computer log-in details and told about annual leave, 
conditions of service etc.   
This is followed by two days basic clinical training covering first aid 
procedures and introduction to features of major, common, life threatening 
conditions and diseases such as heart attacks and stroke. Then the new 999 
recruits begin a ten day training programme about how to use the CDSS for 
emergency call management. This is structured around a training workbook 
which covers 100 clinical scenarios – each with a series of sections teasing 
out how to work with the CDSS to manage the call. This is followed by a 
further ten days training on the related computer systems and 
organizational procedures – learning how to use the CAD system, dealing 
with urgent hospital transfer cases, using the mapping functions and so on.  
The fifth and sixth weeks of training are spent working in the control room 
alongside an experienced call-handler or „buddy‟,  chosen because they have 
good audit results and are considered by control room managers to be 
„suitable‟ as a buddy. By the second week the new call-handlers take calls, 
watched and listened to by their buddy. The buddy can intervene, but aim 
to make less and less input so that by the final shift of week six new call-
handlers are able take calls unaided. This training is rounded off with a final 
week in the classroom reviewing the experiences of taking live calls, using 
monitoring information and feedback from the „buddies‟ to identify and 
rectify problems or issues revealed.  
The training programme for SPA was modelled on the established 999 
training and followed a very similar structure. When the service launched 
one difficulty for the trainers was that SPA training had to run without them 
knowing quite what the SPA service was going to be like. The first versions 
of the SPA training programme had a very strong focus on emergency call-
handling and life-threatening conditions. As a result, in the first months of 
the SPA service call-handlers tended to refer higher numbers of calls than 
expected to ambulance dispositions. We were able to feedback our 
observations about the training programme– pointing out the emphasis on 
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999 work, partly because the trainers were themselves previously or 
currently working in 999. This information, combined with audit and 
monitoring by the Trust and the on-going experience of delivering the SPA 
service meant that the trainers were able to adapt the training to reflect the 
slightly different nature of urgent care calls.  
Training at 999 and SPA was situated in the context of a large well 
established organization which had a history of training staff for a range of 
emergency care roles. The use of the CDSS since 2006 meant that, at the 
time of our fieldwork, the organization had a number of staff who were able 
train new staff. These included human resources and training staff, clinical 
supervisors, and a number of experienced call-handlers. By contrast the 
OOH service was a smaller organization with far fewer training resources. 
Although the OOH service itself was well established and there were staff 
with experience of managing urgent care calls (using a paper based protocol 
system) existing and new staff had to be trained to use the CDSS. This 
meant quickly training members of the existing staff as CDSS trainers. 
When we began our fieldwork only one member of staff, who was an 
experienced call-handler, had trained as a CDSS trainer and this person had 
responsibility for cascading training to existing call-handlers and newly 
appointed staff. While another person was trained to deliver the training 
during the course of our study the training function remained considerably 
smaller in the OOH setting.  
The initial retraining of OOH staff was supported by members of the CDSS 
developer team and the programme appears to have been a slightly 
condensed version of that delivered at 999 and SPA. With the new UCC and 
the inclusion of face-to-face work, existing reception staff needed to be 
trained to use the CDSS and the existing call-handlers needed additional 
training in face-to-face work. At the same time the number of staff 
expanded and new recruits had to be trained to use the CDSS, the 
associated computer technologies and had to learn about the wider 
organization. The CDSS training was delivered by 1-2 recently trained 
trainers and additional organizational orientation and training was provided 
by other middle managers within the organization.  
3.6.4  On-going call-handler training 
Continual updates to the CDSS - as the result of new clinical knowledge and 
practices or external changes to service provision or targets – meant that 
additional continuous training was required. More detail is provided about 
this in chapter 7 when we examine the reflexive monitoring work done to 
appraise and adapt the technology to keep it in use. But in brief, during 
early implementation at 999 system update training was delivered by the 
CDSS developer team – largely because they understood the nature of the 
changes made to the CDSS. Latterly, in all three sites continuing training 
was delivered using materials jointly prepared by the developer team and 
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the setting trainers. For example the last training we observed on CDSS 
release 6 at OOH involved a day for all call-handlers where they worked 
through a workbook of new scenarios and had short presentations reviewing 
changes to the CDSS questions. The OOH trainer worked through a set of 
prepared training materials (provided by the CDSS developers) which she 
had annotated and adapted during the course of repeated training sessions.  
3.7 Summary: same technology, different settings - what 
have we learned?  
We have outlined how the same technology - the CDSS – is subtly different 
in the different settings of emergency (999) and urgent (SPA and OOH) 
care. The way the CDSS is used and the dispositions reached differ between 
emergency and urgent care and this requires different „work‟ by call-
handlers and those around them (e.g. call-handlers in urgent care - OOH 
and SPA – are required to book appointments).   
The co-location of two services (999 and SPA) in the same Trust does not 
diminish important differences between urgent and emergency care work, 
even using the same CDSS. There are also some interesting differences in 
characteristics of the 999 and SPA workforce e.g. educational attainment.    
Another important difference between the three settings is the length of 
time using the CDSS, and providing their service. The 999 call-handling 
service is very well established and has the longest experience of using the 
CDSS. By contrast, SPA is a new venture for the Trust and a new type of 
service within the context of the NHS. The OOH service, whilst long 
established had relatively recently adopted the CDSS. In addition it had 
recently reconfigured and relocated to the UCC and begun using the CDSS 
for face to face reception work. All of these features distinguish this setting 
from the comparator urgent care service at SPA.  
So, our different settings provide different types of service, in different 
circumstances and have different experiences using the CDSS. In terms of 
workforce we have deliberately focused on those staff using the CDSS on a 
daily basis - the call-handlers - and those immediately around them. Again 
there are differences workforce characteristics (e.g. age, qualifications) and 
in role differentiation and organizational hierarchies in the three settings.  
Finally we have shown that while there is a common core of training in 
using the CDSS and undertaking call-handling work, this too varies across 
the three settings. There are differences in the content and format of 
training, and these are associated with the length of experience the 
organization has of using the CDSS, the training resources available, and 
the different types of work in the different contexts of urgent and 
emergency care. 
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Having established this foundation for our study of the same technology in 
different settings the following four chapters use NPT to structure our 
findings and begin to answer our questions about the workforce 
management and training issues arising from the deployment of the CDSS.
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4 Coherence – Does the intervention make 
sense? 
4.1 Introduction 
NPT claims that for an innovation to become embedded in practice it 
requires coherence. The intervention needs to make sense to the actors 
involved, who must understand its functions and utility for their work. 
Furthermore, these actors must understand the intervention to be 
practically achievable, such that they will invest in making it work. For 
example, consideration may be given to whether appropriate staff are in 
place, with the necessary skills, whether the intervention will integrate 
effectively with other everyday routines, or whether there are appropriate 
levels of supervision and management support for the intervention.  
Whilst this may sound obvious, the history of ICT interventions in health 
care is littered with examples of applications that seemed like a good idea 
to policy-makers or IT developers but failed to consider the understandings 
of those who would actually use the intervention in their daily work (see 
Chapter 1). It is clear that this has contributed to the past failures: the 
existence of coherence around an intervention is critical to its outcome.    
NPT proposes that coherence develops through a process of communal 
specification, whereby those actors involved in its enactment develop a 
shared representation of the intervention and its utility and advantages over 
other ways of organising the work. The embedding of an intervention in 
everyday practice is affected by anything which increases or decreases the 
understanding of the practice as meaningful in terms of what it is, what it 
does and whether it is practically achievable.  
In what follows, we explore the part that coherence has played in each 
setting.  
4.2 999 
Prior to the introduction of the CDSS, 999 calls were handled by non-clinical 
staff, with basic training in anatomy and physiology who used a computer-
based classificatory system for prioritising ambulance dispatch („Criteria 
Based Dispatch‟ (CBD)). This consisted of an initial assessment to gather 
demographic information, before asking a series of questions to prioritise 
the call and assign the patient to a category. After determining the chief 
complaint, the call-handler would move to a flip chart for that condition. By 
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asking a series of questions the call-handler allocated a specific category 
from the chart and an „ABC‟ prioritization66. CBD used statement prompts 
and allowed the call-handler considerable flexibility in choosing questions 
and recording answers. There was strong coherence around this system, 
but there were nonetheless two concerns about it. First, there was some 
inconsistency in the outcomes reached by call-handlers, and managers were 
concerned about the decision-making process  
„…a lot of it was intuitive, based on the experience of the call-handler 
and wasn‟t actually using the system to end up making the decision. So 
that was the reason why we needed to move [to a new system]‟. 
Interview, 999 senior manager  
Second, there was pressure to reduce „Category A‟ (calls requiring an 8 
minute ambulance) and „Category B‟ (calls requiring an 18 minute 
ambulance) dispositions.  Paramedic assessment at the scene recorded a 
Category A rate of <10%, but call-handlers were producing an average of 
25% [999 Report 2007]. Even allowing for safety margins this was judged 
unsustainable in the fiscal circumstances.  
The CDSS was presented to 999 as an extended triage system built on a 
comprehensive clinical evidence base that would enable clerical staff to 
make more sophisticated clinical evaluations without further clinical training 
or experience. It promised standardised decision-making, a wider range of 
dispositions and enabled call-handlers to give on-going advice to the caller 
for worsening symptoms or self-treatment.  
Against this background, the new CDSS had a high level of coherence in the 
999 setting, built around a general set of beliefs – shared by the software 
developers, the Department of Health, 999 managers and the call-handlers 
– that the new technology would allow non-clinical staff to perform the re-
defined task of 999 call-handling in a safe and timely manner.  
This general specification of coherence was underscored by an independent 
evaluation commissioned by the Department of Health67, which verified that 
the CDSS was safe for non-clinicians to use to triage calls to 999. This 
allowed the Ambulance Trust to become a pilot site for the CDSS [999 
Annual Report 2008/09] 
The CDSS achieved coherence here because there was widespread trust in 
its applicability and safety in handling 999 calls. Staff across the 
organization linked this directly to the clinical knowledge base underpinning 
the algorithms driving the system. The representation of the CDSS as 
“developed by doctors and nurses” was a message regularly repeated, for 
example:  
You‟ve got to trust the system. Sometimes I think that shouldn‟t be the 
disposition, but then again, that system [CDSS] has been designed by 
doctors and nurses and like a team of specialists … Even though I 
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sometimes think “that question is ridiculous”, there‟s a reason for it 
being there so you‟ve got to ask it. Interview, 999 call-handler 
[Call-handler] explains that [the CDSS] has been designed by “a huge 
group of people...non-clinicians, clinicians - lots of input...it‟s a very safe 
system to use, used correctly”. Observation 999  
Survey findings that directly measured trust in the CDSS supported these 
data (Table 8). Responses to five items on the trust survey relating to safety 
and effective handling of calls were aggregated to give an overall measure 
of trust in the systems competence to triage calls. The mean overall rating 
for competence was found to be quite high (M = 3.8; SD = 0.6, measured 
on a 5 point scale). Of note at the individual item level, call-handlers ratings 
of trust in the CDSS to arrive at safe dispositions and handle emergency 
calls effectively were particularly high (M = 4.0, SD = 0.7; M = 4.0, SD = 
0.8, for safety and effectiveness respectively). Call-handlers were also 
asked to rate their trust in the competence of the CDSS relative to other 
systems they knew of. Analysis revealed this mean rating to be similar, 
although slightly lower, than their overall view of the systems competence 
(M = 3.7; SD = 0.9). 
Although most of the staff in 999 had been recruited to use the simpler CBD 
system, the extension of their work to include a more complex process of 
clinically-based questioning and advice, and a fuller range of potential 
dispositions, was understood to be safely achievable, providing staff were 
adequately trained to use the CDSS.  
Thus, the appropriateness and safety of the new CDSS provided one key 
element for coherence around the introduction of the CDSS at 999. But the 
meaningfulness of this intervention was also tied to the additional 
advantages it brought to call-handling. In part this links to the clinical 
evidence base, which – it is assumed – will result in standardised decision 
making and therefore „better‟ resource use and health outcomes. 
Underpinning the CDSS is a conviction that there is an objectively „correct‟ 
disposition for every condition. The CDSS syntheses current clinical research 
into to series of mathematical algorithms which, when followed accurately, 
should produce consistent outcomes:   
The previous system gave them [the call-handlers] a lot of freedom to 
use a particular set of training skills in their heads, it wasn‟t 
documented, a really scary system… they had a lot of freedom to decide 
what was needed Interview, CDSS developer 
its aim is to give the same disposition to every patient who presents with 
the same condition. Interview, 999 manager 
On this basis, there was widespread agreement that clerical staff using the 
CDSS could reach more reliable decisions than clinically trained staff. The 
embedding of clinical expertise in the CDSS meant that the call-handlers did 
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not require extensive clinical training. Indeed having clinical knowledge 
could interfere with the safe use of the CDSS. 
…with [the CDSS]… they only want you to concentrate on what the 
caller‟s saying at the time, and each question that‟s presented to you at 
the time. Whereas, if you‟ve got someone who‟s medically trained, they 
tend to try and think about what‟s wrong with them, try and diagnose 
them, and they‟re thinking ahead all the time, and they‟re thinking too 
deep really … it can be a hindrance [being a clinician]. Interview, 999 
manager 
With these knowledge claims secure, the CDSS could be used to ration 
ambulances according to objective and systematic assessment of need. In 
the period 2006-2009 999 calls rose from 347,628 to 405,000 and budget 
constraint was a national and local priority:   
Public spending will become much tighter and as one of the biggest 
spending departments, the NHS will come under scrutiny to trim its 
budget. … The responsibility will lie with all of us at the Trust to look for 
greater efficiencies in our day to day operations. 999 Annual Report 
2008/09 
The need to ration was part of the coherence around the CDSS, at all 
organizational levels, although expressed differently by different actors. For 
some rationing was linked to controlling costs, for others a response to 
„time wasters‟, whilst others saw it as empowering patients:  
[call-handler] explains that she now realises how important [the CDSS] 
is. Many people call for an ambulance even if they do not need one. [The 
CDSS] helps them to select where to send the vehicles. Observation 
999  
The benefits for me were, were not taking some people to  hospital and 
only responding to people who really needed it because that was one of 
[the previous system‟s] downfalls, was that we responded to 
everything. … [The CDSS] empowers patients a bit more to kind of think 
about what‟s wrong and to do something themselves about it or give 
them the ability to be able to confidently tell them that they can stay at 
home, you can take Codeine or Paracetamol, you know, if it doesn‟t get 
any better, you can go and see your doctor the next day. Interview, 
999 manager 
So it was widely agreed that that the CDSS could be used by non-clinical 
staff to triage 999 calls, standardising decision making and allowing 
rationing of scarce resources to achieve clinically, financially and socially 
desirable outcomes.  
However, alongside this communal specification of coherence, there was a 
minor strand of dissent amongst call-handlers and some managers who, 
whilst they supported the intervention, believed that call-handlers still 
needed to exercise some discretion - for example, in calls that fell „outside‟ 
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the CDSS, such as an incoherent caller, or multiple cases in the same call 
(e.g. a car accident). Indeed, it was accepted by the developers that there 
would be occasional „over-rides‟ to work outside the CDSS but not that call-
handlers would need to exercise discretion within the system. Whilst this did 
not detract from the coherence around the CDSS there was a sense that the 
CDSS did not „cover every eventuality‟ and thus call-handlers must be 
prepared for the unexpected. This was linked to other concerns amongst 
some call-handlers that their job was being deskilled: 
I think people‟s initial reaction when they see [this type of CDSS] … 
when you see questions on the screen, that look very scripted,  you think 
well, anybody could come in and do this. It‟s sort of taken away the skills 
that I have, so I think that‟s how a lot of people felt and felt that it was a 
very scripted system and very rigid and they weren‟t sort of using their 
own sort of decision-making or their own sort of knowledge. Interview, 
999 manager  
Despite this, there was strong coherence around the CDSS at 999: it made 
sense and was seen as capable of supporting call-handling work safely. It 
was also understood as offering the opportunity to ration – saving money, 
delivering appropriate care, using evidence based knowledge. This 
coherence was maintained, in part because it was not too tightly specified; 
staff could understand the CDSS as better for patients because it produced 
more appropriate dispositions, or as a device for reining in costs, or both of 
these.  
4.3 SPA  
Whereas 999 and OOH introduced the CDSS to manage an established 
service, in SPA it was introduced to underpin a new service set up to 
provide 24/7 access and direct referral to all out-of-hours services (services 
provided by the PCTs). The CDSS was critical to the operation of SPA, 
combining the triaging software used in 999, with a new „Capacity 
Management System‟ allowing call-handlers to offer service information 
(e.g. opening hours pharmacists) and to book out of hours appointments.   
Coherence around the SPA service derived from the NHS Next Stage 
Review, which called for the development of integrated out-of-hours 
services. This resonated with Trust managers, looking to secure the future 
of their service:  
…we‟d already realised that, … the whole health care model‟s becoming 
so complicated it‟s difficult to navigate your way, way through it; it‟s not 
the patient‟s fault that they don‟t know how to, how to access and who 
to access and that the NHS… should get its act together and make this 
as easy as possible. Interview, 999 senior manager 
Furthermore, managers clearly identified the need to improve urgent care 
to alleviate pressure on emergency services:  
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If we don‟t change our systems and processes the ambulance service will 
just implode with … increased demand. Interview, 999 senior 
manager 
Thus, the development of SPA derived coherence from wider political and 
policy debate and a consensus that „something must be done‟. Coherence 
around the use of the CDSS to do this was built together by the Trust 
managers and the CDSS developers, and underpinned by the same 
rationalities of standardization and evidence-based medicine that were 
important in building coherence in 999 (see 4.2 above). Because the 
knowledge represented in the CDSS was understood as independent of 
context, the same system could be directly transferred: 
We, thought we could help work with the [CDSS] developer to provide 
this, in effect, single point of access … [it] doesn‟t matter whether it‟s 
urgent or emergency, it‟s only us that define it as urgent and 
emergency, you know, the patient doesn‟t.  They, they want, they‟ve got 
something wrong with them and they want it sorted now. Interview, 
999 senior manager 
This sense of trust in the system‟s competence was supported by the survey 
responses of SPA call-handlers (Table 8). The mean overall rating for 
competence was found to be high (M = 4.1; SD = 0.7, measured on a 5 
point scale). At the individual item level, call-handlers ratings of trust in the 
system‟s ability to arrive at safe dispositions and handle SPA calls 
effectively were particularly high (M = 4.3, SD = 0.7; M = 4.0, SD = 0.8, 
for safety and effectiveness respectively). Trust in the system‟s competence 
at handling SPA calls was comparable to the same call-handlers beliefs 
about its competence to triage 999 calls (M = 4.1, SD = 1.0) consistent 
with the qualitative data that there was a strong belief that the system was 
capable of operating effectively in both settings. 
The managers, having implemented CDSS for 999, were confident about 
extending it to SPA. They had nearly three years‟ experience of recruitment, 
training, monitoring and supporting staff using the CDSS, so they were sure 
that implementation was practically achievable. They believed that SPA staff 
needed same skill-set as those in 999 and that this would – eventually - 
enable staff to work flexibly across urgent and emergency care, maximising 
effective workforce management.  
I would like to think that they would all …be skilled to take all levels of 
calls. I think if we start to carve out different types of calls coming to 
different, then you sort of lose that, the capacity. If they are all trained 
to take the 999 calls, then when they‟re not doing an urgent call, they 
can pick up a 999 call and vice versa. So I think it‟s, you know, you have 
better use of resources if they‟re all trained up to take all calls. 
Interview 999 senior manager 
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4.4 Out-of-hours  
Prior to the introduction of the CDSS, calls to this out-of-hours service were 
handled by clerical staff using a mixture of paper based clinical protocols 
and „Adastra‟ (a computerised case management system which records 
patient details and clinical management decisions). The paper protocol had 
been developed by local GP directors partly informed by materials produced 
by another PCT68. The protocol comprised 70 pages of alphabetically 
organized sets of complaints (abdominal pain, accidents, etc.) within which 
grids of symptoms and criteria were presented enabling the call-handlers to 
prioritise calls for the attention of the duty GP. There was considerable 
flexibility for the call-handler in how questions were asked. 
These call-handlers worked part-time, often alongside other health care 
work e.g. as GP receptionists. They were not clinically trained, but in some 
cases had many years‟ experience and experiential knowledge about 
prioritising calls, communicating with patients, and service user 
expectations. The survey shows that 45% of OOH call-handlers had prior 
experience in health and social care, significantly more than those at 999 
and SPA (16% and 26% respectively).  
Coherence around the existing system was high amongst the managers and 
GPs. 
Yes, we were very happy with it; it worked very well. Like I said, we won 
a national award for it because it was so effective. The PCTs locally were 
very happy and they‟ve audited it. And we have a clinical governance 
system that reviews calls and the outcomes of the calls, and the 
performance of the operators, the GPs, nurses, etc. Interview, OOH GP  
Call-handlers liked the established system, felt accomplished and confident 
using it. There was a strong belief that the system was both safe for 
handling calls, efficient and quick to use. 
The positive, with using that system, was that the calls used to take on 
average 2 minutes …. with the old system, they didn‟t need as many 
operators, so it was more cost effective. Interview, OOH call-handler 
I think we had one of the best systems going. Interview, OOH call-
handler 
There were some key differences between the protocol system and the 
CDSS. The latter was more structured and allowed a greater range of 
dispositions and the opportunity to advise patients (e.g. self-care advice). 
The CDSS was not presented as an alternative but as a similar way of doing 
the task, with the same staff and organizational structures. In this way, the 
managers attempted to build on satisfaction with the old system to develop 
coherence around the new one:  
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it backs up our decision to have non-clinical call-takers triaging and 
going through our initial pathways… by doing a service similar to what 
we were used to, it was not too much of a change for our operators. 
Interview, OOH senior manager 
To me, [the CDSS] is just a system of our old protocols put onto the 
machine for us to read out. Interview, OOH manager 
The protocol system did not meet national standards for OOH services69, 
which required out-of-hours providers to start „definitive clinical assessment‟ 
within 20 minutes of answering urgent calls. The new standards did not 
recognise the work done using paper based protocols as clinical 
assessment, but the CDSS was recognised as enabling this, even when used 
by the same workforce 
Because the staff couldn‟t advise patients at that point, it still wasn‟t 
recognised even though the PCTs were happy with the way we did 
things. So we knew we had to, sort of, do something. Interview, OOH 
senior manager 
 [The CDSS] in one way, helped us a great deal by continuing the similar 
non-clinical triage that we've always done. And when we've compared 
[it] to what we did, it‟s very similar. But because it‟s a nationally 
approved evidence-based system, it gives us the medial legal protection 
for our staff, and it ticks the boxes for the PCTs. Interview, OOH GP 
Trust in the systems competence to triage calls was further supported by 
the survey (Table 8). The mean overall rating for competence was found to 
be high (M = 4.0; SD = 0.5, measured on a 5 point scale). Of note, at the 
individual item level, call-handlers ratings of trust in the system‟s ability to 
arrive at safe dispositions and handle OOH calls effectively were both high 
(M = 4.0, SD = 0.9; M = 4.0, SD = 0.6, for safety and effectiveness 
respectively). Despite this, however, trust in the systems competence 
relative to other systems was less certain (M = 3.6, SD = 0.7). 
As well as meeting new standards OOH managers wanted the new system 
to do more than its predecessor which had simply sorted call urgency for 
the GPs. Call-handlers could not suggest alternatives to the caller so 
„expensive‟ doctors had to deal with complex and simple calls alike. OOH 
managers were keen to direct callers to alternative dispositions if possible 
and to offer advice. The belief was that this would improve the quality and 
safety of care and reduce demand. 
… that was an advantage … for the first time our non-clinical operators 
could give directed clinical advice, or direct patients to be able to go and 
see their GP or health care professional within several days […]  So that 
was a bonus for us because that was new, and that was also going to 
reduce the pressure on the out-of-hours work. Interview, OOH GP 
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In addition, auditing calls in the protocol system was slow and managers 
needed a system that facilitated faster performance analysis:  
But we did recognise that to audit all those calls, was a very lengthy 
process because everything was free text, basically typed in. So we 
decided that we needed something to audit more quickly with reporting 
[…] Interview, OOH senior manager 
The communal specification of coherence at OOH centred on the need to 
extend the call-handlers‟ role so that they could offer clinical advice within 
an increasingly standardised regulatory bureaucracy organized at the 
national level. The existing system was not regarded as unsafe or 
problematic locally, but was rendered unsuitable by external changes.  
However, despite this broad coherence there was some ambivalence over 
the extent to which the CDSS would, could or should remove all discretion 
from the call-handlers. Concerns were raised about whether such work 
could be performed by non-clinical staff:  
Ah, there's nothing that I can say that I think it is better than the way 
we were doing it, not at the moment. It is, first line triage done by non-
clinical staff, for half the price that you're going to have to pay a nurse.  
If that‟s good, if that‟s saving people money, that‟s fine, but they're 
asking people who have 60 hours training and not a medical background 
at all, to do what they're doing, and sometimes I think, oh dear [laughs]. 
Interview, OOH call-handler  
As we will show in subsequent chapters, such views had implications for the 
on-going coherence, cognitive participation and collective action around 
CDSS. As in 999, there was broad coherence around the introduction of the 
CDSS at OOH, but also some tensions around deskilling: this was not only a 
concern for call-handlers themselves in term of how skilled and interesting 
their work was, but also raised questions about the skills necessary to do 
call taking effectively. 
4.5 Coherence across the three different settings 
Studying the how the same technology came into use in three settings, 
shows that it is possible to achieve coherence around this intervention, even 
where local conditions vary considerably. Across all three sites, there was 
agreement that the CDSS was suitable for the (varied) task at hand. 
Similarly, there was agreement that the appropriate resources – staff, 
training and organizational structures – were in place to enable effective 
implementation of the intervention, even though these resources varied 
from place to place. These findings were endorsed by our survey, which 
showed that call-handlers self-reported trust in the CDSS was broadly 
similar across all three settings. 
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This said, we also identified a significant difference in coherence between 
999 and OOH on the one hand and SPA on the other. In both 999 and OOH 
- where experienced staff were required to switch from an established 
system of call-handling to the „new‟ CDSS, there were some doubts on the 
„shop floor‟ about whether a CDSS could embody all the knowledge 
necessary to do the work. These call-handlers argued on the basis of 
experiential knowledge (sometime acquired over many years) that call-
handling would continue to require off-line experiential expertise. When 
call-handlers were asked by our survey to assess the competence of the 
CDSS relative to other systems, the SPA respondents rated the CDSS more 
highly than at either of the other two sites. There was then a „gap‟ between 
999 and OOH staff trust in the CDSS per se, and their evaluation of its 
competence relative to other ways of doing the job. Whilst at 999 the 
differences between overall competence and relative competence were 
marginal, at the OOH site relative competence ratings were significantly 
lower than overall competence. These findings are consistent with the 
qualitative findings regarding different beliefs about the CDSS in each of the 
settings. Call-handlers at 999 and SPA had experience of other systems and 
had some reservations about this new system. In OOH some staff preferred 
the previous system. 
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Table 8. Respondents self-reported trust in the CDSS (by trust factors) 













Overall trust in CDSS 
system competence 
3.8 (0.6)     4.1 (0.7) 4.0 (0.5) 
Competence relative 
to other systems 
     3.7 (0.9)a*** 
 
    4.1 (0.8)a*** b*** 
 
    3.6 (0.7)b*** 
 
N.B.   Common superscript in same row shows significant difference between those sites - *** 
p<0.001 
 
4.5.1 Workforce implications  
So far as the initial specification of coherence is concerned, there appears to 
be a need for different managerial strategies where a technological 
intervention replaces an established service, run by staff in post, compared 
with those cases where the service and the staff are new. Staff knowledge 
and experience of a service and the working identities built through the 
everyday conduct of work influence the coherence of new technology for 
different staff in different settings.   
4.5.2  Implications for developing NPT 
Our findings about the nature of coherence, across all three settings, 
elaborate the processes through which coherence is achieved. We show that 
it is important to recognise that coherence is achieved in the context of 
wider discourses that shape the intelligibility of an intervention. To 
understand coherence we need to explore the discourses that enable this 
intervention to „make sense‟. This goes beyond the task-focussed question 
„can the CDSS do the job?‟ to ask how the job is understood in broader 
social, political and economic terms. What underpinned coherence in all 
three cases was not simply a narrow evaluation of the tasks to be done but 
a far wider set of understandings linked to shifts in the power/knowledge 
relations. These include discursive shifts in how the NHS is understood 
(acceptance of rationing), how the public is meant to behave (challenging 
callers‟ rights to services) and wider contests about clinical knowledge 
(dominance of EBM). It is the interplay of these discourses that underpins 
the coherence of the CDSS across all three sites.  
It is worth pointing out that what we have discussed here is an initial 
specification of coherence – but coherence is not a one-off or static 
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achievement. This underscores May and Finch‟s point that the constructs of 
NPT are „dynamic and … their reproduction over time is emergent‟54 (p 542). 
Coherence is not guaranteed or stable, but demands continual re-production 
through people‟s experience of the intervention in everyday use, and as 
organizational structures and wider contexts change. This may work to 
enhance the coherence of an intervention over time or, of course, to 
destabilise it.  
Finally, it is important to note that the discursive shifts described above are 
general in nature and clearly not specific to our case. Indeed, they are 
arguments that have been mobilised for other ICT interventions but which 
have – nonetheless – not been successful. Coherence per se is not enough 
– we need to look now at how actors are brought on board to do work that 
makes this intervention work. 
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5 Cognitive participation – Who does the 
work? 
5.1 Introduction 
NPT proposes that the processes involved in implementation are made up of 
long chains of engagement performed by a range of different actors. The 
nature of these interaction chains will vary depending on both the new 
practice itself and also on the actors involved in its enactment. The domain 
of cognitive participation in NPT focuses attention on these interaction 
chains, and proposes that the embedding of a new practice is dependent, at 
least in part, on the extent to which the actors needed for implementation 
can be defined and organised into shared purpose. Furthermore, it suggests 
that any factors which promote or inhibit these actors‟ participation will be 
influential in how, or indeed whether, the new practice comes into use.  
NPT proposes that the actors needed to implement a new practice include 
not only those with the immediate hands-on responsibility for performing 
the task, but also those in the wider context who influence the institutional 
and political structures in which the intervention is situated. Some actors 
will have the power to participate voluntarily, whilst others – for example, 
junior staff - will appear to have little choice. However, in practice, any of 
these actors can affect the smooth operation of the interaction chains 
involved in implementation by either facilitating their enactment or 
disrupting them.  
In the early stages, cognitive participation involves the initiation of the new 
practice by leading actors. However for this to progress they must also 
enrol the other key actors needed for collective action. This enrolment is 
itself dependent on processes of legitimation or „buy-in‟ to the coherence 
around the new practice (see Chapter 4). Implicit in this is the notion of 
trust, both in the beliefs about the practice itself, but also in the ability, 
benevolence, and integrity of the various actors in the network. We now 
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In 999, the initiating actors were the Department of Health, the CDSS 
developers and the local managers. Whilst (as we saw in Chapter 4) each 
agreed on the broad advantages of the CDSS (a communal specification of 
the CDSS) - it became clear during our research that the underlying 
motivations for this varied significantly between actors.  
For the government and the DH, motivations to become involved related to 
the perceived ability of the CDSS to support rationalization and maintain 
services under conditions of increased demand and cost pressures. DH 
support for the development of the system was grounded in ambitions to 
reform and integrate urgent and emergency care to provide more efficient 
services. The particular policy advantage of the CDSS lay in its potential to 
replace expensive clinicians with cheaper clerical staff and to extend the 
scope and accuracy of triaging:   
… if you can handle this with call-handlers and just a few nurses, adjust 
that skill-mix, you could save a shed load of money. And actually have 
no detriment to the outcomes. And to be honest, in the economic climate 
it‟s going to get tougher and tougher. …I think that‟s why…the DH is so 
keen to see [the CDSS] being used, because it‟s the only way they‟re 
going to afford their policy. Interview, key stakeholder 
For the CDSS development team enrolment was about putting their 
technical solution first in the process of rationalization and standardization. 
The team had a strong vision of their solution, but had not found it easy to 
get institutional support. They needed to enrol the wider, more powerful 
networks in the DH to take their project forward:  
we‟ve just gone from strength to strength because we‟re now in an 
organization with infrastructure specifically geared to making this kind of 
thing available across the nation. Interview, CDSS developer  
With DH support the CDSS was piloted in two OOH sites but then 
withdrawn. Nonetheless, the developers were satisfied that the CDSS had 
„worked‟ in these settings, attributing withdrawal to commissioning 
problems and local politics. The opportunity to pilot at the 999 setting 
offered the development team the chance to pilot emergency call-handling, 
new territory in which to prove the utility of the CDSS. The developers 
invested heavily in appealing to the ambitions of the other actors who were 
necessary to secure success in this new setting.   
For the Trust managers, the motivation for enrolment related in part to 
beliefs that the CDSS could match „the right professional‟ to the caller‟s 
needs and be „in the right place at the right time‟. Other systems were more 
expensive and the CDSS offered a means of reducing ambulance demand 
which could standardise call-handlers dispositions and provide sophisticated 
© Queen‟s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Greener et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health               





record to document decision making. The CDSS presented itself as a means 
of achieving some of these aims. 
However they also saw the CDSS as a means of positioning themselves as a 
leading Trust in the wider NHS. Consequently they found their ambitions 
tied to those of the CDSS developers. The 999 managers believed that by 
working with the developers to bring the CDSS into the 999 they could 
shape it to realise their ambitions.  
the main reason we moved over onto [the CDSS] was because it became 
available and as… a dynamic Trust, we thought, well, if we get a hold of 
this tool, … get it designed … by somebody who knows what they‟re 
doing, in other words, us, and it should work a hell of a lot better than 
the alternative. So we wanted to get a hold of it and work with it to 
make it a reality. Interview, senior manager 
We‟ve always been in the forefront of new things, new initiatives …you 
can guarantee if something‟s going to happen, we will be at the forefront 
of that and we‟ve got a reputation for that, of wanting to try new things 
and wanting to push the boundaries a little bit further, so it didn‟t 
surprise us when we [piloted the CDSS]. Interview, 999 manager 
There was significant pressure on the organization to implement the CDSS 
rapidly (such pressure was a common feature across all three settings, 
either from the DH (at 999) or local PCTs (SPA and OOH). The organization 
was under additional pressure as it had to integrate the CDSS into wider 
technological systems. Alongside the CDSS, the organization implemented a 
new CAD system at the same time. (CAD is used by dispatchers, call-
handlers, and managers for ambulance resource management, 
communications and radio and mapping). Implementing two new systems 
simultaneously created challenges for the organization:  
And the command and control system probably gave us a lot more issues 
than did going live with [the CDSS] […] And that‟s mainly because the 
staff, were desperately trying to answer calls with the new system whilst, 
at the same time, call length had doubled and, they were bemused by 
the new CAD system. […]  So, I had lots, lots of problems around that, 
two different systems on the same day. Massive change. Interview, 
999 senior manager 
If I was to be honest, when [the CDSS] come in, I thought I was going 
to have a nervous breakdown….it was such a shock…You knew all that 
information was there, and it was all in the computer, but it was making 
sure that you were going to go the right way…. because we were the first 
service to use it, there was a lot of problems with it, in the 
beginning. …when [the CDSS] first come in, it really was hard. I have 
had nights, when I‟ve got in me car and I‟ve been driving home, and I‟ve 
been crying, and saying, I‟ve never put in a day like that. It was quite, 
quite stressful. Interview, 999 call-handler 
© Queen‟s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Greener et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health               





These pressures were exacerbated by needing additional staff, and delays in 
a proposed move to a larger building.  
it was a very fraught place to work when it got busy; very frenetic and 
frantic and, at, at times, people would be left running out of the building 
in floods of tears because they couldn‟t cope with the, you know, the 
environment that was building up. It was like a pressure cooker. […] 
When we moved across into this place we‟d learnt lots and lots and lots 
of lessons about matching capacity to demand. So, we‟ve got a heck of a 
lot more agents upstairs and building a bigger space. Interview, 999 
senior manager 
In addition to securing information systems and other infrastructure, 
management also sought to secure the enrolment of their own staff, 
principally those who worked in the control room. For the front-line staff 
participation was mandatory. In formal bureaucratic terms they had no say 
in the decision to adopt the new CDSS. In one of the earlier pilots, members 
of staff were given the choice of whether to use the system or not and while 
some showed very high levels of commitment (even giving up annual leave 
in order to complete the training), others did not, disrupting the interaction 
chains needed for the successful completion of the work and making the on-
going use of the CDSS impossible. In contrast, all 999 control room staff 
had to use the CDSS if they wanted to remain working in the organization. 
However, although in formal terms agency was withheld from this group of 
workers, their active consent and enthusiastic participation was nonetheless 
recognised as important to the success of the intervention. Both 999 
managers and the CDSS developers invested time in keeping the call-
handlers on board, both in the initiation phase and – later on (see Chapter 
6). This investment of time was important in developing a sense of trust in 
the utility of the system ensuring that call-handlers were willing and 
committed participants in the implementation process being pressed upon 
them. The work building coherence around the CDSS helped to offset 
reservations about deskilling which might have otherwise hindered 
implementation and the work by managers and CDSS developers in keeping 
staff enrolled was key to the normalization of the CDSS. 
Implementing the CDSS in 999 involved the enrolment of a number of key 
actors including the DH, the CDSS developers, managers and staff. This 
enrolment was possible because they identified the CDSS as a route to 
achieve their – diverse - ambitions. The shared communal specification of 
coherence around the intervention, described in Chapter 4, was broad 
enough to carry different interpretations and priorities and thus enable 
collective commitment to the CDSS at every level of the organization. 
However as we shall see in chapter 6, keeping the CDSS in use 
subsequently required the enrolment of further actors to support the call-
handlers in handling more complex calls, and to monitor and audit 
performance. 
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The key actors in the initiation of this new service were the DH, the CDSS 
development team and the Ambulance Trust managers. All three shared the 
wider commitment to bring together the existing patchwork of fragmented 
services into a single point of access, from which callers could be triaged 
and directed appropriately. Through working together on 999, all three 
actors saw the potential for the CDSS to deliver this goal, but each had their 
particular concerns.  
For the developers, this provided an opportunity to embed the CDSS in both 
emergency and urgent care simultaneously.  
… if we can get it to a place where it‟s used in ambulance services and 
urgent care … we get some really powerful synergies out of it. 
Interview, CDSS developer  
For senior managers, integrated services offered benefits to patients and 
the NHS in rationalising and co-ordinating a confusing and costly system, 
but also offered an expanded role for the Trust. Based on past experience, 
senior managers were confident in the CDSS, and in their ability to manage 
the system to deliver an effective urgent care service and to do this in a 
more cost-effective manner than other competitors, by expanding the non-
clinical workforce:   
I think we‟ve demonstrated so far that [the CDSS] can deliver safe 
assessments to the patients. It can deliver them consistently…can deliver 
them with a work force which is essentially, technicians, people who are 
not nurses, they‟re not doctors, they‟re not clinically trained. They are 
trained in the use of [the CDSS] and therefore they are a less expensive 
work force, considerably less expensive work force than that which is 
engaged by NHS Direct, for example, or by …doctors‟. Interview, 
senior manager 
Indeed, senior managers saw the advantages of the CDSS in emergency 
care as just the „tip of the iceberg‟ in comparison with the affordances it 
might bring to urgent care:  
The big prize will be to apply it to those callers who would previously 
have phoned their GP in-hours because they had an unscheduled care 
need or they would have phoned their doctor out of hours…or they would 
have phoned NHS Direct… And my belief is that [the CDSS‟s] true worth 
will then be… can be truly exhibited […] then we‟ve got the real chance 
of making this combination of evidence based or low cost assessment 
combining that with the Directory of Services and advising 
commissioners on what alternative services they should be putting in 
place out there in the community. That‟s when I think the real prize will 
be achieved by the NHS and patients. Interview, senior manager 
However, extending the Trust‟s role into urgent care presented new 
challenges since it required enrolling a wider range of external actors (PCTs 
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and local GPs). The Trust and CDSS developers had learned from previous 
implementations that they needed to take the time to gain this external 
support. For the Trust, although they had some links with urgent care 
providers (e.g. 999 could refer to Urgent Care Teams in some localities), 
working in a new sector meant establishing links with a range of services. It 
was also necessary to integrate the CDSS into wider technological systems 
– such as the clinical database which links SPA with the UCCs to book 
appointments.  
When the two local PCT areas tendered for a five year contract to provide 
SPA, the Ambulance Trust and the CDSS developers negotiated a shorter 
contract to provide this service. This allowed them the flexibility to realise 
the bigger aims and ensure that work in the SPA did not jeopardise their 
larger ambitions:  
And we thought this is actually really dangerous [implementing the CDSS 
too quickly] because the whole of the national three digit number 
programme depends on credibility with the clinical community […] and if 
this is done … badly because it‟s done quickly you will start to create the 
kind of resistance. Interview, CDSS developer  
Both Trust managers and the CDSS developers were aware that they had to 
gain trust and legitimation of the new system by getting it right and 
involving all the stakeholders.  
.. we need to get all the technology in place, all the, hearts and minds 
that people need to have in place; the doctors who are going to be 
getting work from us they never had before. And…the IT stuff so the 
systems works, populating all of the service directories…[ ] there‟s lots 
and lots of potential interface problems, and so we have to get on top of 
it. Interview, senior manager 
…but there won‟t be any buy in, and there will be people on the sidelines 
sniping because the clinical community won‟t have had the opportunity 
to look at the system and reassure itself that it‟s appropriate. They won‟t 
have established the relationships that make them feel that their voice is 
heard, their concerns are real and their feedback will genuinely be taken 
on board.  Interview, CDSS developer 
The launch of the new SPA presented a number of organizational and 
technical issues. Many of problems were not with the CDSS per se, but 
rather wider problems of integrating health services. 
I think it was a case of everybody was in the same boat in terms of not 
really knowing what to expect and what was going on, and felt that we 
were kind of thrown into the deep end to start with. And we weren't 
really trusted, we had to go to the supervisors a lot especially for 
emergency responses, which I can kind of understand, otherwise we 
would probably be sending a lot more emergency responses. Interview, 
SPA call-handler 
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A manager from the PCT comes over to talk to us. She says that they 
[the CDSS team, the PCTs and managers] have had a meeting today to 
“thrash out some of the problems”. She confirms that many of the 
problems have been about home visits and transport […] In terms of 
booking out-of-hours appointments for patients, one PCT was already 
operating an appointment system but one wasn‟t. Some out-of-hours 
centres have experienced a bigger change than others. Observation 
SPA 
The new SPA required about 50 new staff. Some were trained and ready to 
answer calls prior to the SPA launch, and started work in 999 first. These 
„dual trained‟ call-handlers, laid the foundations for the emergence of a 
generic call-handling staff, integrating the 999 and SPA function. Because 
the SPA call-handlers were almost exclusively a new workforce, the Trust 
had less work to do in enrolling them into use of the CDSS. New call-
handlers did not have the reservations that 999 call-handlers had about 
deskilling or about negotiating dispositions with patients, because they had 
nothing to compare it to. The Trust also enrolled some staff by promoting 
some call-handlers to the role of call handler supervisor – ensuring their 
commitment to the new service and the CDSS.  
5.4 OOH 
The key actors involved in the initiation of the CDSS at OOH, included the 
DH, the CDSS developers, managers and medical directors, as well as the 
local PCT. One influential actor in the DH, who was committed to the use of 
the CDSS for integrated care, had become engaged in the more diffuse 
activity of promoting the CDSS to those receptive to trying it out, and this 
individual introduced the CDSS developers to one of the OOH managers:  
[me] and the commissioning manager from [the PCT] had gone to a 
meeting where [DH individual] was…we basically got chatting around the 
issues and he said that this [CDSS] was being piloted and seemed to be 
really successful. So basically, he put us in contact with [CDSS 
developers] Interview, OOH senior manager 
This trusted source gave the CDSS additional credibility, easing the work 
needed to bring the CDSS team and the site together. Enrolment was 
further supported by the CDSS‟s growing reputation as a technology that 
could be trusted because it was used successfully for 999. 
[They] have it in the Ambulance Service currently, so it‟s got, it must 
work because otherwise it wouldn‟t have been used, would it? 
Interview, OOH senior manager 
For the out-of-hours organization, the CDSS not only helped them meet new 
DH Quality Requirements (see Chapter 5) but also supported their 
commitment to deliver integrated urgent and emergency care. The CDSS 
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fitted neatly into plans for a new UCC and managers saw it as a way to 
triage OOH calls and visitors to the new centre using a single system. 
It‟s going to assist us with our move up to front-ending [ ] A&E, where 
we can then triage a lot of calls that…[ ]would originally go to A&E, and 
we can remove that need for them to go into the hospital system and 
deal with them in primary care, so it will reduce pressures on A&E as 
well.  And the way [the CDSS] is developing, I can see it being adopted 
by more and more urgent centres, same-day health centres, out-of-
hours services. Interview, OOH GP 
Like 999 these managers positioned their service „at the cutting edge‟ this 
helped to legitimate the CDSS – which itself was a pioneering technology:  
Obviously we‟re really keen on some of the developments nationally, like 
the 111 number and all those kinds of things. By using the system, it 
gives us a real focus… we‟ve always been used to pioneering things. …[ ] 
we like to do things the best, so I think that‟s why [the developer] was 
quite keen on us to do it. Interview, OOH senior manager 
Interestingly the CDSS developers appear to have had little involvement in 
the decision to expand the use of the CDSS for face-to-face contacts:  
 
Q: can you just talk me through how that call-handling process is going 
to take place in [OOH]? I‟m still a bit unclear as to how that all fits with 
A&E 
Developer: I will hold my hand up as being equally confused as you. We 
have said right from the beginning that although we‟re [ ] working on a 
face to face product…, the way that [the UCC] is actually going to 
operate, they will still be using our [ ] system.  But they will have to 
adapt it and we‟ve kind of said, …when they suggested that this is…that 
you won‟t be getting a new product that‟s going to be all whistles and 
bells and will work for a face to face setting. Interview, CDSS 
developer 
Unlike the other settings, the CDSS was introduced before all the call-
handlers had been trained and ran alongside the existing system for 6 
months until training was completed. This was stressful, but it did mean 
that for some months, OOH had both the CDSS and the protocol system 
operating simultaneously. Some 50 call-handlers (both existing and newly 
recruited) were trained over approximately six months. As in 999, the OOH 
call-handlers had no choice over whether to use the CDSS – a managerial 
decision was taken on their behalf. When the system went live, support was 
provided by the CDSS developers on a one-to-one basis for the two newly 
CDSS trained operators. The need to implement the CDSS within a short 
timescale put the organization under considerable pressure, and perhaps as 
a result, of three members of staff identified to become CDSS trainers, only 
one went on to become a trainer. This technique of cascading learning by 
„training the trainer‟ was not the CDSS developers‟ preferred mode of 
training. 
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it‟s not necessarily something that is the ideal…our preference … if you‟re 
actually going to be training somebody I think you have to know yourself 
essentially what you‟re going to come up against. …[ ] …I‟m a great 
believer that you can‟t actually go and train something unless you‟ve 
done it yourself. So I think you need to have a good grounding in 
actually taking some calls yourself and experiencing that.  … [ ]  in an 
ideal world it would be lovely, we would be able to give [individual] a 
month‟s worth of experience before she had to actually go out and train. 
Interview, CDSS developer 
The first training course was conducted over a five weeks, but the second 
round of training was condensed so that OOH could quickly implement the 
system. There were some additional challenges: with a largely part-time 
workforce fitting in training was problematic (and training sessions were run 
twice to ensure that staff were able to attend). Consequently there was 
considerable pressure on staff, especially the trainer. 
[The trainer] must have worked 24 hours a day. She was shattered. It‟s 
a lot better now because we‟ve identified more support [ ]… identified 
another person to go on the training programme. So we‟ve learnt our 
lesson, so to speak. But we did it on the job rather than beforehand. 
Interview, OOH senior manager 
For the CDSS developers, it was important that OOH successfully 
implemented the CDSS because implementation had failed in two previous 
OOH services. The OOH organization was heavily supported by the CDSS 
team, in both the initial stages of implementation, training the trainers, and 
adapting the system to fit their needs.  
The speed of this process may have played some role in creating 
ambivalence, and even resistance towards the CDSS amongst some existing 
call-handlers. Some did not appear to buy-in to the communal specification 
of the new CDSS as „better‟ than the previous system or the idea that not 
all callers were entitled to speak to a doctor. 
Q: [was] this was a necessary step, to use [the CDSS]? Do you think 
that you could have continued with [the protocol system] …?  
Call-handler: I think it‟s because the powers that be need a triage to be 
done quicker and the only way to do that would be, probably, to employ 
twice or three times the number of doctors. This way [with the CDSS] 
it‟s classed as triage and we do it. So it‟s ticking the boxes that way. But 
I‟m sure that if we had carried on with [previous system] I think we had 
one of the best systems going. Interview, OOH call-handler 
I think what it does is it makes it very difficult for somebody who‟s got 
the experience. And because we built up a service of patients being seen 
straightaway, the hard thing now is to be able to say to somebody you 
need to be seen within 72 hours, to give them care advice and tell them 
to go away. Well, not to tell them to go away but to tell them that from 
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the information that they‟ve given you, they don‟t need to be seen any 
sooner than that. So they can go and make an appointment with their 
own GP within the next three days […] I think it‟s just an education for 
us and an education for the patient. Interview OOH manager 
This view was not held by all staff. Managers successfully secured support 
and enrolment from some call-handlers to be trained to take on training 
roles using the CDSS and to act as champions for the system 
implementation.  Overall, it appears that at OOH the level of enrolment and 
legitimating was not as strong as at 999. There was more resistance from 
call-handlers and some recognised that enrolment, lead from the top was 
going to be important to embedding the CDSS:  
Quite often there‟ll be a heated discussion going on somewhere of people 
really that are just running it down, and probably people that have never 
used it.  I mean, the doctors obviously haven‟t… they don‟t have to use it 
because we‟re using it, but there‟s a lot of negativity about it. I don‟t 
know what the answer is to that one, but it‟s the old saying: you need to 
get the people in charge or the right… the people at the top need to be 
in, trained and confident with it before we start pushing it up at the 
bottom. Interview, OOH call-handler 
5.5 Cognitive participation across the three settings 
In all three settings, a network of actors - DH, CDSS developers, 
organizational managers - took the lead in initiating the intervention and in 
enrolling those necessary to bring it into use. This was built on the 
foundations of coherence and trust that the CDSS could deliver desired 
goals (described in Chapter 4). Variation around coherence links to the 
different degree of buy in from different actors. Managers in 999 and OOH 
had to work particularly hard to develop trust and co-operation from the 
call-handlers, who had greater scepticism towards the CDSS than those in 
SPA. There appears to have been more resistance to implementation in 
OOH. It is possible that this finding is an effect of the phasing of our 
fieldwork which was nearer the start of the intervention than in 999. 
However, we do not think that this is a plausible explanation. First, because 
we have the comparison with SPA at a similar implementation phase, and 
second, because we did not find reports of similar resistance in the early 
days of 999 (important because this was also an established service 
introducing the CDSS as a new system). Rather, we suggest that the 
ambivalence in OOH was related to the speed of implementation and 
concurrence of significant organizational change, particularly the relocation 
and integration into the new UCC. This meant that staff could not be trained 
together and that there could not be a single switch over to the new 
system. This was a difficult transition, for managers, trainers and call-
handlers alike, but may have had a particularly negative effect on the call-
handlers, who already had less commitment to the communal specification 
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of coherence (described in Chapter 4) which rested on wider visions of 
rationing, standardization and EBM, rather than an immediate concern for 
the task at hand. Combined with all the other disruptions it is likely that 
these call-handlers found the CDSS implementation difficult to cope with. 
Furthermore, the OOH providers spent less time with the CDSS developers 
compared to 999. At the 999 the developers were closely involved in the 
implementation to help to get the CDSS practices „right‟. This high level of 
engagement built a strong trusting relationship with the CDSS development 
team and front-line staff and fostered enrolment and legitimating of the 
CDSS. However, implementation at the OOH site received less attention, 
perhaps because the developers felt that the system „worked‟ and therefore 
required less involvement. This reduced their opportunity to talk to staff and 
achieve the necessary legitimation to make the CDSS work in this setting.  
5.5.1 Workforce implications 
Two important workforce implications arise from these findings. First, 
thought should be given as to whether to make enrolment mandatory. 
Failure to do this at the early OOH sites (not studied here) appears to have 
led to a breakdown in the interaction chains needed for successful 
implementation. Second, the early stages of implementation need to be 
managed to engender the trust necessary for buy-in. Not only does trust 
need to be cultivated with those actors that have the power to choose to 
enrol (or not), but also with those for whom participation is mandatory - in 
this case the call-handlers. This enrolment work not only needs to take 
place between managers and workers, but also may be important between 
the CDSS developers and the front-line staff. Trust in the technology was 
based in part on trust in external developers and whilst this may be partially 
based on their reputation it is greatly influenced by direct positive personal 
experiences. We are not suggesting that the CDSS developers neglected 
OOH, indeed as we will see in chapter 7, they invested considerable time in 
the introduction and adaptation of the CDSS, but relative to the enormous 
investment of time and effort at 999, there was less investment to 
maximise the enrolment of call-handlers. 
5.5.2 Implications for developing NPT 
Despite the communal specification of coherence (described in Chapter 4) it 
is clear that different actors were placed distinctively in terms of enrolment 
into the interaction chains necessary to bring the CDSS into use. Cognitive 
participation was (in part at least) about how different actors were 
positioned, and positioned themselves in relation to the wider coherence 
around the CDSS and was constrained, not least by the discursive nature of 
the „vision‟ itself and by power differences between actors. Some actors 
were able to exercise executive or bureaucratic power – determining, for 
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instance, the adoption of the CDSS for other staff who have to use it as part 
of their daily work. Call-handlers as clerical workers had no legitimate 
claims to an autonomous or experiential basis for what was essentially 
clinical decision making. Nonetheless, if they were to collectively deem an 
intervention unworkable this would be a powerful challenge to its coherence 
– even informal acts of resistance in the day to day use of an intervention 
might challenge its coherence. We know from previous studies of new 
technologies in health care that the top-down imposition of an intervention 
will not guarantee its success.  Our analysis reminds us that we need to 
recognise different forms of power in exploring the processes of cognitive 
participation. Whilst policy makers may have legislative power (e.g. to 
license the CDSS), and managers bureaucratic power (to control the 
structures and deploy organizational the resources), front-line staff have 
agentic power – in the detailed enactment of the work – shaping if and how 
an intervention might actually work in practice. We also know, from the 
sociology of work, that this power is not simply constrained by rules, 
procedures or disciplinary practices and must be taken seriously in 
delivering organizational change70-72. In looking at cognitive participation 
using NPT it is important to acknowledge these different forms of power. 
Linked to this, we also need to recognise the agency exercised by non-
human actors and their importance in the interaction chains that deliver an 
intervention into everyday practice. Although the description of „interaction 
chains‟ in NPT echoes ANT framings of „actor networks‟73 as currently 
specified NPT downplays the significance of non-human actors54. This is 
perhaps because NPT focuses on social action and (human) participation in 
normalising innovations or practices. Nonetheless, we have indicated that 
the enrolment of non-human actors - notably other computer systems which 
managed patient information, geographical and dispatch databases -was 
also critical in the network mobilized to bring the CDSS into use. This is not 
only an important point for IT management but draws attention to the 
importance of relations between human and non-human actors and the 
ways that these shape outcomes, a point which we return to as we move on 
to consider the collective action undertaken to embed the CDSS in everyday 
practice.
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6 Collective action – What is the work and 
how does it get done? 
6.1 Collective action 
NPT proposes that organising and enacting a new practice requires 
collective purposive action: it requires effort and activity by all of the actors 
implicated in its implementation. NPT suggests that in order to understand 
the collective action which enables an intervention to become routine we 
must focus on its workability - how actors operationalise the work 
(interactional workability) and the division of labour and skills required 
(skill-set workability) – and on its integration into the setting - how actors 
understand the actions of those around them (relational integration) and 
where the practice or innovation sits vis-à-vis the wider social and 
organizational context (contextual integration).  
In this chapter we examine the workability and integration of the CDSS 
across our three case study settings. In each case, we begin with a short 
vignette (boxes 1-3) describing the daily work of telephone triaging for 
emergency and urgent care patients and show how the CDSS fits into this 
work. This is followed by our findings from the ethnography and survey 
work relating to each setting in turn. 
  
Box 1: The work of 999 
Calls to the national 999 service are answered, first, by a British Telecom 
operator who routes the call to the appropriate emergency service. 
Incoming calls are randomly allocated to an available call-handler. Call-
handlers sit in twos at a double desk. They wear ambulance service 
uniform: a crisp white shirt – with the NHS and Ambulance Service logo, 
and shoulder tabs for epaulettes denoting rank – and black skirt or trousers. 
Each has a headset with a microphone and earpiece, a keyboard, a mouse, 
and two large monitors. Between calls, the call-handlers chat to colleagues, 
read, paint their nails or simply wait. A buzz in the earpiece alerts the call-
handler to an incoming call: “hello, ambulance service?” Immediately, the 
call-handler clicks the „new call button‟ (flashing red for 999 and blue for an 
urgent call e.g. from a GP). This opens the New Live Call box on screen, 
which requires caller details (telephone number and address) and includes a 
section for recording ad hoc notes e.g. for the ambulance crew. The address 
is double checked with a caller recognition system, or using an on-line 
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Gazetteer, while the call-handler establishes whether the caller is the 
patient or calling for someone else, and if the patient is child or an adult. 
The CDSS then opens with an initial option to „pre-alert‟ the dispatch desk – 
if the call-handler judges that this likely to be a potentially life threatening 
case. Still talking to the caller, the call-handler begins to navigate the CDSS.  
Male and female „body maps‟ have opened, and the call-handler „clicks‟ with 
the mouse to select and asks where the problem/symptom is located. 
Clicking on the chest area opens a series of „chest pathway‟ questions 
designed to narrow down the diagnosis. The call hander runs through the 
questions, sometimes using prompts from the screen, or versions of these. 
As the caller responds the call-handler clicks answers – sometimes 
backtracking, sometimes ticking an answer without asking a question 
because the information is supplied unasked and sometimes typing in a 
short phrase. Working rapidly through the questions the call-handler may 
also complete demographic details or crew notes in another window, whilst 
the caller supplies detail. Call-handlers are encouraged not to waste time 
getting patient‟s names before the crucial clinical information has been 
entered, but many do ask and use this information throughout the call. 
Alongside the CDSS questions, the call-handlers insert explanations to the 
caller about why the questions are important: “an ambulance is on it is way 
but taking this information now is useful for the ambulance crew in treating 
your son”. Often the call-handlers have to probe for information, asking the 
caller to speak up, or clarify an answer, and sometimes the call-handler has 
to explain the clinical language and/or translate the callers‟ responses into 
one that fits the options in the CDSS. All the while, the call-handler is aware 
that an ambulance has already been sent by the dispatchers – located in the 
centre of the room - that she is racing against the clock to reach a 
disposition before the ambulance arrives. The target time for „Category A‟ 
cases is 8 minutes and ambulances are dispatched to every call on receipt of 
address, in case it is a life-threatening case. If an 8 minute ambulance is 
not required it must be „stood down‟ within 8 minutes is up. Other possible 
„dispositions‟ from the CDSS include Category B (19 minute ambulance), 
Category C (60 minute ambulance), and non-ambulance options e.g. see GP 
within 24 hours. The call-handlers sound calm and professional – sometimes 
it appears that they know the clinical questions „by heart‟ – but if the call is 
a hoax or the caller is drunk the call-handlers may become more 
disciplinarian, raising their voice, or making e a gesture to a colleague.  
The call ends with either a final disposition or an over-ride where the call-
handler exits the system early. Early exit can be used when the ambulance 
arrives at the location before the CDSS process is complete or where the 
caller is not able to provide appropriate information to complete the triaging 
process. The closing moments of a call may be used to advise the caller – to 
open the entrance door to the house so the ambulance crew can get in,  or 
to follow a set of clinical instructions (such as those about taking aspirin in 
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the case of suspected heart attack). If the ambulance is a less urgent 
category, before handing up, she will tell the caller to call 999 again in the 
event that symptoms get worse. Once the call is finished the call-handler 
presses a button and disconnects the call. The headset is silent once more. 
6.2 999 
The vignette in box 1 shows that the interactional workability of the CDSS – 
how the call-handlers operationalise their work using the CDSS – draws on 
a range of skills, both in the call-handling task itself, and in the wider skill 
set workability – or division of labour - that underpins the 999 call-handling 
service.  
Call-handling entails a range of tasks, many done in parallel. The call-
handler must listen to the patient, talk to them and ask questions, read the 
screens, type in information and navigate the system with a mouse, all 
within a tight time frame. The CDSS has extended the work of call-handling 
(in comparison with the previous system):  
… the call-takers never had to use negotiation skills, and they kind of 
had a robotic list of things you used to get done … you didn‟t really take 
the phone calls as far as we do now … you just sort of got the main bit of 
information for the crew. We used to pass on the message, of what was 
wrong, and I think now they probably feel that their helping the patient a 
lot more, because there‟s a lot more on-line care as well during the 
phone call.  We always gave CPR and choke and things like that, but now 
they‟re ready to tell them how to give the hypo kit … We tell them how 
to do fever management, paracetamols and things ...I just think that is a 
total different model of call-taking now. Interview, 999 manager 
The task of asking questions is not easy, as this example shows:  
[There is] a call from a woman who is screaming and swearing and it‟s 
difficult to understand a word she is saying. The woman is in a public 
place and seems unable to describe where she is. …[ ] the woman keeps 
saying “I don‟t have the address”. The call-handler is quite terse and 
says “If you don‟t have the address you can‟t have an ambulance”. The 
woman calms down enough to say something about being behind the 
school … [ ]. The call-handler tells her to “calm down, we‟re getting 
someone along”. The caller says that a boy/man has been stabbed…, 
there‟s a lot of blood, he seems to be breathing - this information takes 
some time to elicit. The caller keeps saying “oh my God” and the call-
handler is having difficulty understanding her and getting her to calm 
down. The caller is relaying the call-taker‟s questions to another man 
who is also shouting and swearing [… ] the call-handler then says 
“[name], when you‟re screaming I can‟t understand a word you‟re 
saying...I need you to calm down”. This is a tactic used by the call-takers 
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– getting and using the caller‟s name in an attempt to try and control the 
situation. Observation 999 
Sometimes the call-handlers have to probe for answers, asking additional 
questions and diverging from the script on the screen.  
 [The call-handler] tells me how she is required to follow the system and 
the system makes the decision, but it‟s her job to use probing questions 
to clarify if the information she has obtained is accurate. Whilst on the 
one hand the system goes on what the patient says to be true, she is 
required to probe – particularly where she thinks the caller may be 
misinterpreting the question – deliberately or accidentally, and where 
she suspects the patient is blatantly lying to ensure that they get an 
ambulance. A decision has to be made when to stop probing – this 
seems to be when a) the call-taker has satisfactorily got enough 
information to answer with „enough certainty‟ yes or no or when b) when 
the patient insists, reiterates that they are e.g. gasping for breath, pains 
are in their chest (even when other things they have said in the call 
provides evidence to the contrary). Observation 999 
This work also includes translation of language and dialect, and rendering 
clinical terms comprehensible to the caller: 
The first call is from a man whose first language is not English. He is 
calling on behalf of his son. He is OK with most of the words but has 
difficulty with some of the medical/health words such as “slurring”. It 
takes [call-handler] quite a long time to get through the questions. 
Observation 999 
Sometimes a language barrier makes it impossible to follow the system, if a 
caller cannot understand enough English or where it is difficult to translate 
colloquial expressions:  
Someone [is] phoning on behalf of a 95 year old woman who has had a 
“funny turn”. This phrase is commonly used by callers – particularly 
when used to describe elderly people. [This] non-specific description 
means that the call-taker has to probe to try and understand what the 
underlying health problem is. In this instance, it proves quite difficult and 
after attempts to clarify what “funny turn” means here, she chooses the 
“dizziness or vertigo” pathway. Observation 999 
These extensions of the call-handlers work, using the CDSS to elicit detailed 
clinical information – rather than taking an address and passing the 
message on – requires emotional work by call-handlers (e.g. displaying 
empathy and handling distressing circumstances). Call-handlers sometimes 
used terms such as „love‟ or „dear‟, or first names when talking to callers, 
and to adjust the tone of voice to show concern or sympathy. This 
emotional work could take its toll, as a call-handler explained:  
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Once I had the case of a three year old child who was unresponsive, 
lying in the arms of his mum. I had to leave the control room and went 
to cry into the toilet. It was so difficult. I could not deal with it. How 
could I help in such a difficult situation?‟ … She says that nothing 
prepares you for this “real life is harder than any training”. Observation 
999/SPA 
From our discussion of the workability of the CDSS in everyday practice so 
far, it is clear that call-handlers draw on a range of skills to make the CDSS 
work. There is more to call-handling that simply reading out the prompts 
from the screen. This raises some important questions about the 
relationship between the claims made for the CDSS – that it is abstracted 
clinical knowledge, enabling standardised clinical decision by clerical staff – 
and everyday practice, which is clearly more „messy‟. Whilst the CDSS was 
designed to control the clinical knowledge in play, call-handlers often drew 
on and developed experiential knowledge which influenced their use of the 
system. Call-handlers would sometimes draw on informal knowledge about 
medical conditions or health care that they had learned from the 
experiences of friends, family and colleagues. They also internalised 
knowledge of the system such that they were able to anticipate, asking 
callers questions before they were prompted and predicting likely call 
outcomes before a disposition was reached.  
[call-handler] says „its great working here because we‟ve all got our bits 
of knowledge that no-one knows anything about‟ for example, someone 
has a husband with diabetes and [name] knows about asthma. So they 
can ask each other for advice/learn from each other. She tells the story 
of her handling of a fitting baby - 6 months old. The old advice [pre 
CDSS] was to strip the baby down, open windows and sponge with cold 
water. Now they don‟t advise this because the shock of the cold water 
can be bad for the baby. But when she was handling a call she still asked 
the parents what the baby was wearing - „A little cardy because she‟s 
been poorly? Right well, undo the top buttons of the cardy and open a 
window or two‟. The young call-taker next to her is laughing and she 
asks why at the end of the call. He says she sounds like „a mam‟, says 
she‟s great. The call hander is merging her advice with [the CDSS] to 
offer what she thinks is the best advice. Her peers know this is off-piste, 
but are not shocked or critical. Observation 999  
Additionally call-handlers exercised discretion using the CDSS:    
[call-handler] says “that was naughty…sometimes you let your heart rule 
your head”. There were two main reasons why she overrode the 
disposition 1) the patient was an elderly lady who was anxious 2) there 
were communication difficulties - the patient had speech and hearing 
difficulties – which made triage very lengthy. The patient had already 
spoken to [another health service]. If the call was referred on again the 
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patient would be required to speak to another. … [call-handler] felt that 
the call would take a long time to resolve, potentially leading to further 
distress for the patient. She justified her actions by saying “I haven‟t 
done an override recently…” Observation 999 
These findings are consistent with our discussion of the moral discourses 
that shape the coherence of the CDSS (see Chapter 4), showing how these 
shape decision-making within the CDSS where alternative pathways present 
themselves.  
The ethnography showed that making the CDSS workable in this site had 
intensified the call-handling task and up-skilled, rather than de-skilled these 
staff. The call-handlers themselves were well aware of this. In the survey, 
they reported that skill levels required to use the system were high and that 
they had trust in their own ability to use the system (M = 4.0, SD = 0.5; 
Table 11). Furthermore, call-handlers‟ evaluations of the detailed skill set 
required to make the intervention work was matched by their assessment of 
their own skill set. Whilst the switch to the CDSS now required call-handlers 
to offer additional information to callers, they rated this as the most 
important set of skills needed to do their job (M importance rating = 9.1 see 
Table 9) and rated their own skill in this as high (M = 8.2, SD = 1.1). The 
extended communication with callers, requires new skills of questioning 
(with a mean of 7.8 in terms of importance in the call-handling task and 7.0 
in terms of call-handlers evaluation of own competence), communication (M 
importance = 8.6, M competency = 8.5) and call control (M importance = 
9.0; M competency = 8.3). The latter was seen to be the most important 
competency in the task of call-handling.  
Specific skills rated in the survey included the use of informal knowledge 
from friends, family, colleagues although this was ranked less highly than 
sharing their own experiences with others; supporting other call-handlers in 
their work; and judging when to over-ride (Table 10). At the same time, 
call-handlers endorsed the importance of allowing the system to drive the 
assessment (M = 8.3, SD=0.9; see Table 9), suggesting that the 
combination of call-handlers trust in the evidence base that underpins the 
CDSS and the call-handlers skilled use of this – and a sense of when 
discretion is appropriate – contributes to the workability of the CDSS in 999.  
The second element of collective action focuses on the work that it takes to 
integrate an intervention across teams (relational integration). In 999 it was 
clear that the call-handlers had collectively taken on the work of making the 
CDSS work. They did not operate in isolation – working one-to-one with the 
caller – but were surrounded by supporting colleagues who would willingly 
contribute to the wider call-handling task, if required. For example, call-
handlers often seemed to work together on more complex calls.  
Interviewer: One of the things I noticed…is the way that the call-takers 
help each other out.  Like one of you‟d be on a call and the other one‟ll 
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be on the phone to the desk or looking at the map.  Are you trained to do 
that or is that just something you, you learn to do while you‟re here? 
Call-handler: No. It‟s something you definitely pick up; you‟re not trained 
to do it; you‟re not told by anyone that you‟ve got to help the person, 
but, I think, when you first start, people are obviously keeping an eye out 
for you and they do it for you.  And then once you pick up stuff, you, you 
just do it.  It‟s just natural, you, you don‟t even, like, make a conscious 
decision to listen in to the person‟s call, you‟re just sitting there, reading 
a book, having a conversation, but you just pick up when they‟re having…  
Like while they‟re on the phone or when they‟re struggling with the 
address and it‟s just so easy to go on over.  You can just like go over and 
just start trying to do something or ring the desk or get the police, 
whatever.  Um, it just comes like…  I think everyone helps you like. 
Interview 999 call-handler 
Such observations were supported by the survey which showed that 
working as part of a team, supporting other call-handlers and seeking 
support when unsure about a call were regarded as some of the most 
important skills needed for doing the job in 999 (Table 10). Trust items in 
the survey also showed that call-handlers had a high level of trust in other 
call-handlers to support them. 
The introduction of the CDSS did not change the division of labour in 
relation to the work of dispatch officers or Trust managers, although  
managing the implementation of the CDSS has – of course – caused a 
considerable amount of new work for the managers (as noted in Chapters 4, 
5 and 7). However the extended auditing process for the CDSS meant that 
more staff were employed in this role. In addition a major change to the 
staffing of the service, linked directly to the way that the CDSS was made 
workable in 999 was the creation of the clinical supervisor role.  
Clinical supervisors are nurses or paramedics recruited in direct response to 
the experience of using the CDSS. It became clear that additional clinical 
expertise was required to deal with some cases, which did not fit easily into 
the system, or fell outside of it altogether. Clinical supervisors advise call-
handlers about which pathway to take or the meaning of medical terms. If 
necessary, patients are transferred to the clinical supervisor who can offer 
self-care and other clinical advice, sometimes using CDSS module 2, but 
more often drawing on clinical expertise and training.  
There is another call from a pregnant 22 year old who is reporting chest 
pains. As she reports crushing and stabbing chest pain the call goes 
through as a Category A. Because the woman is pregnant [call-handler] 
checks with the clinical supervisor if it is safe to give the aspirin advice – 
[the supervisor] says that it‟s obviously the woman‟s choice, but the 
possibility of cardiac problems outweighs the risk to the baby. 
Observation 999 
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The clinical supervisors also serve an important role in sanctioning 
overrides/exits from the CDSS and in audit and monitoring - reviewing calls 
and feeding back results and explaining how to improve practice. Whilst 
there was some initial ambivalence about the introduction of the clinical 
supervisor, the survey suggests that, overall call-handlers recognise the 
importance of this new role (Table 10). 
Beyond the 999 setting the call-handlers were keen to differentiate 
themselves in relation to call-handlers elsewhere. The everyday 
performance of clinical questions allowed them to identify themselves not as 
unskilled, generic call centre workers, but as doing complex, health care 
work.  
You know, there's stuff like aspirin [advice] and, and that you can get 
that. You can actually make a difference to someone through that. 
Interview, 999 Call-handler 
 
Box 2: The work of SPA 
SPA is a new service based delivered from the Ambulance Trust 
headquarters and (from December 2009) a second contact centre. This 
vignette focuses on the main headquarters site. Here, on weekdays full time 
SPA call-handlers work in the emergency control room alongside the 999 
staff. At weekends, all SPA call-handlers work in a separate room as the 
999 room is not large enough to accommodate all of the SPA and 999 call-
handling staff in the one room. 
The SPA call-handlers sit at desks wearing a telephone headset, in front of a 
PC, seemingly identical to those in the 999 control room. These staff wear 
the same uniform as 999 call-handlers. The appearance of the room and the 
staff is thus indistinguishable from their 999 counterparts. The work too 
appears very similar to that of the 999 call-handlers, the SPA call-handlers 
also have two computer screens, but the left displays the CDSS and the 
right is used to display the appointment system, showing the available out 
of hours primary care centres, GP surgeries and other services such as the 
district nurse and prison health service. On the left screen there is a box 
displaying calls waiting in red. When a call comes in she hears a sound in 
her headphone and answers „urgent care centre, how can I help?‟ As she is 
answering the call she clicks the „new call‟ button on the tool bar on the left 
screen. A window opens allowing her to check and confirm the caller‟s 
address – to do this she types in the postcode and a list of street names 
pops up so that she can ask the caller their house number, and then 
populate the address section. A „new live call‟ window opens and the call-
handler confirms the name of the patient, the date of birth and the name of 
the GP surgery. She then clicks „new‟ and the CDSS questions appear, 
initially those used to exclude life threatening illness, and once these have 
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been answered the two body maps appear and the call-handler selects the 
appropriate map according to the gender of the patient/caller. As she goes 
through these screens she periodically saves the data via a click box on the 
left screen. She continues asking questions and seeking clarification about 
the symptoms until she reaches the box selecting the type of urgent care 
required. In the event that the caller needs a consultation she can check the 
list of available appointment slots and offer one of these.  The key 
difference between this work and that of 999 is that the calls can take 
longer and there is less of a sense of urgency (unless of course the 
algorithms and questioning identifies the need for emergency care). The call 
typically ends with the caller being offered a consultation, advice about 
seeking treatment the next day and or immediate self-care advice. 
 
6.3 SPA 
Box 2 shows that in terms of workability, SPA also involved considerable 
multi-tasking and parallel processing of the tasks of listening, questioning 
and probing. However, compared to 999, SPA calls took longer, often 10 
minutes before a disposition was arrived at. The most common dispositions 
were „GP dispositions‟ (home visit, telephone advice or attend PCC) and the 
closing section of calls usually involved booking an appointment which 
entailed working with three computer systems:   
The call-handlers talked together; they discussed the fact that having 
three systems to cope with was very intense. They had always to make 
sure they copied all comments and notes from the clerical system to 
SystmOne. They expressed the opinion that it would be better to have a 
unique system so that everything would be together in the future. 
Observation SPA 
Making a booking was made more complex by the negotiation required 
about the disposition. The range of dispositions that could be offered 
included ambulance, GP consultations - both OOH and next day, 
consultation with a community pharmacist and self-care advice. In the 
example below the call-handler reaches an ambulance disposition for an 
urgent care caller, who is reluctant to accept this so the call-handler has to 
negotiate an alternative:  
the final disposition was a 19 minute ambulance. The call-handler 
explained that an ambulance was going to be on its way but the patient 
did not want an ambulance: she refused it. So the call-handler called the 
clinical supervisor and clicked on early exit. He then arranged an 
appointment at one of the primary care centres at 6.50pm, by selecting 
a PCC from the list and clicking on the option book appointment. He 
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confirmed the appointment to the caller and then filled in a box on care 
details with some brief comments on the case. Observation SPA  
Similarly a disposition of „talk to a pharmacist‟ could result in extended 
negotiation with a caller who really wanted to see a GP. The nature of the 
calls to SPA was different to 999, not only because they were not (typically) 
emergency situations, but also because the callers appeared less malleable:   
[the caller] did not want to answer the questions but preferred to talk 
about her personal life. I observed [call-handler] trying to control the call 
pace. She was reading different options and clicking on them once the 
questions had been asked. She also clicked on some options below the 
sentences [including „change answer‟, „restart triage‟, „early exit]‟. 
Sometimes she did not read and was anticipating the answer. It was 
evident that she could not wait to finish she seemed quite impatient. 
Every time the call-handler was asking a question the patient talked 
about a new symptom. It was very difficult to triage. Observation SPA  
Many callers had more than one medical, emotional and/or social problem. 
This, and the longer duration of the calls, meant that the amount of 
emotional work required varied. Call-handlers talked particularly about the 
difficulty of managing callers with mental health problems or those who 
were lonely and „wanted someone to talk to‟. One benefit of having more 
time for SPA calls than in 999 was that the call-handlers could sometimes 
respond to this need to talk, allowing the caller to raise „irrelevant‟ details 
and in turn to make sympathetic responses.  
The additional tasks of negotiating bookings, giving advice and 
communicating with „needy‟ patients added to the complexity of the work at 
SPA. This was reinforced by our survey. SPA call-handlers reported that 
effective call control, skilled questioning and active listening were important 
to performing the job effectively. These call-handlers felt they had high 
levels of skill in all of these (Table 9). As in 999, the survey found that call-
handlers felt that competencies in giving interim and self-care advice were 
the most important factor in enabling them to perform their role effectively 
(M = 9.2, SD = 1.1;  measured on a 10 point scale 1 = not important, 10 = 
very important). The SPA call-handlers also reported that the work required 
a high level of communication skill, and they felt that they had high levels 
of such skills (M = 8.2, SD = 1.0; Table 9).  
While there was an organizational expectation that as the SPA service grew 
staff would increasingly be dual trained to allow them to work in either 999 
or SPA as workflows demanded, some staff and CDSS developers felt that 
there were different skill sets associated with the different types of work:   
A conversation between a developer, clinical supervisor and researcher 
comparing 999 and SPA. The clinical supervisor mentions that she thinks 
that the work requires a “different skill set”. The developer thinks that, in 
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some ways, the out-of-hours work is more difficult, and describes it as 
having “more complexity”. She says that some call-takers might be 
suited to one type of work rather than the other. She characterises the 
difficulties of the different types of work broadly as: on the one hand 
emergency work is stressful/requires thinking on your feet/acting 
quickly/confidently, on the other hand, out-of-hours work is complex, 
less straightforward, and more time consuming – requires patience. She 
notes that “there are some fantastic [999] call-takers” but she says that 
she think some of them might find out-of-hours work “a bit boring” in 
contrast to the “adrenaline” involved in 999 work. Observation SPA 
In contrast to such observations, generally the survey did not identify 
significant differences between 999 and SPA in terms of the skills call-
handlers felt they possessed or how important they felt various skills were 
to performing the role (Table 9 and Table 10).  
In terms of relational integration, at SPA there was no equivalent to the 
dispatch role and therefore the division of labour was flatter. The work of 
integrating the CDSS ran across the SPA staff and extended into the 999 
team, so that relationships with all of these staff had to be managed. 
Depending on the time of day the number of SPA on shift there might be 
fewer opportunities to seek advice or share knowledge with other SPA call-
handlers. (We did note in our observations that when working in the main 
999 control room on weekdays the SPA call-handlers often sat near each 
other to facilitate greater team integration). The SPA call-handlers 
responses to the survey showed that working as a team, seeking support 
when unsure about a call and supporting others were all skills regarded as 
important for the performance of work in this setting (see Table 10). 
   
Box 3: The work of OOH  
When fieldwork began the OOH control room was housed in an office 
building on a busy „A‟ road just outside the town centre. There was little 
space to move around between the four desks for the call-handlers, divided 
up, splitting each into „pods‟ of two and the desk towards the back of the 
room where the triage GP sat. In mid-2010 OOH moved to the UCC housed 
at a large acute hospital. Face to face attenders arrive at the main UCC 
reception and queue to be seen at reception. The receptionist takes 
demographic details and presenting symptom information and uses three 
different information systems -  the hospital information system (HIS), 
Adastra (a case management system) and the CDSS - to triage the 
attender, either to A&E or to OOH care.  
Behind reception the new OOH control room contains two pods each with 
desks for 4-5 call-handlers although not all are occupied at any one time. 
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The control room manager/supervisor sits at a workbench in the corner of 
the room.  
Each call-handler has a single monitor and telephone handset on their desk. 
At one desk sits a GP taking calls directed from the call-handlers and 
another desk is occupied by a clerical worker dealing with records and 
hospital inquiries. When a call comes in the phone buzzes and a red light 
comes on. The call-handler presses a button and answers, clicking the 
computer mouse. He takes demographic details, beginning with date of 
birth and then name. If he is lucky the patient‟s records will already be on 
the system because they have had previous contact with this service. He 
asks what the caller‟s contact phone number is and glances at the phone 
display where the caller identity is displayed, checking that the contact 
number that has automatically appeared on his computer screen is correct. 
(This function is useful when people call from mobile phones and don‟t know 
their number). He asks for the postcode and as he keys the last digit a list 
of addresses appears, he asks for the house number and populates the 
address field. He asks which GP the caller is registered wit and because the 
name given is familiar he quickly clicks on a drop down menu on the screen.  
The call-handler asks, “So what‟s the problem [first name]”.  He asks if the 
caller is on any medications and then moves into the CDSS pathway based 
on the initial disclosure of the „problem‟. He prefaces this section of the call 
by saying “I‟m going to ask a series of questions, some of them might not 
seem relevant but these are to rule out anything life threatening and then 
we‟ll move on to your problem, ok.” He has memorised this phrasing as it is 
repeated with every call with few variations. He then runs quickly through 
questions that appear on the screen. He works systematically through 
pathways as they appear on the screen. Many questions elicit rapid 
responses, and eventually the call-handler says “Ok. We will arrange a Drs 
appointment for you” He looks at the screen, then looks away from it saying 
“ But first I am going to give you a bit of care advice” he then gives advice 
on taking paracetamol, or ibruprofen and that warm or cold drinks can be 
taken, but that the caller should avoid tobacco. He looks at the screen while 
he says this but does not seem to be reading the script. He finishes by 
saying „If you become unable to swallow liquids or saliva then call us back, 
if you find your symptoms get worse then call us back.‟ Having dispensed 
this self-care advice he books an appointment which is in one hour‟s time. 
He clicks through items on the screen and says to the caller “ok you have 
an appointment at 9.30, that is here [names UCC]”‟ He then says goodbye 
and presses a button to end the call‟. A few moments later the phone 
buzzes and flashes again and the call-handler answers “Urgent Care how 
can I help you?” On reception desk receptionist is using the CDSS and the 
other associated software systems to respond to the patient standing in 
front of her. He has a wound on his face and is unkempt and a little difficult 
to understand. The call-handler begins to take his demographic details in 
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the Adastra system. She asks him to repeat the presenting problem, and 
decides that this is a minor injury so decides not to go through the CDSS 
triage. She tells him he will be seen in minor injury (part of A&E). She 
prints name labels and fixes one to a patient record card and hands him 
these forms directing him to the waiting room. She then begins to talk to 
the next patient in the queue. 
6.4 OOH 
Workability at OOH included the same multi-tasking but the intensification 
of the work was less apparent in this setting. The work in OOH had become 
more scripted using the CDSS - the questions had been relocated „in‟ the 
CDSS to guide the management of the call, but call-handlers noted that 
triaging still required a reasonably sophisticated level of understanding:  
You‟ve got to drive it and you‟ve got to have the knowledge and the 
background to work with that because you‟ve got to understand the 
inference of what it is that you‟re asking.  If you don‟t understand what 
you‟re asking, you‟re not going to be able to use it effectively. 
Interview, OOH call-handler 
Some staff suggested that the CDSS had made the work less intense:    
it's not as stressful as the old way because the only responsibility you 
have as a call-taker, is to listen exactly to what you're saying, and you 
make sure what you're answering is right.  You don't have the kind of 
final decision on…  [ ]…  Because the questions are longer, you go more 
into depth, it does give you more time to think about the call, and make 
sure you're getting it right. Interview, OOH call-handler  
I wouldn‟t say it‟s intensified the work, because they were all, the 
protocols we had, that we‟ve created over the years, are quite intense 
themselves. So I don‟t think the intensity has changed. I think it‟s just 
the depth of questioning, that they feel is a little, they‟re resistant to it 
because they feel why do we have to go all through this? Interview, 
OOH senior manager 
Nonetheless there was a strong feeling that the CDSS had extended the 
amount of questions to be asked and therefore the length of time required 
for calls. Using the CDSS to provide self-care advice and information was an 
important reason for its adoption, yet call-handlers were concerned about 
how long this took and how it was received by callers. 
Because sometimes they're not too bad, it's just a couple of little snippets 
… maybe take some paracetamol on your way down, things like that.  
And sometimes there's little ones like, bring a urine sample with you 
when you come, they're very relevant.  But I think if you get like a fever, 
vomit, and diarrhoea, abdominal pain, you could probably be giving 
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advise for about ten minutes because about four come up, they're all 
very, very, very long, and you can feel the patient thinking, why on earth 
have you given me all this advice when I'm coming to see a doctor in half 
an hour. Interview, OOH call-handler  
Some commented that they enjoyed being able to give this extra advice and 
felt it was valued and the survey confirmed that call-handlers felt that the 
provision of information was important (M = 8.9, SD = 1.7; see Table 9) 
and that they were well skilled in this area of their work (M = 7.9, SD = 
1.8). One important issue related to workability was the difficulty call-
handlers had establishing the validity of caller‟s claims about the severity of 
their symptoms:  
You‟ve got to probe a lot because if you don‟t, you can end up with an 
inappropriate 999. For instance, I took a call and it was a lady…. She was 
in Boots, the chemist in town, and she had walked up to the top floor, 
because that‟s where the pharmacy is. Well, she would be a bit out of 
breath, won‟t she? [ ] … I had to go back …I had to say, now, are you 
always breathless like this? Is this your normal condition? …then I could 
proceed and then we got a prescription for her. Interview, OOH call-
handler 
I've had people at work saying they're severely ill, and I said, can you 
not think or do anything else? They're like, no, I can't do anything else 
because I'm sick. But you're like, you‟re at work. So trying to rephrase, 
like, can you not make a cup of tea, can you get out of your chair?  
Using all the tools in your training to get the right answer. Interview, 
OOH call-handler  
As in 999 and SPA call-handlers often had to draw on experience or „general 
knowledge‟ gathered from friends, family or other colleagues to help 
manage calls. The survey revealed that using this type of knowledge was 
seen as important (Table 10). In addition some call-handlers appeared to 
have memorised the previous paper based protocols to help „drive‟ the 
CDSS to what they felt were the correct dispositions, re-triaging if they 
were not happy with the outcome:  
The patient had been suffering of piles since last November. He had 
been given a cream but had run out of it. The CT clicked on rectal in the 
body map and went down the path RECTAL PAIN, SWELLING, LUMP or 
ITCHY. The final disposition was A&E but call-handler went back to 
probe again to get a GP appointment. Observation OOH 
Again survey findings were consistent with the qualitative data showing that 
predicting the likely outcome of calls and using own knowledge to operate 
ahead of the CDSS were rated as important skills, more so than at the other 
settings, although this difference was only significant in comparison to SPA 
(Table 10). 
© Queen‟s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Greener et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health               





Much of the discussion amongst call-handlers about when why they used 
discretion to make the CDSS work centered on what they felt the OOH 
service should provide – namely access to general practice. They managed, 
this by working „around‟ the system, often exiting the CDSS:  
Call handler: If it's children‟s coughs, colds and flu and things, then fine, 
I will […] let it go where it wants to go. And if it goes „to pharmacy within 
three days‟, then that‟s fine, but that‟s not what the patient wants to 
hear. The patient has rung us up because they want to see a doctor or a 
nurse, not because they can see a pharmacy in three days. But I will let 
it take me and then they will say well no, I want to see somebody. So 
that‟s wrong.  
Q: You have an early exit and you will… 
Call handler: Yeah, give the patient an appointment.  But then you know 
it's taking you where it's supposed to take you but the patients don‟t 
want that, they have expectations other than seeing the pharmacist in 
Tesco‟s in three days. Interview, OOH call-handler 
The survey showed that SPA call-handlers felt that judging when necessary 
to override the system was important to performing their role at levels 
similar to other sites (M = 8.9, SD = 1.2; see Table 10), yet our 
observations suggest that this was more common in this setting. These 
findings, both qualitative and quantitative, relating to call-handlers frequent 
use of discretion can be linked to the trust survey data which showed 
trusting beliefs in terms of benevolence and integrity to be lower than 
beliefs in the systems competence (Table 11).  
In relation to skills set workability there was a strong belief amongst 
managers and some call-handlers that the CDSS simply incorporated the 
existing paper based protocols and experiential knowledge into the 
computer. The skills of dealing with the public, asking questions and 
documenting answers were seen as directly transferable – this is what the 
OOH staff had always done. The „new‟ skills required by call-handling staff 
were therefore those associated with learning how to manipulate the CDSS 
software, and working through protocols in an unfamiliar order. The survey 
indicated that SPA call-handlers felt themselves to be well skilled across this 
range of tasks as was the case at the other settings (See Table 9). 
The dynamics of relational integration had been altered by both the move to 
the UCC and recruitment of additional staff to deal with the increased 
workload due to the longer call times. The OOH staff now interacted with a 
wider range of clinical and non-clinical staff – from primary, secondary and 
emergency care services at the hospital site, and the extension of the OOH 
to cover UCC reception meant that they also dealt with face to face 
patients. While the core triage skills were seen as generic to either call-
handling or face-to-face work, in practice the skills required for dealing with 
face to face patients were slightly different. They needed additional skills to 
negotiate with more than one person simultaneously - often a patient came 
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to the desk with a carer or family member. They could also incorporate 
visual and non-verbal cues (e.g. establishing the amount of blood loss 
without asking the patient): some call-handlers liked this 
[call-handler] commented that it really helps assess the patient because 
you can see things that are obvious. Observation OOH  
The team relationships in OOH were different to 999 and SPA in part 
because of the relatively smaller size of the shifts. A shift team included 7-
10 call-handlers, one of whom would be a shift manager, akin to the duty 
manager at 999 and SPA. In addition there would be at least one GP 
handling calls who functioned in a similar way to the clinical supervisors in 
SPA and 999 – taking direct referrals from the call-handlers (usually 
phoning the patient back).  
Call-handlers would chat between calls or put people on hold during calls to 
seek support from others. For the reception staff the location in the acute 
hospital meant that there were often other clinical and administrative staff 
nearby who could provide additional advice or support (although none of 
these staff was trained to use the CDSS). Overall our observations revealed 
an environment where there was strong support within the teams and this 
is borne out in the survey where call-handlers reported that working as 
team, offering and seeking support from others and accepting and 
responding to feedback as very important to getting their job done 
effectively at higher levels than at the other sites (Table 10). 
Several of the staff talked about the relationships between OOH staff and 
other health care staff – notably GPs, in positive terms and it was clear that 
there was considerable pride associated with working in this health care 
setting and in their identity as health care workers. There was perhaps less 
emphasis in OOH on the clinical component of the work – although the 
levels of embodied knowledge we observed seemed similar: 
we‟re not diagnosing, we‟re not… I don‟t want to be a doctor… if I‟d 
wanted to be a doctor or a nurse I would have done that years ago. I 
don‟t think that, for our purposes, we really need, to do… to dwell on 
that, to be honest. I mean, obviously, it‟s interesting, but I don‟t think 
we need it actually for the job, because [the CDSS] does it for you.[…] 
Our job is just to collect information, input it, and let the system, not 
diagnose, but come out with the best, appropriate course of action. 
Interview, OOH call-handler 
6.5 Collective action across the three settings  
The work of organising and enacting the practice of call management and 
triage using the CDSS requires collective purposive action. At 999 and SPA 
the workability of the CDSS has intensified work as call-handlers are 
required to navigate multiple information systems, conduct extended 
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clinically-based questioning, and deal with complex responses. This requires 
discretion, negotiation and translation skills and a good deal of emotional 
labour. Calls to SPA and OOH took longer than 999 calls – the work seemed 
intense, but in different ways to 999 where the 8 minute target for 
ambulance dispositions forced a more rapid pace for the call-handling. It is 
clear across all the settings that the work of call-handling using the CDSS is 
„health care work‟ not simply „call-handling‟. At 999 and SPA the 
introduction of the CDSS altered skill set workability and relational 
integration by requiring a new role – that of clinical supervisor – to 
integrate it into everyday use. In OOH the key relational change had been 
around UCC reception which added the complexity of dealing with face-to-
face patients. The UCC location also meant that OOH was now part of a 
much larger organization with an established managerial hierarchy and pre-
existing working relationships.  
In terms of skills, the survey shows few differences between sites and self-
rated skills (Table 9). The exceptions are OOH where call-handlers rate their 
communication skills as significantly higher than those at SPA. This may of 
course reflect the greater length of experience of these staff. Across 
competency categories there were some differences in terms of how 
important various skills were perceived to be, for example OOH rate 
effective call control and effective communication, significantly higher than 
those in SPA. In addition Table 10 shows results for skills regarded as 
unnecessary in the formal audit, and possibly regarded as undesirable. It 
also highlights the importance of team relations and a range of informal 
knowledge sharing practices. 
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N.B. Note these skills are formally reflected in the systems audit process.) 
Common superscript in same row shows significant difference between those sites -  * p < 
0.05 
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Table 10. Skill and importance ratings of competencies not included in formal 
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to performance 
feedback  
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N.B. Common superscript in same row shows significant difference between those sites -  * p 
< 0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Mean Ratings (SD) Mean Ratings (SD) Mean Ratings 
(SD) 
Trusting Beliefs    
      Competence 3.8 (0.6) 4.1 (0.6) 3.9 (0.5) 
      Benevolence 3.6 (0.7) 4.0 (0.7) 3.8 (0.5) 
      Integrity     3.3 (0.7)a**     3.8 (0.8)a** 3.5 (0.5) 
    
Trust in call 
handler support 
    4.4 (0.6)a*   4.3 (0.7)    4.0 (0.6)a* 
Trust in own 
ability to use CDSS 
 4.0  (0.5) 4.1 (0.7)  4.1 (0.5) 
N.B.   Common superscript in same row shows significant difference between those sites -  * 
p < 0.05;   ** p<0.01 
 
Table 11 shows that there was little difference in call-handlers ratings of 
trusting beliefs in the system‟s competence, benevolence and integrity 
across the three settings. However the relative ratings between the trusting 
beliefs in the system‟s competence, benevolence and integrity which show 
that trust‟ in the systems competence are greater than in its benevolence 
and integrity. These findings are consistent with observations about how the 
system is used on a day-to-day basis.  
We have shown that the collective action that brings the CDSS into 
everyday use (and keeps it in use) in the three settings entails the 
combination of the technology and the workers. Over time the boundary 
between the work and the worker becomes blurred such that dispositions 
were not „made‟ by the CDSS but by a hybrid of the technology and the call-
handler. The operationalization of the CDSS changes the work – making it 
intense, or longer for example, but also by changing the workers by offering 
them an identity as health workers not just call centre operatives. The skills 
and divisions of labour created and sustained by introducing the CDSS are 
not just those required to operate the computer system „by rote‟ but are 
also about individual experiential, embodied expertise and (in 999 and SPA) 
the additional need for clinical expertise to support the system. 
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6.5.1 Workforce implications  
This chapter has described how the work of managing calls (and face to 
face patients in OOH) was operationalised using the CDSS in the three 
different settings. It is clear the workability of the CDSS is only possible 
through the use of embodied and experiential knowledge and discretion by 
call-handlers.  This „expertise‟ needs to be accommodated in order to bring 
the CDSS into everyday, use rather than tightly controlled (and indeed the 
successful deployment of the CDSS in the three settings appears to be 
partly because managers and developers have recognised the need for 
some interpretive flexibility in using the system). The experiential nature of 
this expertise and its development through sharing knowledge in teams has 
implications for the skills required for call-handling – which extend beyond 
manipulating the computer system.  
We have also shown that while the immediate task of dealing with a call 
was „one-to-one‟ the relationships between call-handlers and the wider 
team enabled calls to be managed. The integration of call-handlers into 
teams, not just of call-handlers, but in the wider organizational hierarchy 
supports and maintains the deployment of the CDSS. In all three settings 
the spatial location of the work – in areas which facilitate team 
communication and sharing of knowledge support the operationalization of 
the CDSS and call-handling work – it seems unlikely that the CDSS could be 
made to work in environments where staff did not have this connectivity.  
6.5.2  Implications for developing NPT 
The collective action domain of NPT is perhaps the most elaborated, since 
much of its „content‟ derives from the earlier specification of NPM which 
focused on collective action. Nonetheless one of the issues our analysis 
raises for using NPT to study collective action is „what is the „it‟ that is being 
normalised?‟ This chapter has shown that it is not „the CDSS‟ as a pre-
formed, independent entity (i.e. the software) that has been normalised, 
rather, a hybrid of the CDSS and an evolving set of practices make call-
handling work in these three settings. This also means that we cannot only 
look at the immediate „user‟ of a technology (indeed the domain of cognitive 
participation alerts us to the wider interaction chains that bring a 
technology into use), and must understand the collective co-constitution of 
these practices. We have shown here that this extends beyond the 
individual call-handler working with the CDSS, to the wider teams and 
organizational divisions of labour surrounding the practice, both new roles 
that are introduces to support the practices and the existing hierarchies 
within and beyond the organization. 
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7 Reflexive monitoring - What is required to 
keep the CDSS in place? 
7.1 Introduction 
Reflexive monitoring describes the formal and informal evaluation that is 
done to appraise the effects of an innovation. NPT proposes that for an 
innovation to become embedded in practice it requires an on-going process 
of monitoring and adjusting the intervention to keep it in place. In this 
study, reflexive monitoring is concerned with how the actors in each case 
review, reflect upon, and monitor their use of the CDSS.  
Formalised judgements about the utility and effectiveness of a new practice, 
based upon institutionally shared beliefs (systemization), are central to 
reflexive monitoring. Institutional knowledge production and 
implementation (communal appraisal) exists alongside individual appraisal 
that relies upon experiential and unsystematic knowledge to judge the value 
and outcomes of a practice. Both communal and individual appraisal may 
lead to attempts at reconfiguration of the CDSS, where ideas about the 
CDSS and its use are flexible (for example, it may be subverted, modified or 
reconstructed by staff). 
In the following analysis we consider the role that reflexive monitoring has 
played in each of the three case studies to examine what is required to keep 
the CDSS in place in each setting.  
7.2 999 
The CDSS developers, despite imagining the completion of the development 
phase, have continually upgraded the CDSS. Given that the technical know-
how resides with these IT experts, it might be assumed that they alone 
have the power to shape the technology. However the work at 999 had 
been undertaken in conjunction with managers and clinical supervisors, so 
much so that the Trust managers describe their relationship with the 
developers as a partnership. The developers brought the kernel of a 
system, but the Trust added the specific expertise necessary to bring it into 
use:  
We came together to discuss how we might help [the CDSS team]… we 
started working with the team … giving our experience and knowledge to 
help them to draft that first attempt at [the CDSS] … I think it was more 
of us lending our experience and [the CDSS team] tapping into the 
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knowledge that we had around emergency services. Interview, 999 
senior manager 
This teamwork is not a one-off investment in a generic system, but has 
been vital in embedding this technology and will be necessary in subsequent 
deployments of the CDSS. This investment is needed not only to make 
adaptations to the system so it can mesh with other technologies and other 
user requirements, but also to develop the working relationship and trust 
needed to secure enrolment and legitimation of the new technology (see 
chapter 5) 
A key „selling‟ feature of the CDSS was that it was used by non-clinical staff. 
However while there may have been an initial vision of a clinician-free 
environment, the Trust managers found it necessary to introduce the clinical 
supervisor role for 999 (and SPA). Part of this role was to audit the call-
handlers (see below), but also to support the call-handlers by providing 
clinical expertise (e.g. when the call-handler has reservations about the 
disposition). Clinical supervisors sanction „early exits‟ (where triaging is not 
completed within the system) and „over-rides‟ (where the call-handler 
chooses not to follow a pathway/disposition). While the CDSS developers 
have tightened up on this over time, for example by re-programming the 
software to prevent over-rides, the presence and actions of clinical 
supervisors effectively legitimised „fuzzy logic‟ in the day-to-day operation 
of the CDSS. 
I think whenever you come up with something and you‟re unsure about 
it, and you‟re uncomfortable perhaps with…knowing where to go and if 
they‟ve got various things, and you feel that you haven‟t triaged them 
effectively for every symptom…you can always pass it to the clinical 
supervisor. […] And I think that‟s when they become, like I say, really 
important, so you can pass them [the call]…they can make sure that the 
call is triaged accurately. Interview, 999 call-handler 
In 999 there was some initial conflict between duty managers and the 
clinical supervisors over roles and responsibilities. The establishment of the 
clinical supervisor role disrupted the established division of labour and daily 
practice but this quickly settled around the new posts and the clinical 
supervisors became widely accepted and valued. 
Now that…a new lot [of clinical supervisors have come] in, everybody‟s 
got used to the system. I think the liaison with them now is good. In fact 
I‟ll go extra and say yeah, they are a benefit to the room. Interview, 
999 call-handler 
Whilst the ethnography demonstrated that 999 call-handlers valued the role 
of the clinical supervisor, in the survey the 999 call-handlers had only 
average levels of trust in the clinical supervisors (M = 3.2; SD = 0.9; Table 
12), significantly lower than SPA. Part of this might be accounted for by the 
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variability 999 call-handlers perceived there was in how clinical supervisors 
dealt with call-handlers in their everyday work. Of 33 call-handler 
respondents to the survey, 17 (55%) agreed or strongly agreed that clinical 
supervisors were inconsistent in how the dealt with call-handlers. 
it kind of varies from clinical supervisor to the next, from one to the 
next. Some are more encouraging at saying, you know, use your own 
judgement; if you‟re uncomfortable with it, pass it to us.  Others are a 
bit more: well, just use [CDSS]…[  ] And so, yeah, it kind of varies 
slightly. Interview, 999 call-handler 
Alongside the CDSS there was an extensive audit procedure (imposed by 
the CDSS developers as a condition of use) to appraise and monitor the 
performance of individual call-handlers and overall activity. Within the 999 
and SPA settings the auditing process was identical and call-handlers were 
subject to considerable monitoring and surveillance of their work. All calls 
are stored and call-handlers had five of their calls analysed in detail each 
month. The calls were assessed and feedback provided to call-handlers. The 
Ambulance Trust employs a team of auditors and clinical supervisors to 
undertake this monitoring.  
There were two main elements of the audit. First, call-handling skills were 
assessed against an audit tool, designed by the CDSS team (see Chapter 
2). The underlying function of this was to ensure call-handlers are „following 
the system‟ rather using their own judgement. Second, rates of 999 
dispositions (against targets for Categories A, B and C) were examined, 
outliers and variation identified and scrutinized. Call-handlers were subject 
to additional audits and retraining if performance was deemed inadequate. 
We have staff upstairs who can probably, on a lot of calls, go through it 
without using [the CDSS] because they are so used to it. But that is 
where you catch them out…You have to click a number of times, and if 
they don‟t click [ ], or it is a long time where they haven‟t clicked 
it...because we‟re listening to the call and they are giving the whole spiel 
on the phone, but they just haven‟t looked at it [the CDSS system] [...] 
They have to follow the system and have to be audited to follow the 
system. Interview, 999 manager  
if they‟re failing the audits, we normally look into why and we find it‟s 
one particular area, and it‟s just a misunderstanding or not full 
understanding on one subject matter. It‟s not often that we get someone 
failing…all over the board with different things. It‟s normally that they 
don‟t understand really the main job of asking questions. Interview, 
999 manager 
This formal reflexive monitoring by the Trust is overt. Its purpose is not 
simply surveillance, or to discipline and punish, but to improve practice and 
to support the call-handlers to improve. At 999 (and SPA), there is a culture 
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of encouraging the call-handlers to evaluate their own practice, as a 
learning process.  
The clinical supervisor talks about the importance of the audit as a way 
of “informing practice” […] she says that she doesn‟t like using the term 
“failing an audit”. Observation 999 
We‟ve kind of all been brought up within the service of being able to 
criticise yourself and not take it as being a fault. It‟s learning; it‟s making 
sure that you, we, all make mistakes but we just learn from it. But 
making sure as well that the clinicians are praising the staff…because you 
need that. If you‟re just criticising all the time that‟s not going to do 
anything for their confidence at all so we do have to try and make sure 
that we praise a good call, and if I see someone I go and say that was 
fantastic, you did well, and you‟re kind of making sure that they know 
that. Interview, 999 manager 
In addition to ensuring the call-handlers are working safely, they are 
audited to ensure that they are using the system to ration the use of 
valuable resources. There are strong normative messages within the 
organization about ambulance disposition rates, particularly relating to the 
deployment of „Category A‟ ambulances. Anonymised print outs of 
disposition rates for each individual call-handler are displayed on the control 
room wall (with unique identification numbers known only to the individual 
themselves) which allows the call-handler to compare their practice. 
In general, the ethnographic data suggested that the call-handlers 
supported the principle of audits, particularly to ensure safety. They 
sometimes drew a distinction between who audits the call, valuing the input 
of the clinical supervisor over the non-clinical auditor. We will see later in 
this chapter that this is particularly evident within the SPA setting. 
I do think that it is important to have audits. I think really, they do 
ensure that people are clinically safe…it is important. And although 
people do grumble about it - no one likes to have their work 
checked…I‟ve only failed one audit whilst I‟ve been here, and I wasn‟t 
particularly happy that I‟d failed it, but I‟d actually failed it from the 
auditors, as opposed from the clinical supervisors‟ [assessment]….but I 
do think it is important that all calls are audited, because like I say, 
really, if you weren‟t being checked on a regular basis, you could literally 
just do anything [laughs]. Interview, 999 call-handler  
Although the call-handlers were supportive of the audit process the survey 
indicated that call-handlers were less positive about the audit team. 999 
call-handlers had quite low levels of trust in the audit team (M =  2.7, SD = 
1.0), significantly lower when compared to the SPA and OOH setting. Part of 
this might be accounted for by the variability call-handlers perceive in audit 
decisions made by individual auditors: the survey found that 14 (nearly 
50%) of call-handlers agreed/strongly agreed that the audit team were 
inconsistent in how they audited call-handlers. 
© Queen‟s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Greener et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health               






Whatever the formal position regarding audit, particularly the claims to very 
tight monitoring of call-handlers, it seems that – in practice – the auditors 
allow greater leeway for the call-handlers in exercising the discretion in 
their day-to-day work (described in Chapter 6). The important point to note 
here is that whilst audit could have been used to insist that call-handlers 
stick to „the script‟ provided by the CDSS, the developers and managers 
appear to have accepted the call-handler‟s using the system flexibly (e.g. 
call-handlers adapting phrasing and using some of their „own‟ knowledge in 
conjunction with the system).  
This relates to an inherent tension in the work of call handing. On the one 
hand there are strong normative messages during training and in their 
everyday work which reinforces the claim that “if you follow the system you 
can‟t go wrong” (Observation 999). On the other hand, call-handlers are 
expected to use a degree of “common sense and judgement” (Interview, 
999 manager). Indeed, we have seen that the system works, precisely 
because call-handlers are able to use the system flexibly. However, the 
balance between following the system and using common sense/judgement 
is not an exact science and creates variability in auditing decisions between 
those clinical supervisors and other auditors: 
Some will use it like a robot…you know they‟ll say, well I can‟t ask that 
because I‟ll deviate from the system. But I always say to them, we 
expect you to use some common sense and judgement and it‟s not about 
deviating from the system; it‟s about sometimes having that gut feeling 
that we all get when we think something‟s not right Interview, 999 
manager 
This need to balance the CDSS script and discretion can provide grounds to 
challenge audit, as this call-handler explained in accounting for his decision 
to go „off-script‟ and keep talking to a suicidal caller:  
 
Q: So you made a conscious decision to stay on the phone in light of 
what was going on? 
Call handler: …yeah, I mean fair enough if there‟d been calls waiting and 
no call-takers available, I might have cut it short, but I thought due to 
circumstances, the best thing for me to do would be to stay on and I got 
absolutely bollocked, for want of a better word for it, by one of the 
clinical supervisors. I did a similar thing with a different clinical 
supervisor a couple of weeks later and I got a well done, you used your 
common sense; that was exactly the right thing to do. Interview, 999 
call-handler  
Call-handlers judgements derived from experience using the system were 
central to reflexive monitoring. Overall, there was a shared belief that the 
CDSS was reliable - indeed, there was a collective belief within the 
organization that the CDSS itself was more or less infallible (although a 
prominent belief in the 999 setting, this was particularly strong in SPA). 
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Concurring with the ethnographic data, the survey indicated that overall 
levels of trust in the CDSS were relatively high amongst 999 call-handlers in 
terms of competence, predictability, dependability, reputation and faith 
(Table 13). Failure of the CDSS is usually apportioned either to the caller 
who has provided incorrect or misleading information, or the call-handler 
using the system incorrectly (for example, selecting the wrong algorithm). 
The survey reported that call-handlers had only average moderate levels of 
trust in callers (a finding that was consistent across all three sites), but 
were relatively more confident of their own abilities to use the system 
correctly (Table 12). 
There is so many avenues; there is exactly that, so many pathways…You 
just have to go with the flow, and as long as you ask the right questions, 
you‟ll go down that right road. And it, again…it depends on what they 
answer. If they give you the wrong answer to a question, then you‟ll go 
down the wrong thing. Interview, 999 call-handler 
Then obviously you do have that element about call-taker error or, 
patients not actually presenting the full truth, but I would say 99.9% we 
get it right. Interview, 999 manager 
Call-handlers did not have complete trust in the CDSS partly because they 
(and other Trust staff) perceived that the system was poor at handling some 
types of calls (e.g. calls where the patient was under the influence of alcohol 
or the caller was not with the patient) 
7.3 SPA 
Whilst at 999 the introduction of new practices to enable reflexive 
monitoring occurred alongside the introduction of the CDSS, many of the 
audit and monitoring practices were firmly in place when the SPA service 
commenced.  
Some of the reflexive monitoring directly involved the CDSS developers, 
who responded to managers and call-handlers feedback by adapting and 
upgrading the CDSS. The CDSS was not a finished, pre-defined technology 
but a set of mutually evolving and inter-related actors and practices, to 
which staff contribute. 
I mean, if there‟s any worries or if you feel something‟s not quite right 
[with the CDSS], then we approach the clinical supervisor and just say, 
look, what‟s this all about? So yes, you can discuss it. If there‟s any 
problems, obviously they‟re relying on us, when there‟s been an update 
to let them know if there are problems there. So yes, you do get a 
chance to discuss it. Interview, SPA call-handler 
In contrast to the 999 setting, the clinical supervisors were part of the 
process from the beginning in SPA. Here, the clinical supervisor is viewed 
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very positively, not only as an additional „benefit‟ (as in 999), but rather as 
a necessity, in providing clinical input to ensure that the CDSS is safe and 
efficient (as well as being a conduit in providing feedback about the CDSS 
to the CDSS development team). 
 
there‟s always going to be situations where you‟re not sure and you need 
somebody with medical [knowledge]… Interview, SPA call-handler,  
 
we all just use [the CDSS] as we‟ve been trained and we‟ve always got 
queries… If we‟ve got any queries we‟ve always got the clinical 
supervisors…because they‟re the ones with the clinical knowledge. 
Interview, SPA call-handler 
Part of the clinical supervisor‟s role was to ensure that the call-handlers are 
using the system „correctly‟. The system itself was perceived as necessarily 
over-cautious because the call-handlers are not clinically trained. 
 [the CDSS] errs on the side of caution, so that if there is a risk, based 
on what they‟ve told you, as long as you‟ve asked the questions 
correctly, and understood what they‟ve told you, you‟re always going to 
get the best response for them. Interview, SPA call-handler 
The survey results, overall, supported the ethnographic data, in that the 
SPA call-handlers reported fairly high levels of trust in the clinical 
supervisors (M = 3.7; SD = 0.7), significantly higher than that of 999 call-
handlers (Table 12). In addition to support from the clinical supervisors, 
some call-handlers were undertaking additional clinical training. The 
proximity of clinicians and this additional knowledge boosted the call-
handlers identities as skilled, knowledgeable health care workers and helped 
them mange calls. This in turn made the work rewarding: 
 
I‟m doing an anatomy and pathophysiology course which is in my own 
time. They‟re offering us further learning in terms of medical practice, so 
hopefully we‟re going to start picking up on it […] It‟s through the 
university, and [the Trust] are paying for it […] 
Q: And how long is the course? 
It‟s a ten week course of four hours and then we have an exam at the 
end. It‟s…anatomy and pathophysiology, it‟s a module towards the 
student paramedic  […]  so if we pass these exams, we can go and do 
student paramedic…But I mean, I don‟t necessarily want to be a 
paramedic, it‟s just more further learning and it backs up things at work. 
Interview, SPA call-handler 
Although the formal audit process was operationalised identically in the 999 
and SPA settings, the way in which call-handlers accept – and value it - 
differed. The SPA call-handlers almost overwhelmingly accepted the audit 
system and were extremely positive about it ensuing that they work both 
safely and effectively, as well as acknowledging its role in building their 
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confidence, and developing their skills, as a call-handler. However, it is 
worth noting that the SPA call-handlers did not have target rates for 
dispositions, a particularly unpopular aspect of auditing in 999. Additionally 
SPA call-handlers also derived a sense of competency, of being „good at 
what they do‟, from passing audits. Although call-handlers were positive 
about the audit process, SPA call-handlers reported moderate levels of trust 
in the audit team (M = 3.2, SD = 0.8) significantly higher than those in the 
999 setting. 
It‟s also good for your confidence, as well, because they will come back 
to you and say, look, this is exceptionally well handled. But it‟s also not 
just the calls that they have picked - if you‟ve got a call you‟re worried 
about, they‟ll audit it for you if you want it done, and then you can take 
away your mistakes, or the things you did right, and learn from them. 
But it‟s a very good process and they will sit down and talk you through 
it so you know what‟s going on. Interview, SPA call-handler  
I think it‟s definitely important to have audits in any…industry like this. 
It‟s so important because, literally, we‟re dealing with people‟s lives. We 
have to be monitored. And I do think it‟s helpful. I mean, I enjoy getting 
feedback just so I know what to work on and so I know what areas I can 
improve on. And what I‟m doing well because it motivates me. I do think 
it is an important part of the job. Interview, SPA call-handler 
As in the 999 setting, the call-handlers used some interpretative flexibility 
to manage calls, although newer SPA call-handlers, who had less previous 
experience to draw upon, were more likely to report that it was important to 
„follow the system‟.  
They are [some 999 call-handlers] quite often seen as over-stepping or 
stepping out of the boundary and that‟s really frustrating for them 
because they know, and I know, that they‟re right. But because the 
system says you have to be ultra safe, which you have to be because in 
this day and age, you know, litigation and all of that…We have to make 
sure that we kind of stay within that boundary. So it tends to be those 
people who‟ve worked with the [previous] system….that do tend to just 
step outside every now and again. The new people don‟t know anything 
different so they follow it to the letter and that is, that is good. 
Interview, 999 manager 
It‟s too easy to get in the mindset, if you know what you‟re looking for 
and you know how to get to that disposition, but you‟ve got to stick to 
the question because there could be one question where an answer is 
not sure, that could completely change the disposition. Interview, SPA 
call-handler 
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In addition, one of the key differences was that SPA call-handlers were 
much more likely to consistently check out their decisions and use the 
clinical supervisors to legitimate their decisions: 
 [The CDSS] kept taking [call-handler] to the HEAD INJURY path but the 
call-handler thought that this was not appropriate, so she contacted the 
clinical supervisor. The clinical supervisor agreed and suggested she 
went for an EARLY EXIT. An ambulance was arranged for the patient. 
Observation SPA 
Call-handlers shared beliefs about the CDSS that shape the reflexive 
monitoring process. These beliefs were in turn shaped by their individual 
and collective experiences of using the CDSS. The SPA call-handlers had 
developed high levels of trust in the system.  
I‟ve never found one where I‟ve actually got one that‟s completely the 
wrong disposition, where it‟s been [the CDSS] fault‟. So yes, I do trust it 
more than me. Interview, SPA call-handler 
The survey findings reflected the ethnographic data in the trust that call-
handlers had in the CDSS (Table 13). Overall trust in the CDSS was higher 
here than at either of the other two settings (M = 4.0, SD = 0.6) and SPA 
call-handlers reported high levels of dependability (M = 4.1, SD = 0.7) and 
faith (M = 4.0, SD = 0.7) in the system. SPA call-handlers were particularly 
strong in their beliefs that CDSS failure was the result of either call-handler 
or caller error.  
 
it‟s only as good as the person who‟s using it and it‟s only as good as the 
answers that you‟re getting off the patient […] You‟ve got to ask them 
[the caller]. You‟ve got to make sure that they understand the questions 
because if you‟re not using it properly, they may not understand the 
questions and the [answers] they are giving you back aren‟t going to be 
the correct ones for [the CDSS] to safely assess it. Interview, SPA 
call-handler 
7.4 OOH 
At OOH we were able to observe the introduction of the CDSS in a new 
setting and for a new type of service (face-to-face). Whilst the CDSS 
developers saw the CDSS as a „finished product‟, albeit one requiring 
periodic updates, OOH wanted further adaptation to meet their (evolving) 
needs. Much as in 999 where the Trust added the specific expertise to bring 
it into use, OOH saw that they could contribute to the development of the 
CDSS for their setting. 
I think it‟s quite a good system. I think, we, need to tweak it, find the 
little bits with regards to the outcomes and that‟s it. But I think it‟s fairly 
good. Interview, OOH call-handler  
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Like I say, there are a few leaks, a few cracks, but that's going to be 
happening with any new system really, any new thing you introduce 
Interview, OOH call-handler 
Like 999 and SPA the introduction of the CDSS required new roles to 
support the training and formal audit mechanism. This reflexive monitoring 
was somewhat different since existing audit systems were less developed 
and there were fewer staff resources to support the process in the OOH 
setting. Initially there was only one member of staff responsible for all 
training and auditing (compared to the 999 and SPA setting, which has a 
well-established team of about six staff for this). As more staff required 
training to use the CDSS the organization increased the number of staff 
trained to undertake training and auditing.  
 
Unlike 999 and SPA, OOH had not introduced a clinical supervisor role to 
support the call-handlers‟ work. However they may obtain clinical advice 
from the triage GPs and although GPs do not sanction call-handler‟s CDSS 
use in quite the same way as the clinical supervisors do in 999. In order to 
support call-handlers OOH identified some call-handlers who act as „liaison‟ 
staff (these are new responsibilities for some existing call-handlers). Their 
role was not to provide clinical advice but to support call-handlers with 
problems or difficult calls (for example, offering advice about which route 
the call-handler should take through the system). 
Just once or twice I‟ve not been quite sure which way to follow it 
through.  […] Like this morning, one of the patients said she was told to 
ring back if her symptoms didn‟t get any better, and I wasn‟t quite sure 
whether to take the call or just offer an appointment […] So I just wasn‟t 
quite sure which way to take it. […] if you do struggle, there‟s always 
somebody there. You know, there‟s always a liaison there to just help 
you out if you do struggle. Interview, OOH call-handler 
In OOH we were able to trace the introduction of formal monitoring 
practices from their inception. In this setting, whilst all call-handlers were 
audited in the same way as SPA and 999 they only received feedback on 
their performance if they failed an audit. As a consequence, some call-
handlers seemed unaware whether or not they had been audited. This gives 
the impression that the process is much more covert here than at the 
Ambulance Trust. Furthermore, whilst the managers and trainers claimed to 
derive useful information from the process, it did not contribute to the wider 
sense of skill development, competence or security as seen in both 999 and 
SPA. Thus far, auditing in this site has been used to identify mistakes and 
problems. There was less focus on identifying good practice and on staff 
learning/development. 
The audits will pick up anything that‟s just one-off. And obviously they 
will also identify with anything that‟s recurrent. And if it becomes 
recurrent, then we obviously bring them back into training again. [The 
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trainer] is quite good. She does pick up quite quickly and she‟s already 
had a couple of staff in and just given them some tips on how to do 
different things. Interview, OOH Senior Manager 
We‟re going to be reviewing higher [ ] call volumes to start with because 
they‟re areas that we‟ve identified already that we want to look into. 
We‟ve noticed a difference in new call-takers to existing call-takers, 
Interview, OOH manager 
There appears to be a subtle difference in how the audit has been presented 
to staff - and how in turn, it is perceived. In OOH there was a greater 
emphasis on „surveillance‟ and identifying call-handler error, rather than 
audit as an opportunity for learning and developing call-handling skills. 
However despite this, call-handlers from the survey reported a high level of 
trust in the audit „team‟ (mean of 4.0, significantly higher than that of 999 
or SPA). This might, in part, be influenced by the fact that the OOH audit 
„team‟ has primarily consisted of one individual, who is also the trainer and 
a close colleague.  
Q: In terms of audits what do you think about them? Do you think they 
are useful, that they‟re helping you? 
CH75: I think so, yes because once its [the call record] closed you can‟t 
go back into it so I think if we have done something wrong on it, picks 
up in the audit and then you‟re told if you have made a mistake. You‟re 
made aware of it. Without it you‟ll probably make the same mistakes so 
yes, I think they‟re a good thing. Interview, OOH call-handler 
However, despite the emphasis on identifying bad practice, there was an 
accepted level of flexibility in using the system across the organization – to 
a greater extent than in the other settings. A degree of flexibility was 
legitimated by the OOH GPs, the trainer and the shift managers. This was 
particularly apparent in their decisions to not use the CDSS for certain types 
of calls (e.g. palliative care patients) where call-handlers decide whether to 
use the CDSS, or whether to simply pass the call directly to the GP.  
…for the patient who‟s at end of life, [where it‟s] not possible to answer 
questions on the telephone, and you‟re asking for a specific type of pain 
or, and they‟re obviously, they can‟t answer you. It‟s not appropriate to 
put them all the way through questioning when you wouldn‟t be leaving 
them for two hours or six hours anyway. You would want them to be 
seen as quickly as possible. So there‟s no point in putting them through 
the torment of taking a load of questions, for them to be asked all over 
again by the doctor. So in areas like that, it‟s not really appropriate to 
assess them. Interview, OOH manager 
In the same way that 999 and SPA call-handlers check out their decisions 
with the clinical supervisors, OOH call-handlers sometimes check decisions 
and to confirm that the GP is happy with the decision. 
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so if you ask if it can be upgraded and they [the shift coordinator] say 
no…then you shouldn‟t upgrade it really…but also, you can ask the 
doctors as well, most of them are happy to say. I mean, you can‟t ask 
pathway to choose, but…  
Q: Because they are not trained, they don‟t know how to use [the 
CDSS]? 
Exactly, so… but you can ask them. If it was another query, you can ask 
the doctors if…you know, it says that they need to speak to them, but 
can I  [change the disposition] They go, yes that‟s fine. Interview, OOH 
call-handler 
As in SPA there is the belief that discretion, experiential expertise and some 
clinical knowledge is not inappropriate given the over-cautiousness of the 
CDSS. This is not a criticism of the CDSS – caution is respected – but so is 
the human judgement to override in appropriate circumstances.   
a lot of the confidence comes from the fact that the system is over 
cautious, you know. It's not going to make the mistake of sending you to 
a doctor when you really need to go to hospital. However, it is going to 
make the mistake of, it's going to send you to hospital when you really 
need to go to a doctor. Interview, OOH call-handler  
I think it errs on the side of caution …[ ] …it‟s difficult for me to say 
whether it‟s the correct disposition because I‟m not medically trained or 
anything; then you‟d have to speak to the doctor to see whether they 
think the disposition is correct or not. Interview, OOH call-handler  
Despite some call-handlers believing that the CDSS is safe or over-safe, 
some staff had doubts about the CDSS – both in the technology itself and in 
its potential to reduce the need for GP triage. Lack of trust in the system 
was particularly prevalent amongst experienced staff who had used the 
previous protocol system. 
I understand it rules out the immediate life threatening; that‟s good but 
it… at the moment it does not take away fear; in fact it increases it. 
Q: and it isn‟t actually helpful 
I don‟t think so at the moment, no but they were reckoning between 
25% and 40% less triage [for the GPs]. Obviously I don‟t have any stats 
but I can‟t see that. Interview, OOH call-handler 
The survey findings however, reflected quite high levels of trust in the CDSS 
at OOH (similar to those found in the 999 setting), although „faith‟ in the 
CDSS was scored lower (M = 3.5 compared to 4.0 in SPA, see Table 13). As 
consistent with the other settings, call-handlers apportioned CDSS failure as 
the result of call-handler or caller error.  
At first I was a bit sceptical thinking that it was going [wrong] ... It 
turned out to be me going down the wrong route which was giving the 
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wrong, or not probing enough on a question and coming out with the 
wrong outcome.. Interview, OOH call-handler 
But sometimes you find, like with the bleeding question, I think it's hard 
for someone to judge a pint of blood, especially if it's in a towel, or 
mixed with urine, or water, it's very hard to judge that.  So sometimes 
the question the system is asking is throwing out the wrong disposition, 
not because I phrased it wrong, not really because what the system is 
asking is wrong, but because the way the public, the patient, answers, 
it's kind of their answering in a way. […] I suppose in that sense, the 
system can lead it down the wrong way. Interview, OOH call-handler,  
7.5 Reflexive monitoring across the three settings 
By studying the how the same technology comes into use in three settings, 
we can see how, although there are similar factors in play keeping the 
CDSS in place, there are differences in how these mechanisms are 
operationalised. Across the three settings, there was significant involvement 
from the developers in keeping the CDSS in everyday use. They not only 
invested considerable time and effort in the introduction of the CDSS 
(although less so at OOH), they have also invested time and effort in 
adapting the system in response to its use over time. Continual adaptation 
of the CDSS was undertaken in partnership between developers and 
users/managers in all three sites. One might expect that the adaptation 
would decrease with each site (as the system is „refined‟ over time) but this 
does not appear to be the case. Refinements are often not around the 
clinical content of the system, but rather involve changes to make it work in 
particular settings.  
To keep the CDSS in place, all sites have found that it is vital to devote 
additional resources to support the call-handlers in their use of the CDSS. 
The 999 and SPA settings both introduced a new clinical role (a clinical 
supervisor) to manage and audit call-handler‟s performance. Additional 
clinical support has not been introduced in OOH, perhaps because there is 
already GP present whose expertise can be drawn on.  
The formal audit mechanism is set by the CDSS developers (e.g. the 
minimum number of audits per month and the use of the audit tool). 
However, the audit process has been operationalised differently in OOH 
compared with 999 and SPA. The process at 999 and SPA is formalised, 
developed and overt, and primarily is – or is at least is presented as - an 
opportunity for learning, as well as ensuring safety. In OOH, although the 
process is not punitive, the audit is presented as a way of identifying 
mistakes and preventing bad habits. Nonetheless, call-handlers across all 
three sites perceive that audits are an important aspect of them doing their 
job well. Trust in the audit team varied across sites – with it being lowest in 
999 (M = 2.7 compared to 3.2 in SPA and 4.0 in OOH). This was surprising, 
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since one might expect that trust in the audit team would develop over 
time. 
In spite of a formal and well developed audit system, call-handlers still 
exercise some considerable flexibility in using the CDSS. For example, call-
handlers sometimes go „off-piste‟ and use their „own knowledge‟ in 
conjunction with the system, or adapt and translate wording so that the 
caller understands what is being asked. This echoes previous research 
which suggests that as technologies are brought into the field of daily 
practice, users exercise „interpretive flexibility‟74 which describes, for 
example, how users ignore particular functionalities or develop creative 
alternative forms of use to produce outcomes that may differ significantly 
from the original intentions for a given innovation. Interpretive flexibility 
around the use of the CDSS is tolerated in all settings, but the way in which 
call-handlers use the system flexibly is played out in slightly different ways 
between the settings. 
Reflexive monitoring includes the beliefs that people have about the utility 
of the intervention, which are necessary to keep the intervention in place. 
Call-handlers overall, understood the need for audit, and valued it. They 
trusted in the CDSS, whilst recognising that it „failed‟ in some circumstances 
(primarily due to call-handlers not asking the questions „correctly‟ or callers 
providing misleading or incorrect information). There was perhaps more 
doubt at OOH – partly perhaps because it was new and a number of staff 
were happier using the previous system. These findings were endorsed by 
our survey (Table 13), which showed that call-handlers self-reported trust 
in the CDSS was broadly similar across all three settings, although in SPA 
call-handlers rated the CDSS more highly than at the other two settings. 
The „trust‟ factors did not significantly differ between sites (although SPA 
site reported higher levels of faith in the system). Findings were broadly 
consistent with the qualitative findings of the study regarding different 
beliefs about the CDSS in each of the settings.  
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 Mean (SD) Ratings Mean (SD) Ratings Mean (SD) Ratings 
Employing 
organization 
     3.7 (0.8)a***       3.9 (0.8)b***       4.5 (0.5)a*** b*** 
Audit team        2.7 (1.0)a* b***        3.2 (0.8)a* c***        4.0 (0.6)b*** c*** 
CDSS team   3.5 (0.7)a*  3.7 (0.7) 3.9 (0.5)a* 
Clinical 
supervisor 
   3.2 (0.9)a**      3.7 (0.7) a**  N/A 
Callers 3.3 (1.2) 3.1 (1.3) 3.1 (0.9) 
Self 4.0 (0.5) 4.1 (0.7) 4.1 (0.5) 
N.B. Superscript shows significant differences between sites:  *p< 0.05; **p<0.01;       
***p<0.001 
 
Table 13. Call-handlers self-reported trust in the CDSS 
Trust Factors 999  
(N = 31) 
SPA  
(N = 39) 
OOH 
 (N = 33) 
 Mean (SD) Ratings Mean (SD) Ratings Mean (SD) Ratings  
Competence 3.8 (0.6) 4.1 (0.6) 3.9 (0.5) 
Predictability 3.7 (0.6) 3.9 (0.6) 3.6 (0.6) 
Dependability 3.7 (0.8)    4.1 (0.7)  a*    3.7 (0.6) a* 
Faith 3.7 (0.8)    4.0 (0.7) a*    3.5 (0.5) a* 
Reputation 3.7 (0.8) 3.9 (0.9) 3.6 (0.6) 
Overall trust 
in the CDSS 
   3.7 (0.6)a*       4.0 (0.6) a* b*    3.7 (0.4) b* 
N.B.   Superscript shows significant differences between sites: *p< 0.05; **p<0.01; 
***p<0.001 
7.5.1 Workforce implications 
Having looked at reflexive monitoring across the three settings it is clear 
that there is a need for on-going support and development by the CDSS 
developers. The technology is never fixed or finished and interpretive 
flexibility and continual change in use contexts requires adaptation in 
partnership with the range of actors is necessary to keep the technology 
into use.  
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Our analysis has shown that call-handlers require support in their everyday 
use of CDSS – be it from other more experienced call-handlers or clinical 
supervisors. The extent to which clinical input is necessary to make the 
CDSS work is unclear, although there is clinical input in all three settings 
(the clinical supervisors in SPA and 999 and the GPs in OOH). It therefore 
seems unwise to assume that because the CDSS can be operated by non-
clinical staff that this removes, completely, the need for day-to-day clinical 
input.  
In terms of workforce training the organization has to be able to manage 
the inherent tension in call-handler work between ensuring the call-handlers 
follow the system, whilst at the same time recognising the a degree of 
flexibility in the way call-handlers use the CDSS is what makes it work. This 
requires flexibility in training (and audit) to support this. 
7.5.2  Implications for developing NPT 
NPT makes it clear that the work of embedding this intervention in 
everyday work is on-going: it is not done, once and for all, but requires 
social action to monitor practice and make adjustments to keep the 
intervention in place. NPT points to the importance of reflexive monitoring 
– as well as to collective action – required to make an intervention work 
and to keep it working.  This is an important extension to NPM and 
reminds us that we cannot assume that there is a single, fixed entity that 
is normalised. 
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8 Answering the questions in our proposal  
8.1 Fulfilling the research proposal 
In our proposal, we noted that the implementation of new technologies, 
such as CDSS, depends on the interplay between technologies and the 
workforce in everyday practice. We argued that we urgently need to 
understand the consequences of these „technologies in use' for workforce 
configuration and training and organizational management, and that this 
required systematic analysis.  
We set out to inform workforce planning and policy by undertaking a 
detailed comparative case analysis of a particular technology focusing 
specifically on workforce issues – the nature of the work and who did it, 
organizational and team relationships, divisions of labour and skill-mix and 
the wider organizational contexts surrounding a technology.  
Our objectives were to:  
i) understand the impact of new technology on everyday work and service 
delivery.   
ii) identify education and training needs for staff engaging with new 
technologies; 
iii) examine the implications of new technology for workforce 
reconfiguration and management planning. 
Our analytical approach, has been informed by a range of sociological and 
psychological theories and traditions, but was initially framed around the 
normalization process model (NPM)59,60. NPM offered a systematic approach 
to understanding the collective action required to embed new interventions 
into health care work. However, during our project NPM has evolved into a 
wider theory of social action – the normalization process theory (NPT)58. We 
welcome this development, which allows us to address all of our original 
questions and – at the same time – to broaden our analysis. However, with 
the extension of NPT, it makes sense to re-order our questions (and the 
phrasing, but not the intent of two questions). With the benefit of this 
revision our original 8 questions (labelled a-h in the original proposal) can 
be restructured as four „how‟ questions – allowing us to summarise and 
integrate the descriptive analyses of the preceding chapters which we do 
below. We are then left with four „what‟ questions which allow us to draw 
out the implications of this analysis for policy and practice and form the 
basis for our conclusions and recommendations in the final chapter.  
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8.2 Integrating Our Findings 
The four preceding chapters worked through our analysis of the 
ethnography and survey data using the four components of NPT (coherence, 
cognitive participation, collective action and reflexive monitoring). This 
section integrates our analysis using four questions to review what we have 
learnt from the case studies 
8.2.1 How does the CDSS impact upon everyday work and how is it 
understood / managed? 
The preceding four chapters have shown that this is strongly shaped by the 
particular work settings.  
In 999 the CDSS has facilitated the management of categorization and 
prioritization of emergency calls against three categories of urgency (A, B 
and C) for ambulance response and enabled alternative (non-ambulance) 
advice to be given. It has been received as a positive way of triaging 999 
calls despite the apparent intensification of the work content (more 
questioning, increased tasks within the call etc).  
In SPA the CDSS facilitates the management of urgent care calls, enabling 
sorting by urgency and consequent transfer to GP – if required – and/or 
direct health advice (e.g. making out of hours GP appointments or advising 
paracetamol and warm fluids). This work involves similar tasks to 999 in 
terms of navigating the CDSS but is extended in that the range of 
presenting conditions and possible dispositions is wider than in 999, and 
many calls take longer to handle.  
In OOH the CDSS performed a similar function to that in SPA – managing 
calls to out-of-hours primary care –  and had more recently been deployed 
to manage face-to-face attenders at a UCC, offering emergency care 
(delivered by the acute Hospital) and urgent primary care (provided by 
primary care).  Here the CDSS had both extended the work (e.g. the 
number of questions and the length of time calls took, and latterly the 
encompassing of A&E reception tasks) and also made the work more 
scripted by relocating the knowledge previously derived from paper 
protocols and call-handler experience in the wording of questions in the 
CDSS. 
In all three settings the use of the CDSS required considerable emotional 
labour. This included issues associated with managing potentially life 
threatening events and diseases, through to the need to establish rapport 
with the caller, manage anxiety and distress and to deal with anger and 
abusive talk. Additionally we observed that while clinical information has 
been embedded in the CDSS the work of using it requires considerable 
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discretion and the use of embodied knowledge.  It was clear in all three 
settings that call-handling bore a closer resemblance to other forms of 
health care work than to call-handling work per se. 
Across each setting the use of the CDSS appeared to have coherence; there 
was broad agreement that the CDSS was suitable for task even though the 
task varied across settings. This coherence was underpinned by wider 
understandings and discourses, notably about i) rationing resource use, ii) 
modifying caller/patient behaviour and iii) the legitimacy of EBM. The CDSS 
could only „make sense‟ or become intelligible in light of discursive shifts in 
understanding that had taken place in the external environment of health 
services and broader society.  
It is important to note that not all individuals shared exactly the same 
understanding of the CDSS. Indeed not all in the same position regarding 
this new technology. For the call-handlers as day to day users of the CDSS 
their enrolment (cognitive participation) in using the CDSS was mandatory 
and they had very little power to resist its introduction. In contrast the 
senior managers‟ understandings of the CDSS – in the case of 999 for 
example the particular emphasis on rationing – were key to decisions about 
its adoption.   
Considerable effort was expended in establishing the legitimacy (coherence) 
of this new technology for the work and in enrolling a range of staff 
(cognitive participation) in the tasks of bringing it into everyday use.  
Further it was clear that this coherence was dynamic: it needed to be 
reworked and renegotiated over time. For example, there was considerable 
reframing of the advantages of the CDSS in OOH from when it originally 
replaced the paper system to when its use was extended to the face-to-face 
setting. The work of bringing the CDSS into use and maintaining its 
everyday use (collective action) was enabled by a wide range of actors who 
worked at establishing sufficient coherence and securing enrolment and buy 
in (cognitive participation).  
The CDSS also had an impact on the work in terms of monitoring and 
governance, and vice versa. Chapter 7 showed that reflexive monitoring 
was essential to keeping the system and work practices in place and that 
the deployment of the CDSS necessitated the creation of additional training 
and surveillance functions in each setting. 
8.2.2 How do users and networks develop confidence and trust in 
the CDSS? 
This is not automatic and we have shown that considerable effort was 
expended by a range of actors prior to the deployment of the CDSS in each 
setting. The work by DH alongside the CDSS developers in establishing the 
safety of the system was an essential foundation for the local coherence of 
the CDSS. This coherence was supported by wider external discourses, such 
© Queen‟s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Greener et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health               






as evidence-based medicine, which ensured that the idea of formally en-
scripting clinical knowledge in a computer system (rather than „in‟ a 
clinician) „made sense‟. This work helped to legitimise the CDSS and build 
confidence and trust in its ability to do the job safely.   
For the day to day users of the CDSS – the call-handlers – there were clear 
differences in levels of confidence and trust in the system related to the 
nature of previous systems in use, if any. In OOH the call-handlers 
appeared least confident and trusting about the CDSS. Partly, this reflected 
the relative newness of the CDSS here – compared with the 999 and SPA 
settings. However, much of this scepticism in OOH centred on unfavourable 
comparisons with the previous paper based protocol system. Furthermore, 
there was a sense that the CDSS had been imposed on them due to 
external factors (new quality standards), which caused some resentment, 
as did the increased call times and extension to face to face interactions. 
However, the lower levels of trust in this setting seemed to be located in 
those call-handlers who had used the old system and was not shared by the 
newer call-handlers who seemed more positive about the CDSS and its 
competence to do the job. This mix of views between experienced and 
newer workers may explain why the survey findings do not show mean 
levels of trust at OOH to be significantly lower than those in the 999 setting. 
At 999, where the system had been in use for the longest period of time, 
during our observations staff appeared confident using the CDSS and in 
interviews they expressed trust in the system. This trust was rooted in 
understandings of the CDSS‟ safety, respect for the clinical expertise it 
represented, and the fact that the DH had approved its use.  
The survey shows that trust was highest amongst staff in SPA, where the 
CDSS had been introduced from the start of a new service. There were no 
comparators for these staff, most of whom had been newly recruited. It 
appears that this enabled higher levels of confidence and trust in the 
system, from the start, whereas trust and confidence appeared to develop 
over time for those who had experience of using other systems.  
Of interest across all settings we noted that trust in the system operated 
across a certain bandwidth of interaction. For the majority of cases call-
handlers experienced a high level of trust in the system: which lead them to 
blame themselves rather than the technology when things went wrong. 
However, for smaller percentage of cases there were reservations about the 
system‟s ability to triage the call appropriately. This lack of trust fell into 
three broad categories. In some instances it was felt that the system did 
not have the ability to deal with certain scenarios effectively, for example in 
cases where there were multiple symptoms, or where the caller lacked 
adequate language skills such as young children or those with learning 
difficulties, however by and large the call-handlers seemed happy to regard 
these calls as falling outside the system and dealt with them accordingly. In 
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other examples there was a lack of trust in the system‟s benevolence, for 
example in terms of whether it was acting in the best interests of the public. 
Call-handlers at the OOH setting (notably the longer serving staff members) 
expressed strongly felt dissatisfaction that the system did not give callers 
what they wanted – access to a GP. Finally in some cases there was a lack 
of trust in the system‟s integrity. Call-handlers felt that some cases were 
„special‟ - that some callers, the elderly, the dying, distressed parents with 
unwell small children were deserving of a higher level of care. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum were some callers for whom the call-handlers 
had little empathy (e.g. callers who appeared to be under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs) and here the call-handlers were uncomfortable where the 
system lead to dispositions which gave such callers a higher level of care 
than they felt was warranted. The survey findings supported our 
observations about call-handlers showing that they felt that the system was 
significantly less trustworthy in terms of benevolence and integrity than it 
was in terms of its competence to do the job. As our observations show 
therefore outside the bandwidth of interaction in which the CDSS is trusted 
are areas of distrust which lead to the exercising of discretion by call-
handlers which in turn often leads to over-riding dispositions 
In all settings the organizational managers expressed high levels of trust 
and confidence in the CDSS and this clearly contributed to the coherence 
and cognitive participation of other staff in the networks surrounding the 
CDSS. Trust acted as a mobilising factor that promoted enrolment of actors 
and facilitated the operation of the chains of interaction that made the work 
possible. However, even where levels of confidence and trust are lower, 
notably at the OOH setting, the CDSS has been embedded in everyday 
practice. Nonetheless we suggest that confidence and trust in the system is 
helpful to successful deployment.  
8.2.3 How are tasks divided formally and informally between staff 
using and managing CDSS? 
There were clear formal hierarchies and divisions of labour in each of the 
three settings. However, as we have demonstrated in Chapters 4-7 these 
were structured and worked in specific ways in different settings.  
In the 999 there was a strong organizational and managerial hierarchy up 
to Executive level. The distinction between call-handling and dispatch staff 
centred on task differentiation and predated the introduction of the CDSS, 
and interestingly while the CDSS intensified call-handling work, this work 
still appeared to have a lower position in the hierarchy. The clinical 
supervisor role – created after the introduction of the CDSS – extended the 
division of labour and disrupted the call-handler-control room management 
hierarchy by:  
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- Introducing a new layer of supervision for the call-handlers, creating some 
initial boundary disputes with duty managers; 
- Introducing a clinical worker into an area of work designated as clerical;   
- Endorsing the need for external clinical expertise to make the CDSS 
intervention work effectively; 
- Questioning the pseudo-clinical identity of the call-handlers – by 
introducing a clinician to regulate clinical decisions.  
The introduction of the clinical supervisor role produced some initial 
resentment from some call-handlers and other staff, but over time this has 
lessened. Nonetheless the tension between the claim that the clinical 
knowledge is all in the system and the presence of the clinical supervisor is 
not acknowledged. The clinical supervisor role was incorporated into SPA 
and is an accepted feature of the SPA hierarchy.  
In OOH there was a division of labour between those who worked in the 
call-handling control room and those who dealt with face-to-face 
encounters. At the time of our observation, the move to the UCC was recent 
and some face-to-face staff had not been trained for the CDSS and some 
call-handlers had not learnt the face-to-face procedures.  Over time it was 
anticipated that the distinction will be reduced as call-handlers/receptionists 
are increasingly dual trained and will cover either service, as required.  In 
this setting there was no designated clinical supervisor role but there was a 
GP, who took calls referred by call-handlers and could provide clinical 
advice.  
Across the three settings, there were few informal divisions of labour or 
hierarchy which differed from the formally established ones – except for a 
general awareness of seniority related to length of service which can 
influence who shares knowledge and supports newer workers.   
8.2.4 How does the CDSS „fit‟ in wider political, sectoral and 
organizational contexts (what are the barriers and 
facilitators)? 
One of the key reasons why the CDSS was successfully brought into use in 
the three settings was the fit between what it offered as a computer 
technology and the ambitions and aims of those working in the wider 
political, sectoral and organizational contexts, notably those at high levels 
of management with power to enact decisions about service 
(re)organization and delivery. 
During our study, the position of the CDSS in relation to NHS policy and 
political thinking shifted considerably. What was once a small scale 
technology with limited use, was licensed for the ambulance service and – 
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more significantly still – was nominated for a new national urgent care 
three-digit number telephone service.  
Originally, the CDSS was built by a team of developers based in NHS Direct 
(which was employing nurses to give telephone advice, using a different 
CDSS). The team were seconded to NHS Connecting for Health (CfH), 
where the CDSS became an increasingly high profile success whilst other 
key NHS IT projects continued to face difficulties and setbacks. Over this 
period, the Development Team and CfH also established a „National Clinical 
Governance Group‟ for the CDSS bringing together all the Royal Colleges 
(including midwives and nurses) in a shared endeavour to support and 
develop the system for a national three digit number to access urgent care. 
By the end of our fieldwork the CDSS was strongly aligned with the 
ambitions of the DH at political and policy decision-making levels.    
At a local level, in 999 and SPA the CDSS was championed by the senior 
managers and Trust executives.  As we described in Chapters 4 and 5 much 
of the coherence and cognitive participation around the CDSS was driven by 
the organizational ambitions of this Trust and the efforts of particular 
individuals to achieve these. The CDSS was understood as central to this 
endeavour. The Trust‟s ambitions were shaped by powerful discourses about 
rationing, patient behaviour and EBM: all met by claims for the CDSS, that 
it could enable clerical workers to deliver standardised, evidence based call 
management by non-clinical workers. The extension of the use of the CDSS 
to deliver the new SPA service built on the experience of successful 
implementation for 999 so the earlier service facilitated the development of 
the new one. 
In OOH the introduction of the CDSS fitted less easily into local 
understandings of the OOH service, despite support from senior managers 
(and some middle managers). Call-handlers and some middle managers 
were not persuaded that the CDSS would improve the service, as they 
understood it, and were critical of the reduction in call-handlers‟ autonomy 
(notably in terms of meeting what they saw as the primary aim of the OOH 
service - to give patients GP appointments). Meanwhile, the senior 
managers - at executive and Trust board level – could see long term 
benefits to the service that could be delivered by introducing the CDSS. 
Specifically, the CDSS was used to deliver an ambitious plan to expand the 
OOH service by integrating telephone call-handling with face-to-face urgent 
care in a new Urgent Care Centre. The „selling‟ features of the CDSS – that 
it could be used by non-clinical staff, that it standardised decision making, 
and that it was informed by EBM, and had a successful history of use 
elsewhere meant that it had a very strong „fit‟ with this vision. Given the 
relatively low status and power of the call-handling staff (which we have 
noted before in chapters 4 and 5) their „resistance‟ to the CDSS which 
manifested mainly as conversations comparing the CDSS unfavourably with 
past practice, was easy to ignore or overcome – in effect the decision to 
© Queen‟s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Greener et 
al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for 
Health               






transfer to the UCC, and to adopt the CDSS for call-handling and reception 
work was a fait accompli. More pragmatically, moving call-handling to a new 
location became necessary for another reason too, as the introduction of 
the CDSS required more call-handlers to be employed (to deal with the 
extended call times) and the service outgrew its previous office space.  
8.3 Implications of Our Findings 
This section discusses four questions which allow us to draw out the 
implications of our analysis for policy and practice 
8.3.1 What are the implications of CDSS for work identities, 
organizational management and planning? 
Our main finding from examining the nature of everyday emergency and 
urgent care triage and call management work using the CDSS is that this 
technology creates a new type of worker and new work identity. A naive 
understanding of the implementation of a CDSS in these settings might 
assume that the work is „simply‟ about call-handling – that this task closely 
resembles other call-handling work and that these workers are like those 
who work in any other type of call centre (for example selling insurance).  
Our evidence indicates that we cannot assume that health care call-handlers 
are like other call-handlers. The fact that the work undertaken with the 
CDSS involves direct management of patients and deployment of health 
care resources is a vital part of the work identities of staff in all three 
settings. This is particularly pronounced in 999 and SPA and there are 
cultural, historical and organizational features of these settings which 
reinforce this (e.g. the ambulance service uniforms) but it is nonetheless 
also important to the call-handlers at OOH. The identity of this work as 
health care work – both despite and because the CDSS incorporates clinical 
/medical knowledge – is very important, and this needs to be recognised 
and appropriately supported.  
The health care aspect of this work is attractive from a recruitment point of 
view and the links to the NHS and health care delivery are important for 
retaining staff. The flexibility of the configuration and use of the CDSS – 
allowing relatively low level clerical staff to exercise judgement and 
discretion – helps to sustain these identities. Even in OOH, where staff were 
less impressed by the functionality of the CDSS, they were willing to 
persevere with the system because it was important, in their eyes, to 
deliver health care to patients. Simple things like the job titles and role 
description for these call-handling roles can support this identity and help to 
attract and retain staff, as can the embedding of these roles in 
organizations that offer opportunities for career development – and this was 
a particular attraction for several staff at the Ambulance Trust.  
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Of course a potential drawback to fostering these pseudo-clinical identities 
is that call-handlers may become over confident about their expertise and 
begin to exercise inappropriate levels of discretion. As we showed in chapter 
7 the reflexive monitoring surrounding the use of the CDSS, notably audit 
and retraining helps to temper this.  
Our key message is that the CDSS helps create health care work identities 
and that on balance these are a good thing and need to be recognised and 
supported.  
8.3.2 What knowledge is required by CDSS users and how is this 
shared within teams and across boundaries? 
Our ethnographic work highlighted that despite the rhetoric surrounding 
CDSS technologies, the call-handlers develop and use considerable 
embodied and experiential knowledge to work the system. This expertise is 
vital to the efficient working of the CDSS. The technology does not work 
„straight out of the box‟ or without the input of skilled operators. One of the 
misconceptions about CDSS in general and this CDSS in particular is the 
idea that because it is a system that incorporates expert knowledge – in this 
case clinical knowledge – all the expertise required to do the work is 
embedded in the software/machine. We have demonstrated that this is not 
the case. Huge effort – by developers in designing and continually adjusting 
the software, by managers in promoting coherence and enrolment, by 
trainers and auditors in flexibly and supportively engaging in reflexive 
monitoring and by call-handlers themselves in making sense of the task and 
developing a new practice of call management using this CDSS - has been 
expended and continues to be required to bring and keep this CDSS in 
everyday use. 
Interestingly our survey work suggests that the call-handlers themselves do 
not value their informal and experiential knowledge as highly as some of 
the other skills required to use the CDSS, however they do see them as 
moderately important to the effective enactment of their work. They also 
place a premium on knowledge located at the level of the team and shared 
among them. Our interpretation of this finding is that our observation shows 
that call-handlers make extensive use of informal knowledge but that they 
understand that this is problematic in relation to the rhetoric about 
„following the scripts‟ and the evidence being „in the machine‟. Training and 
audit activities reinforce the idea that embodied and experiential expertise 
are not required when using the CDSS, and our concern is that in the 
context of a formal survey the call-handlers responses present what they 
perceive as the „right‟ answer rather than  reflecting day to day practice.  Or 
perhaps they are signalling that for them there is an important distinction 
between individualised knowledge (from individual personal experience) and 
informal knowledge that is legitimated in teams (where personal experience 
might be shared, challenged or confirmed) to inform practice.  
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The key implication here is that it is important to recognise the role that 
experiential and embodied knowledge plays in bringing the system into use. 
Rather than attempt to prevent this (which we think is impossible, unless 
staff are replaced regularly before they have time to build up experience 
and confidence with the system) it would be helpful to find ways to 
acknowledge the expertise of these workers (this would input to retention 
and job satisfaction) and to find ways to manage it in ways that allow 
rigorous quality assurance while also developing informal knowledge 
constructively.  
Given the slight contradiction in our findings, between the ethnography and 
the survey, a further implication is that those involved in formal monitoring 
of staff should be mindful of the fact that people learn what they are „meant 
to say‟, especially in high surveillance environments (as in these) and that 
to fully understand how work is done it is helpful to directly observe the 
work. Retrospective monitoring of calls provides one mechanism for this but 
we would suggest that this could be augmented by real time observations 
which would reveal how call-handlers anticipate questions and employ 
experiential knowledge.  
In sum, a range of evidence shows that the use of informal experiential 
knowledge by call-handlers is what makes the CDSS work successfully. A 
better understanding of this should be incorporated into the training and 
management of emergency and urgent care call-handling.   
8.3.3 What are the implications of CDSS for workforce planning 
e.g. skills, competencies, entry/retention, education and 
training? 
The fact that this CDSS can be used by clerical staff to make complex 
clinical decisions, and offer clinically based advice, makes it attractive 
across our three settings and, of course, for the planned 111 urgent care 
service. This CDSS represents a significant departure from many other 
CDSS in use in the NHS and other health care systems - for example CAS, 
TAS, Prodigy – designed for use by clinical staff. We have shown that the 
CDSS has been successfully deployed in the three different settings and can 
be used by non-clinical staff. However we have also found that making the 
system work to deliver emergency and urgent care triage is a complicated 
and complex process.  
In the emergency care setting the work has been intensified and it is not 
always possible to triage the call within the 8 minute ambulance response 
target time, meaning that some ambulances arrive before triage is 
completed whatever the eventual disposition of the CDSS. The CDSS has 
not enabled the proportion of Category A and B calls to be reduced to the 
„real‟ level of priority as judged by the responding paramedics but it has 
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been used safely – and this is a key marker of success – and without the 
significant licensing costs of its closest market rival (AMPDS).  
In the urgent care setting – at OOH the additional work and corresponding 
lengthening of call times has necessitated the employment of more staff.  
The SPA is a new service and the introduction of this new service, 
predicated on using the CDSS, has required the employment of more staff 
at all three settings. At SPA and 999 clinical supervisors have been 
introduced to facilitate the use of the CDSS. These staff play an important 
role in training and audit of calls, but, crucially their additional clinical 
expertise supports call-handlers using the CDSS (helping to confirm our 
finding that not all the clinical expertise is „in‟ the CDSS). In addition to 
these staff the deployment of the CDSS requires additional staff to 
undertake the training and audit requirements that ensure the safe use of 
the system.   
The extension of the work and the creation of new roles (and in SPA a new 
service) meant that the introduction of the CDSS led to an increase in staff. 
In none of our settings had the introduction of the CDSS reduced the 
number of clerical or clinical staff employed. This is an important outcome 
that should be borne in mind when introducing the system. It has 
implications for longer term workforce planning, but also more immediate 
impact – for example on human resources staff to manage contracts, 
managers to supervise and plan shifts, and also for spatial configuration of 
the workplace – each of our three sites has had to relocate to cope with 
expansion in headcount. Related to this we have also shown the importance 
of team sharing of knowledge and learning, and we suggest that co-location 
is important for this. For this reason we do not believe that a workplace 
model which isolated call-handlers from each other would be successful.  
We have argued that call-handlers acquire significant expertise – that they 
bring the system into use rather than „operate‟ it. This needs to be 
recognised and supported and it may be that new systems of reward and 
skills development will be required to attract and retain staff.  The 
processes for attracting and selecting staff needs to take these things into 
account. Our finding that the link with clinical work is important for worker 
identity means that these are not just call-handlers they are health care 
call-handlers and job titles/advertisements should reflect this to attract 
appropriate staff. In the context of the Ambulance Trust being part of the 
larger, well-respected ambulance service is important and makes this work 
attractive to potential recruits, as does the potential to move up a career 
ladder within this service.  Thought needs to be given to the semiotics and 
branding of the organizations within which this type of call-handling work is 
located – our sense is that for most of the staff employed (at all levels) it 
was important to be part of the larger NHS and to be delivering health care 
as part of a nationally and or locally recognised organization. This aspect of 
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the work could be used constructively and effectively to attract the best 
staff.   
We have suggested that call-handlers are able to use acquired expertise 
and discretion to make the system work on a day to day basis.  Recognising 
the importance and value of this – whilst retaining the standardization 
offered by the CDSS is tricky, but balancing these features is necessary to 
bringing the system into use and we suggest to retaining staff.  
Our study has shown that learning to use the CDSS is a continual process. 
Although the relatively short initial training enables call-handlers to deal 
with calls they become proficient through experiential learning and team 
knowledge sharing over time. In addition the necessary continual updates 
to the system (some of which respond to external changes in the clinical 
evidence base, legislation or service provision, and some of which arise 
directly from call-handler and user feedback) mean that training needs to 
be refreshed regularly. Comparing the new service at SPA with the other 
two settings it is clear that training staff who have previously used a 
different system to use the CDSS is more difficult than employing new staff. 
But this should only be a transitional problem – as we have shown training 
and audit can be used in a supportive way to ensure that both novice users 
and „expert‟ users improve their practice.   
Surveillance and monitoring is an integral feature of call-handling work, and 
likewise governance and audit are core aspects of modern health care 
delivery. In the context of this CDSS our analysis suggests that audit plays 
a role beyond monitoring. At the Ambulance Trust in particular audit has 
been systematically and creatively harnessed as an opportunity for 
workplace learning and on-going training. The way that the audit process 
(which is an essential part of reflexive monitoring) is handled is important, 
both the mode and the content. Statistical analysis and review of the 
outcomes of decisions made using the CDSS are an important part of the 
process, as is listening to calls. Both of these are undertaken. Given our 
findings form the ethnography we would suggest that observation of call-
handling in real time would augment this process and highlight some of the 
reasons why some call-handlers seem more proficient. At the Ambulance 
Trust the audit process is visible and regular – so staff are aware of the 
process (which itself has become normalised as part of the work of the 
organization). It is important that the audit process is part of learning 
activity and ideally a team activity – given the importance of team 
knowledge sharing we have identified, rather than a punitive system. The 
process of retaining staff where problems are identified appears to be 
handled in a supportive and positive way at the Ambulance Trust and this is 
a model that could be adapted for other settings. However it is worth noting 
that survey findings indicate that that trust in the audit team is lowest in 
999 who have the longest experience of using the system and of the audit 
process.  
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8.3.4 What are the implications of understanding the wider context 
and associated barriers/facilitators surrounding the CDSS for 
workforce and policy planning?   
We have shown, by systematically using NPT as a framework for our 
analysis that the four constructs of coherence, cognitive participation, 
collective action and reflexive monitoring play out differently in the different 
settings in which we have studied the deployment of the CDSS. 
Our conclusion is that the CDSS – the „thing‟ that we set out to study - is 
not just the software: it is a computer technology and a set of practices 
related to that technology. It is this wider set of actors and artefacts (other 
technologies, multiple actors, wider contexts) that keep the intervention in 
place. For this reason we have tried to be clear from the outset of this 
report that the CDSS, and indeed our findings must be understood as 
technology in context.  
The wider context(s) surrounding the particular CDSS we have examined 
include the wider actor-network (to borrow from other theories of science 
and technology) which includes the specific CDSS technology, associated 
technologies including ICT systems, hardware and software, the call-
handlers – not just as users of the CDSS but as embodied agents, with 
identities and agency, and surrounding them the patients/callers, the CDSS 
development team, the myriad levels of managerial staff and the wider 
organizations they represent (primary care, ambulance trusts etc). Beyond 
this there is the wider policy and political context – which during the lifetime 
of our study saw a change in the national political administration and which 
has anyway been the subject of considerable reform and change – all of 
which impact on the CDSS and the work of emergency and urgent care 
services. Especially significant for our „same technology‟ and „different 
settings‟ are moves to integrate urgent and emergency care (notably the 
reorganization of services at OOH) and the introduction of the 111 service. 
Both of these externally driven changes have, as we have shown, 
implications for workforce in terms of numbers, training and management. 
Beyond these contexts we have argued there have been important 
discursive shifts – notably the discourses of rationing and EBM which have 
been crucial in ensuring that the CDSS could be brought into use. The 
implication of our understanding of the wider context surrounding the CDSS 
for workforce planning and policy is that this wider context matters. This 
CDSS is a rare example in a catalogue of case studies that have shown the 
failure to bring computer technologies into everyday use and to embed 
them into practice. This report details three case studies where a CDSS has 
been brought into use and appears to have a strong chance of 
normalising/embedding. But this has been achieved and will only continue 
to be maintained with the efforts of those involved in the specific settings 
and if the wider context continues to support the coherence, cognitive 
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participation, and reflective monitoring processes that surround this 
collective action. 
8.4 Strengths and limitations 
To our knowledge this is the first study of a single CDSS used in three 
different emergency and urgent health care service settings. Through 
detailed comparative case studies drawing on appropriate mixed methods 
we have explored the interplay between this technology and the health 
workforce in everyday practice. The study was predominantly qualitative 
with a significant ethnographic component and a smaller survey component. 
This affords rich detail but can be criticised for limited transferability. We 
have overcome these limitations of case study research by using a robust 
theory – the Normalization Process Theory – as a framework to provide a 
systematic analysis and enable us to draw out generalizations: we show 
how the four domains of the theory, alongside other social and 
psychological insights can be used to explain how a technology is brought 
into everyday use.  
Nonetheless we recognise that we have studied three settings, and that two 
of the services studied (999 and SPA) were hosted by the same Trust. It is 
significant that this Trust was a pilot for using the CDSS in 999 and had 
some very active champions of the technology and service reconfiguration. 
As such this organization was a very supportive environment for the 
technology. That said, we have shown how each setting built coherence and 
mobilised participation in bringing the CDSS into use, such that it is possible 
to generalise mechanisms for ensuring this engagement in other settings.   
The survey work was limited by the potential number of respondents 
available in the three settings. While we achieved a respectable response 
rate we do not have information about the non-responders and possible 
bias. This work was necessarily developmental. This is the first time that a 
survey of this kind has been used to study this CDSS.  The survey design 
was informed by well-established theories and previous survey work and we 
have undertaken some validity and reliability testing but further work 
should be undertaken to develop and test the questionnaire for use 
elsewhere.  
The key omissions from this study are an economic analysis and an 
evaluation of patient experiences.  The first will be essential to inform roll 
out of this technology: while we have pointed to the impact of the 
technology on work and the apparent workforce expansion that follows 
deployment, we have not been able to examine the costs of this. While 
difficult to explore it would seem important to find out patients‟ views and 
experiences of contact with the CDSS.  We suspect that many are unaware 
that they are not talking to a clinician when they phone 999 or the OOH 
service.  We do not know how they manage the other end of the interaction 
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with this system, and again if it is to be rolled out, for example to support 
111, this is worth investigating.  
We have demonstrated how NPT can be used as an organising framework to 
analyse ethnographic data. This work provides a useful test and 
demonstration of the theory and we have attempted to draw out the 
implications for developing the theory in earlier chapters.  
8.5 Concluding points 
This research sought to inform workforce planning and policy by 
undertaking a detailed comparative analysis of the workforce implications of 
a particular technology, a computer decision support system (CDSS). We 
used Normalization Process Theory (NPT) to provide a systematic 
framework to analyse how the same technological intervention has been 
brought into everyday use in three different settings.  
We have demonstrated how the four domains of NPT (coherence, cognitive 
participation, collective action and reflexive monitoring) play out differently 
in each setting, but to summarise, the work of bringing the CDSS into use 
and maintaining its everyday use (collective action) was enabled by a range 
of actors who established coherence for the CDSS and secured buy-in 
(cognitive participation) and engaged in on-going appraisal and adjustment 
(reflexive monitoring). This effort has been expended bring and keep the 
CDSS in use and continues to be required to keep it in everyday use.  
The final chapter draws out the main conclusions and recommendations 
from this study.  
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9 Conclusions  
9.1 The CDSS and everyday work  
We have shown how the same technology is subtly different in the different 
settings of emergency (999) and urgent (SPA and OOH) care and requires 
different „work‟ to bring it into everyday use. The co-location of two services 
(999 and SPA) in the same Trust does not diminish important differences 
between urgent and emergency care work, even using the same CDSS.   
The CDSS must be understood both as a computer technology and as a set 
of practices related to that technology, kept in place by a network of actors 
in particular contexts. The CDSS changes the work that is done. It is viewed 
positively despite the apparent intensification of the work. In urgent care 
the work has also been extended and in one setting it appears more 
scripted. The CDSS creates a new work identity that needs to be recognised 
and supported: the call handlers are not „call centre operatives‟, but health 
care call-handlers, and this distinction is important to them and for the work 
they do.   
It is also important to note that this work requires some clinical expertise – 
the call handlers build up a repertoire of additional knowledge about lay and 
medical terminology, body systems and signs and symptoms to help them 
use the CDSS effectively. The call- handlers may also need additional 
clinical support – in two settings (999 and SPA) the additional need for 
clinical expertise to support the system has led to the introduction of 
additional clinical staff. 
The skills and divisions of labour created and sustained by introducing the 
CDSS are not just those required to operate a computer system „by rote‟. 
The knowledge and skills required to use the CDSS include experiential and 
embodied expertise. This expertise is often developed by sharing knowledge 
in teams and thus the spatial location of the work – settings which facilitate 
team communication and sharing – is important. Despite its apparent highly 
individualised form, this is not work that could conceivably be done in 
isolation (for example from a worker‟s home).  
Implementing the CDSS in different settings required considerable 
organizational effort and engagement by a range of key actors. While the 
use of the CDSS can be made mandatory for call-handlers, and this 
undoubtedly supports its adoption, the successful embedding of the 
technology in each setting requires tailored and sustained work to ensure 
coherence (shared meanings and understandings of the technology) and 
cognitive participation (enrolment).  
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Organizations and policy makers need to recognise the work required to 
bring a CDSS into everyday use and cannot assume that successful 
deployment in one setting will provide the blueprint for implementation 
elsewhere.   
9.2 Education and training needs 
We have shown that there are differences in workforce characteristics (e.g. 
age, qualifications) and in roles and organizational hierarchies in each of the 
three settings - despite all using the same technology to manage telephone 
calls. For established services (999 and OOH) some of these differences are 
historical and cultural, reflecting previous patterns in work and organization. 
However differences are also related to differences in the nature of the work 
and the context in which it takes place. This needs to be recognised if 
workers are to be adequately prepared and supported in their roles. It is 
worth noting the range of skills that call-handlers have prior to joining the 
different settings, and to recognise that some staff have higher 
qualifications or competencies than anticipated at recruitment. This is likely 
to have implications both for initial training and for career aspirations and 
staff retention which may be addressed by offering training and providing 
opportunities for advancement 
While there is a common training programme for using the CDSS, training 
practice varies across the three settings. Given the differences in the work 
and settings, training needs to be tailored to the specific contexts of urgent 
or emergency work and the organizational environment where the CDSS is 
deployed – there cannot be a „one size fits all‟ training model.  In addition 
because the technology is never „fixed‟ continual further training is required 
as the system is adapted and upgraded (e.g. where the CDSS is augmented 
with new clinical knowledge or the algorithms change in response to new 
standards or policies).  
We have demonstrated that everyday use of the CDSS requires embodied 
and experiential knowledge, including some clinical knowledge, as well as 
that embedded in the CDSS. This is vital to the interpretive flexibility 
necessary to enable these workers to bring the technology into everyday 
use, and this should be recognised and supported in training. Moreover we 
have shown that this expertise is partially developed through sharing 
knowledge in teams such that the use of peer support as a mechanism for 
learning, and for checking knowledge, could be enhanced by formal 
recognition.   
We have indicated that a supportive model of audit and feedback can 
function as an effective learning activity to support the use of the CDSS. As 
well as providing necessary formal monitoring and surveillance audit can be 
used creatively to ensure coherence and participation and as the basis for 
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continuous learning. Organizations should be encouraged to use audit in a 
supportive rather than punitive manner.  
Organizations deciding to deploy the CDSS need to recognise the significant 
investment in training and monitoring required to bring and keep this 
technology in use.   
9.3 Workforce reconfiguration  
The introduction of the CDSS offers significant opportunities for workforce 
reconfiguration. However, we have shown that this is not a question of 
simple labour substitution which leaves other aspects of organizational 
structures and workforce management untouched. The opportunities for 
workforce reconfiguration do not derive from a finished software product 
but from an ensemble of practices that require considerable work to bring 
the technology into sustained use. 
Our findings show that embedding this particular technology in everyday 
use has resulted in workforce expansion. The settings studied required more 
staff, both those devoted to call-handling, but also a range of new staff to 
support this work, this included those involved in training and audit 
functions, but also -in two settings- the introduction of a new additional role 
of clinical supervisor.  In our case studies the introduction of the CDSS was 
not as simple as installing some software and employing clerical workers. 
The apparent advantages of having a „cheaper‟ labour force to manage call-
handling has to be set against these changes in workforce size and skill mix.  
In terms of implementation, the opportunity costs of the considerable time 
and on-going effort to secure participation and staff buy-in, to and build 
teams and trust in the technology is not insignificant. Not all health care 
organizations are likely to have the resources to make the necessary level 
of investment in these activities to ensure success. 
9.4 Summary 
Our research shows that the ensemble of practices that includes and 
surrounds this technology – the CDSS - appears, in the language of NPT, to 
have a strong chance of normalising (i.e. embedding in everyday practice) 
in these three settings. But this has only been achieved, and will continue to 
be maintained, with the efforts of those involved in the specific settings and 
if the wider context continues to support the coherence, cognitive 
participation, and reflective monitoring processes that surround this 
collective action.
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Appendix 1 
 
Wiltshire Research Ethics Committee Reference Number: 08/H0104/56 
 
This information sheet tells you about the observation and interview part of the study. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Wiltshire Research Ethics Committee Reference Number: 08/H0104/56 
This information sheet tells you about the stakeholder interview part of the study. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Wiltshire Research Ethics Committee Reference Number: 08/H0104/56 
Site Number:       Participant Number: 
 Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the Participant Information 
Sheet “[CDSS] Study_Further_information_for_staff” v1.0 Dated 170708 
for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free  
to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason. 
 
 
3. I agree that the interview will be tape-recorded 
 
 
4. I understand that anonymous quotations from this interview may be used in 
reports, papers and presentations arising from this study 
 
 
5. I agree to take part in the above study 
 
 
6. I agree to be approached at a later date to take part in a follow-up interview 
 
 
Name of Participant   Date    Signature 
 
 
Name of Researcher   Date    Signature 
cjp@soton.ac.uk
When completed: 1 for participant, 1 for researcher
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Appendix 4 
 
Wiltshire Research Ethics Committee Reference Number: 08/H0104/56 
Site Number:      Participant Number: 
 Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the Participant Information 
Sheet “[CDSS] Study_Further_information_for_stakeholders” v1.0 Dated 
170708 for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free  
 
3. to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason. 
 
4. I agree that the interview will be tape-recorded 
 
 
5. I understand that anonymous quotations from this interview may be used in 
reports, papers and presentations arising from this study 
 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study 
 
 
7. I agree to be approached at a later date to take part in a follow-up interview 
 
 
Name of Participant   Date    Signature 
 
 
Name of Researcher   Date    Signature 
We will send you a photocopy of this form to keep. If you have any questions about the study please 
contact the project leader, Catherine Pope on 023 80 59 8293 or  cjp@soton.ac.uk   
When completed: 1 for participant, 1 for researcher
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Appendix 5 
 
Wiltshire Research Ethics Committee Reference Number: 08/H0104/56 
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A study of [CDSS] 




This questionnaire asks you about your views and experiences of using [the CDSS] at 
[OOH]  and about what you think are the skills needed to do your job. 
 
 
All information you give will be treated confidentially and will only be seen by the 
researchers. Your individual responses will not be seen, or be given to [OOH]. 
 
Please read the enclosed leaflet which explains the purposes of the research, your rights 
and how we will keep your responses confidential.  
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  
 
 
Instructions For Completing the Questionnaire 
 
Please take your time and answer the questions as accurately as possible. This 
questionnaire should take you less than 25 minutes to complete. When you have completed 
the questionnaire, please put your questionnaire form in the envelope provided. The 
questionnaire can either be: 
 
1. posted directly to Joanne Turnbull, in the FREEPOST envelope provided (School of 
Health Sciences, Building 67, University of Southampton, Highfield, Southampton, SO17 
1BJ )  
 
     or 
 
2. placed and sealed in the envelope and handed to your manager for a member of the 
research team to collect 
 
 
Thank you for time and co-operation. 
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Site code    Respondent ID  
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Some questions about you                                                 
 
1. Are you… 
Male    1  Female  2      
 
 
2. What is your age?       
16-19  1  20-24 2 25-34 3  
35-44  4  45-54 5 55+ 6  
 
 
3. What is your highest level of qualification? (Please tick one box) 









1+ O levels /CSEs /GCSEs (any grades)  2  
Other (e.g. City & Guilds, 
RSA/OCR, BTEC / Edexcel) 
 8  
5+ O levels, 5+ CSEs (grade 1), 5+ 
GCSEs (grades A-C), School Certificate 
 3  1+ A levels / AS levels   9  
 
NVQ Level 1, Foundation GVNQ 
 4  
2+ A levels, 4+ AS levels, Higher 
School Certificate 
 10  
NVQ Level 2, Intermediate GVNQ  5  First Degree (e.g. BA, BSc)  11  
NVQ Level 3, Advanced GVNQ  1  
Higher Degree (e.g. MA, PhD, 
PCGE, post-graduate certificate 
diplomas) 
 12  
 
 
4. How long have you been using [the CDSS]? 
Less than 6 months  1  6-12 months 2 1 - 2 years 3  
3+ years 4       
 
 
5a. Do you work full time or part time? 
Full time 1  Part time 2    
 
5b. If you work part time, how many hours in an average week do you work? 
   hours     
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Previous work experience and training                                       
 
6. In any of your previous jobs have you done telephone-based or call centre work? 







7. In any of your previous jobs, have you done face-to-face customer service or care 
work?  
 






8. In any of your previous jobs have you worked in the field of health and social care?  






9. Are you currently undertaking or have you completed / qualified in any of the following 
training? (Tick all that apply) 





Paramedic training 1 1 1 
Ambulance Technician  1 1 1 
Emergency Care Assistant 1 1 1 
First aid training 1 1 1 
St John ambulance training 1 1 1 
Health-related course (e.g. nursing, 
medicine). Please describe below 
1 1 1 
Other clinical training. Please describe 
below 
1 1 1 
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10a. Did you receive any clinical training as part of your call-handling training at [OOH]? 
Yes (Please describe 
below) 








10b. If you have answered “Yes” to question 10a above, how useful would you rate this medical 
training in using [the CDSS]? Please give a score by circling a number between 1 and 10 where 1 is 
not at all useful and 10 is very useful 
 
Not 
at all  
        
Very 
useful 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
11. Prior to starting your job at [OOH], did you have previous experience of using the following 
(either in a previous job or using a computer at home)? (Tick all that apply) 
a computer mouse 1  keyboard /typewriter 1  
Microsoft Windows 1  E-mail 1  
Internet 1  Word processing (e.g. Word) 1  
Spreadsheets (e.g. Excel) 1  Databases (e.g. Access) 1  
Other Computer system in a previous job 
or at home (please describe below) 











12. How would you rate your current level of the computer skills needed to do your job? Please 




        
Very 
good 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
© Queen‟s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Greener et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health 
              








© Queen‟s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Greener et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health 
              







Your skills: using [the CDSS] 
Y 
13. In using [the CDSS], please rate your level of ability for each of the following skills: 
(circle a number between 1 and 10 where 1 is very poor and 10 is very good) 
Very                                                                  
Poor 
          Very 
        Good 
Controlling the call according to clinical 
urgency, caller’s needs and service 
demands 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Multi-tasking in order to maintain call 
flow 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Probing for further information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Rephrasing questions when necessary 
whilst retaining the clinical essence 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Using leading questions to elicit 
answers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Picking up on and recognising relevant 
non-verbal cues or background noise 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Recalling information given by the caller 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Providing clear, accurate, clinically 
sound and concise information from [the 
CDSS] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Using informal knowledge from, e.g. 
friends, family, colleagues, to help 
callers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Addressing callers in a professional, 
respectful and sensitive manner 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Adapting approach according to the 
needs of the situation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Establishing a rapport with caller 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Conveying empathy appropriately 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Negotiating effectively 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Converting information provided by the 
caller back into the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Managing your own emotional feelings 
about a call 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Allowing the system to drive the 
assessment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Judging when it is necessary to override 
the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Taking appropriate route through the 
system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Effectively predicting the likely outcome 
of the call 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Using own knowledge to operate ahead 
of [the CDSS] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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                                                             Very                                                             
Poor 
          Very 
     Good 
Documenting call details clearly, 
accurately, and concisely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Working as part of a team 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Supporting other call-handlers to 
perform their role 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sharing knowledge gained from own 
experience with other call-handlers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Seeking support when unsure about a 
call 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Accepting and responding to feedback 
about performance 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
The importance of skills for using [the CDSS]   
                                              
14. Following on from the previous section where you rated your skills in using [the CDSS] 
now think about how important those skills are to do your job. Please rate how important you 
think each of the following skills are: (circle a number between 1 and 10 where 1 is not very 
important and 10 is very important) 
                                                     Not very                                                           
important 
 Very 
        important 
Controlling the call according to clinical 
urgency, caller’s needs and service 
demands 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Multi-tasking in order to maintain call 
flow 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Probing for further information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Rephrasing questions when necessary 
whilst retaining the clinical essence 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Using leading questions to elicit 
answers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Picking up on and recognising relevant 
non-verbal cues or background noise 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Recalling information given by the caller 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Providing clear, accurate, clinically 
sound and concise information from [the 
CDSS] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Using informal knowledge from, e.g. 
friends, family, colleagues, to help 
callers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Addressing callers in a professional, 
respectful and sensitive manner 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Adapting approach according to the 
needs of the situation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Establishing a rapport with caller 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Conveying empathy appropriately 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                                                     Not very                                                           
important      
Very 
        important 
Negotiating effectively 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Converting information provided by the 
caller back into the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Managing your own emotional feelings 
about a call 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Allowing the system to drive the 
assessment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Judging when it is necessary to override 
the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Taking appropriate route through the 
system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Effectively predicting the likely outcome 
of the call 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Using own knowledge to operate ahead 
of [the CDSS] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Documenting call details clearly, 
accurately, and concisely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Working as part of a team 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Supporting other call-handlers to 
perform their role 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sharing knowledge gained from own 
experience with other call-handlers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Seeking support when unsure about a 
call 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Accepting and responding to feedback 
about performance 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
15. Which skills do you think are the most important to do your job? Skills may be taken from the 
list above or may include others that you think are important which we have not already asked you 







16. Which statement(s) describes how you see your current role? Tick all that apply 
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As a long term job or career 1  As a short-term job 1 
 
It fits around study commitments 1  It fits around childcare commitments 1 
 
Gaining experience for another job 
(describe below  
1  Other (please describe below) 1 
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Some questions on your thoughts and feelings about [the CDSS] 
 
17. The following statements relate to your perception of trust in [the CDSS] system Please rate 
how you feel about the system by circling a number for each statement where 1 is Strongly disagree 











[the CDSS] uses its expertise to arrive at a safe 
call disposition 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] will reach a call disposition that 
provides care appropriate to the patients needs 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] leads to poor decisions about call 
dispositions 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] is effective in handling emergency 
care calls 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] is effective in handling out-of-hours 
calls 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] reaches unpredictable decisions 1 2 3 4 5 
I understand how [the CDSS] works 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel I can depend on [the CDSS] to deal with a 
wide range of call scenarios 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] is dependable in handling the most 
common types of calls effectively 1 2 3 4 5 
I have faith in [the CDSS] to handle calls 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] is competent at doing what it is 
designed to do relative to others methods I can 
think of 
1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] is less reliable at handling calls 
than other methods I can think of 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] behaves more predictably than 
other methods I can think of 1 2 3 4 5 
I have as much faith in [the CDSS] to handle 
calls as other methods I can think of 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] has a reputation for being 
trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 
Outcomes from [the CDSS] are not always in 
the best interests of the public 1 2 3 4 5 
I believe that [the CDSS] is used in the best 
interests of [OOH] 1 2 3 4 5 
I believe that [the CDSS] is used by  [OOH] to 
support me in doing my job 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] operates using decision making 
principles that I sometimes find morally 
unacceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 
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I believe that [the CDSS] operates in ways 
consistent with my expectations 1 2 3 4 5 
Overall I trust in [the CDSS] 1 2 3 4 5 
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Some questions about your work environment 
 
18. The following statements relate to your views of, and trust in, other staff and the organisation 
you work for ([OOH]). Please rate how you feel by a number for each statement where 1 is Strongly 











Audit team      
The audit team is good at its job 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that support from the audit team is 
poor 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that the audit team are fair in their 
dealings with me 
1 2 3 4 5 
feel that the audit team is inconsistent in 
their dealings with me 
1 2 3 4 5 
I trust the audit team 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Your organisation – [OOH]      
[OOH] is good at performing its job 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that support from [OOH] is poor 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that [OOH] is fair in its dealings with 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
I trust [OOH] 1 2 3 4 5 
      
The [the CDSS] team      
The [the CDSS] team is good at its job 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that support from the [the CDSS] 
team is poor 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that the [the CDSS] team are fair in 
their dealings with me 
1 2 3 4 5 
I trust the [the CDSS] team 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Using [the CDSS]      
I trust other call-handlers to support me in 
my job 
1 2 3 4 5 
I trust callers to tell the truth during calls 1 2 3 4 5 
I am confident in my ability to use [the 
CDSS] correctly 
1 2 3 4 5 
I am confident I know how to overcome 
any limitations of [the CDSS] 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please return your completed questionnaire either by posting directly to Jo Turnbull using the 
prepaid envelope provided, or by placing the questionnaire in the sealed envelope and handing to 
your manager. 
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Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. We greatly value both your 
responses and the time you have taken to give them.
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A study of [CDSS] 
Questionnaire of skills and experiences of  
[the CDSS] 
This questionnaire asks you about your views and experiences of using [the CDSS] at 
[OOH] and about what you think are the skills needed to do your job. 
All information you give will be treated confidentially and will only be seen by the 
researchers. Your individual responses will not be seen, or be given to, [OOH]. 
 
Please read the enclosed leaflet which explains the purposes of the research, your rights 
and how we will keep your responses confidential.  
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  
 
Instructions For Completing the Questionnaire 
 
Please take your time and answer the questions as accurately as possible. This 
questionnaire should take you less than 25 minutes to complete. When you have 
completed the questionnaire, please put your questionnaire form in the envelope provided. 
The questionnaire can either be: 
 
1. posted directly to Joanne Turnbull, in the FREEPOST envelope provided (School of 
Health Sciences, Building 67, University of Southampton, Highfield, Southampton, SO17 
1BJ )  
     or 
2. placed and sealed in the envelope and handed to your manager for a member of the 
research team to collect 
Thank you for time and co-operation. 
Site code    Respondent ID  
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Some questions about you                                                 
 
1. Are you… 
Male    1  Female  2      
 
 
2. What is your age?       
16-19  1  20-24 2 25-34 3  
35-44  4  45-54 5 55+ 6  
 
 
3. What is your highest level of qualification? (Please tick one box) 









1+ O levels /CSEs /GCSEs (any grades)  2  
Other (e.g. City & Guilds, 
RSA/OCR, BTEC / Edexcel) 
 8  
5+ O levels, 5+ CSEs (grade 1), 5+ 
GCSEs (grades A-C), School Certificate 
 3  1+ A levels / AS levels   9  
 
NVQ Level 1, Foundation GVNQ 
 4  
2+ A levels, 4+ AS levels, Higher 
School Certificate 
 10  
NVQ Level 2, Intermediate GVNQ  5  First Degree (e.g. BA, BSc)  11  
NVQ Level 3, Advanced GVNQ  1  
Higher Degree (e.g. MA, PhD, 
PCGE, post-graduate certificate 
diplomas) 
 12  
 
 
4. How long have you been using [the CDSS]? 
Less than 6 months  1  6-12 months 2 1 - 2 years 3  
3+ years 4       
 
 
5a. Do you work full time or part time? 
Full time 1  Part time 2    
 
5b. If you work part time, how many hours in an average week do you work? 
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   hours     
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Previous work experience and training                                       
 
6. In any of your previous jobs have you done telephone-based or call centre work? 







7. In any of your previous jobs, have you done face-to-face customer service or care 
work?  
 






8. In any of your previous jobs have you worked in the field of health and social care?  






9. Are you currently undertaking or have you completed / qualified in any of the following 
training? (Tick all that apply) 





Paramedic training 1 1 1 
Ambulance Technician  1 1 1 
Emergency Care Assistant 1 1 1 
First aid training 1 1 1 
St John ambulance training 1 1 1 
Health-related course (e.g. nursing, 
medicine). Please describe below 
1 1 1 
Other clinical training. Please describe 
below 
1 1 1 
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10a. Did you receive any clinical training as part of your call-handling training at [OOH]? 
Yes (Please describe 
below) 








10b. If you have answered “Yes” to question 10a above, how useful would you rate this medical 
training in using [the CDSS]? Please give a score by circling a number between 1 and 10 where 1 is 
not at all useful and 10 is very useful 
 
Not 
at all  
        
Very 
useful 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
11. Prior to starting your job at [OOH], did you have previous experience of using the following 
(either in a previous job or using a computer at home)? (Tick all that apply) 
a computer mouse 1  keyboard /typewriter 1  
Microsoft Windows 1  E-mail 1  
Internet 1  Word processing (e.g. Word) 1  
Spreadsheets (e.g. Excel) 1  Databases (e.g. Access) 1  
Other Computer system in a previous job 
or at home (please describe below) 











12. How would you rate your current level of the computer skills needed to do your job? Please 




        
Very 
good 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Your skills: using [the CDSS] 
Y 
13. In using [the CDSS], please rate your level of ability for each of the following skills: 
(circle a number between 1 and 10 where 1 is very poor and 10 is very good) 
Very                                                                  
Poor 
         Very 
        Good 
Controlling the call according to clinical 
urgency, caller’s needs and service 
demands 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Multi-tasking in order to maintain call 
flow 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Probing for further information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Rephrasing questions when necessary 
whilst retaining the clinical essence 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Using leading questions to elicit 
answers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Picking up on and recognising relevant 
non-verbal cues or background noise 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Recalling information given by the caller 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Providing clear, accurate, clinically 
sound and concise information from [the 
CDSS] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Using informal knowledge from, e.g. 
friends, family, colleagues, to help 
callers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Addressing callers in a professional, 
respectful and sensitive manner 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Adapting approach according to the 
needs of the situation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Establishing a rapport with caller 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Conveying empathy appropriately 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Negotiating effectively 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Converting information provided by the 
caller back into the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Managing your own emotional feelings 
about a call 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Allowing the system to drive the 
assessment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Judging when it is necessary to override 
the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Taking appropriate route through the 
system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
© Queen‟s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Greener et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health 
              






Effectively predicting the likely outcome 
of the call 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Using own knowledge to operate ahead 
of [the CDSS] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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                                                             Very                                                             
Poor 
          Very 
     Good 
Documenting call details clearly, 
accurately, and concisely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Working as part of a team 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Supporting other call-handlers to 
perform their role 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sharing knowledge gained from own 
experience with other call-handlers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Seeking support when unsure about a 
call 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Accepting and responding to feedback 
about performance 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
The importance of skills for using [the CDSS]   
                                               
14. Following on from the previous section where you rated your skills in using [the CDSS] 
now think about how important those skills are to do your job. Please rate how important you 
think each of the following skills are: (circle a number between 1 and 10 where 1 is not very 
important and 10 is very important) 
                                                     Not very                                                           
important 
 Very 
        important 
Controlling the call according to clinical 
urgency, caller’s needs and service 
demands 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Multi-tasking in order to maintain call 
flow 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Probing for further information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Rephrasing questions when necessary 
whilst retaining the clinical essence 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Using leading questions to elicit 
answers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Picking up on and recognising relevant 
non-verbal cues or background noise 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Recalling information given by the caller 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Providing clear, accurate, clinically 
sound and concise information from [the 
CDSS] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Using informal knowledge from, e.g. 
friends, family, colleagues, to help 
callers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Addressing callers in a professional, 
respectful and sensitive manner 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Adapting approach according to the 
needs of the situation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Establishing a rapport with caller 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Conveying empathy appropriately 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                                                     Not very                                                           
important      
Very 
        important 
Negotiating effectively 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Converting information provided by the 
caller back into the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Managing your own emotional feelings 
about a call 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Allowing the system to drive the 
assessment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Judging when it is necessary to override 
the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Taking appropriate route through the 
system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Effectively predicting the likely outcome 
of the call 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Using own knowledge to operate ahead 
of [the CDSS] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Documenting call details clearly, 
accurately, and concisely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Working as part of a team 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Supporting other call-handlers to 
perform their role 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sharing knowledge gained from own 
experience with other call-handlers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Seeking support when unsure about a 
call 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Accepting and responding to feedback 
about performance 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
15. Which skills do you think are the most important to do your job? Skills may be taken from the 
list above or may include others that you think are important which we have not already asked you 







16. Which statement(s) describes how you see your current role? Tick all that apply 
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As a long term job or career 1  As a short-term job 1 
 
It fits around study commitments 1  It fits around childcare commitments 1 
 
Gaining experience for another job 
(describe below  
1  Other (please describe below) 1 
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Some questions on your thoughts and feelings about [the CDSS] 
 
17. The following statements relate to your perception of trust in [the CDSS] system Please rate 
how you feel about the system by circling a number for each statement where 1 is Strongly disagree 









[the CDSS] uses its expertise to arrive at a 
safe call disposition 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] will reach a call disposition that 
provides care appropriate to the patients 
needs 
1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] leads to poor decisions about 
call dispositions 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] is effective in handling 
emergency care calls 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] is effective in handling out-of-
hours calls 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] reaches unpredictable 
decisions 1 2 3 4 5 
I understand how [the CDSS] works 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel I can depend on [the CDSS] to deal 
with a wide range of call scenarios 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] is dependable in handling the 
most common types of calls effectively 1 2 3 4 5 
I have faith in [the CDSS] to handle calls 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] is competent at doing what it is 
designed to do relative to others methods I 
can think of 
1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] is less reliable at handling calls 
than other methods I can think of 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] behaves more predictably than 
other methods I can think of 1 2 3 4 5 
I have as much faith in [the CDSS] to 
handle calls as other methods I can think of 1 2 3 4 5 
[the CDSS] has a reputation for being 
trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 
Outcomes from [the CDSS] are not always 
in the best interests of the public 1 2 3 4 5 
I believe that [the CDSS] is used in the best 
interests of [OOH] 1 2 3 4 5 
I believe that [the CDSS] is used by  [OOH] 
to support me in doing my job 1 2 3 4 5 
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[the CDSS] operates using decision making 
principles that I sometimes find morally 
unacceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 
I believe that [the CDSS] operates in ways 
consistent with my expectations 1 2 3 4 5 
Overall I trust in [the CDSS] 1 2 3 4 5 
Some questions about your work environment 
 
18. The following statements relate to your views of, and trust in, other staff and the 
organisation you work for. Please rate how you feel by a number for each statement where 1 is 










Clinical supervisors      
Clinical Supervisors are good at their job 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that support from Clinical 
Supervisors is poor 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that Clinical Supervisors are fair in 
their dealings with me 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that Clinical supervisors are 
inconsistent in their dealings with me 1 2 3 4 5 
I trust the Clinical Supervisors 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Audit team      
The audit team is good at its job 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that support from the audit team is 
poor 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that the audit team is fair in their 
dealings with me 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that the audit team is inconsistent in 
their dealings with me 1 2 3 4 5 
I trust the audit team 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Your organisation       
[Organisation] is good at performing its job 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that support from organisation is 
poor 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that [organisation] behaves fairly in 
its dealings with me 1 2 3 4 5 
I trust [the organisation] 1 2 3 4 5 
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The [the CDSS] team      
The [the CDSS] team is good at its job 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that support from the [the CDSS] 
team is poor 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel that the [the CDSS] team are fair in 
their dealings with me 1 2 3 4 5 
I trust the [the CDSS] team 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Using [the CDSS]      
I trust other call-handlers to support me in 
my job 1 2 3 4 5 
I trust callers to tell the truth during calls 1 2 3 4 5 
I am confident in my ability to use [the 
CDSS] correctly 1 2 3 4 5 
I am confident I know how to overcome 
any limitations of [the CDSS] 1 2 3 4 5 
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And finally a further request                                                   
 
We would like to see if there is a link between the skills, training and attitudes that people 
have and how [the CDSS] is used. This could help us develop an understanding of the 
benefits of [the CDSS], the skills required to do the work and how it can be successfully 
implemented at other locations in the future. 
As a final request we would like to ask for your permission to link the responses you have 
given in this questionnaire to your call sorting statistics held by [Ambulance Trust] (this is the 
information that is put up on the wall at [Ambulance Trust]). The purpose of linking data in this 
way is not to assess you as an individual, but to look at patterns in responses across all 
EMSOs more generally. 
The linked data would be seen only by the researchers. No-one at your organisation will see 
your personal responses to this questionnaire and your individual results will not be given to 
[Ambulance Trust]. The researchers will be able to link your questionnaire responses to your 
call sorting statistics by your individual identification number. We will never link your name to 
the call sorting statistics, so this will remain a completely confidential process. 
If you would be happy for us to link your questionnaire responses with your call sorting 
statistics, then please simply write your individual identification number in the space below. If 
you are not happy for us to this, please leave the space below blank.  
 
 
To consent to the research team linking your questionnaire responses with your call 
sorting statistics, please place your individual identification number here:   
 




Please return your completed questionnaire either by placing in the locked box located behind 
the duty manager’s / SPA supervisor’s desk for a member of the research team to collect, or 
by posting directly to Jo Turnbull using the prepaid FREEPOST envelope provided. 
 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. We greatly value both your 
responses and the time you have taken to give them.
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Lucille Dowle (lay advisor) 
Helen Smith (Professor of Primary Care, University of Brighton) 
Nicholas Reeves (DH Advisor) 
Martyn Forrest (Connecting for Health) 
Kathy Jones (London Ambulance Service) 
Stephen Peckham (Reader in Health Policy, LSHTM) 
Arjan Shahani  (lay advisor) 
Ann Short (lay advisor) 
Tim Strangleman (Reader in Sociology, University of Kent) 
 
Purpose and activities 
The advisory group assisted the project by providing external research and 
theoretical input and informing us about relevant practice and policy issues. 
The group members were invited because of their experience and interest in 
issues related to the use of technologies in health care settings and they are 
drawn from academic, policy making and health care arenas. The group also 
included public/lay representatives with the aim of helping keep our research 
relevant and accessible to a wide range of audiences and users.  
The group played an important role in helping us think about the implications 
and dissemination of our findings. We held three meetings over the course of 
the project in May 2009, October 2009 and April 2010 
The main focus of each meeting was as follows: 
May 09:   Introduction to the research; choosing the three case study 
settings, discussion of urgent and emergency care policy  
Oct 09:  Case study site selection, interim findings and analysis 
April 09: The survey, findings in relation to NPT, the structure of the final 
report. 
The advisory group requested a further meeting to discuss the final report and 
dissemination plans. This will be arranged in Autumn 2010 to coincide with 
feedback from NIHR SDO. 
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Table a. Mapping of individual item to skill competency category for Survey 







Controlling the call according to clinical urgency, caller‟s 
needs and service demands 




Probing for further information 
Rephrasing questions when necessary whilst retaining the 
clinical essence 
Using leading questions to elicit answers (reversed) 
Active listening 
 
Picking up on and recognising relevant non-verbal cues or 
background noise 





Providing clear, accurate, clinically sound and concise 




Addressing callers in a professional, respectful and sensitive 
manner 
Adapting approach according to the needs of the situation 
Establishing a rapport with caller 
Conveying empathy appropriately 
Negotiating effectively 
Converting information provided by the caller back into the 
system 
Managing your own emotional feelings about a call 
Skilled use of 
[the CDSS] 
functionality 
Allowing the system to drive the assessment 
Taking appropriate route through the system 
Documenting call details clearly, accurately, and concisely 
 
 
© Queen‟s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Greener et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health 
              








Table b. Mapping of individual trust items to trust dimensions for Trust in 
CDSS technology 
Trust Factors Item 
Competence 
 
[the CDSS] uses its expertise to arrive at a safe call 
disposition 
[the CDSS] will reach a call disposition that provides care 
appropriate to the patients needs 
[the CDSS] leads to poor decisions about call dispositions 
(reversed) 
[the CDSS] is effective in handling emergency care calls 
[the CDSS] is effective in handling out-of-hours calls 
Predictability 
 
[the CDSS] reaches unpredictable decisions (reversed) 
I understand how [the CDSS] works 
Dependability 
 
I feel I can depend on [the CDSS] to deal with a wide 
range of call scenarios 
[the CDSS] is dependable in handling the most common 
types of calls effectively 
Faith 
 
I have faith in [the CDSS] to handle calls 
Reputation [the CDSS] has a reputation for being trustworthy 
Relative 
Competence 
[the CDSS] is competent at doing what it is designed to 
do relative to others methods I can think of 
Relative reliability 
[the CDSS] is less reliable at handling calls than other 
methods I can think of 
Relative Faith I have as much faith in [the CDSS] to handle calls as 
other methods I can think of 
Benevolence 
Outcomes from [the CDSS] are not always in the best 
interests of the public (reverse) 
I believe that [the CDSS] is used in the best interests of 
[the organisation] 
I believe that [the CDSS] is used by [the organisation] to 
support me in doing my job 
Integrity 
[the CDSS] operates using decision making principles that 
I sometimes find morally unacceptable (reverse) 
I believe that [the CDSS] operates in ways consistent 
with my expectations 
 
© Queen‟s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Greener et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health 
              















[Organisation] is good at performing its job 
I feel that support from [Organisation] is poor (reverse) 
I feel that [Organisation] is fair in its dealings with me 
I trust [Organisation] 
Audit Team 
 
The audit team is good at its job 
I feel that support from the audit team is poor (reverse) 
I feel that the audit team are fair in their dealings with me 
feel that the audit team is inconsistent in their dealings 
with me (reverse) 





The [CDSS Development] team is good at its job 
I feel that support from the [CDSS Development] team is 
poor (reverse) 
I feel that the [CDSS Development] team are fair in their 
dealings with me 




Clinical Supervisors are good at their job 
I feel that support from Clinical Supervisors is poor 
(reverse) 
I feel that Clinical Supervisors are fair in their dealings 
with me 
I feel that Clinical supervisors are inconsistent in their 
dealings with me (reverse) 
I trust the Clinical Supervisors 
Callers 
 
I trust callers to tell the truth during calls 
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This document is an output from a research project that was commissioned by the 
Service Delivery and Organisation (SDO) programme whilst it was managed by the 
National Coordinating Centre for the Service Delivery and Organisation (NCCSDO) at 
the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. The NIHR SDO programme is now 
managed by the National Institute for Health Research Evaluations, Trials and Studies 
Coordinating Centre (NETSCC) based at the University of Southampton.  
Although NETSCC, SDO has managed the project and conducted the editorial review of 
this document, we had no involvement in the commissioning, and therefore may not 
be able to comment on the background of this document. Should you have any queries 
please contact sdo@southampton.ac.uk. 
 
